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THE RELIGIOUS ATTITUDE



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THE RELIGIOUS ATTITUDE

*A Psychological Study of Its
Differentiation*

BY
ANGUS STEWART WOODBURN

Introduction by
SHAILER MATHEWS

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INTRODUCTION

The historian of religion must pursue his way between the Scylla of primitivity and the Charybdis of philosophy. From each of them he may gain valued information, but to neither of them must he commit himself. Our literature is filled with treatises on the practices of uncivilized peoples, but there is too little study of the more complete religions. Indeed, one is tempted somewhat cynically to say that while the study of the religion of the Bantus is scientific, the study of the religion of Western civilization seems to need an apology. If such an antithesis be too radical, a study of the literature of the history of religion will show how unconsciously the student passes from the study of concrete religious attitudes and practices to religious doctrine and philosophy. No religion can be known by exclusive study of its sacred literature. But even less can it be understood by the neglect of its more complicated and finished stage. It is easy to say that philosophy becomes religion, but such a statement indicates a mental confusion. The psychology of philosophical thinking is very different from that of the devotee of religion. Neither by the study of primitive religious customs nor by the exposition of the rationalization of religious trust and hope can the religious attitude be expressed with fullness and accuracy.

It is one of the merits of Professor Woodburne's work that it has sprung not only from a wide orientation in religious science but from a fortunate first-hand acquaintance with the developed religion of India, as well as with Christianity. The more extensive a student's observation and experience, the more worthy of attention are his conclusions. That is, let it be quickly added, if he has no thesis to prove, but only conclusions to reach. I believe this to be true of Professor Woodburne. He has an academician's knowledge of primitivity, and in Madras he has also actual contact with two such divergent techniques as those of Christianity and Hinduism. As a result, he has made a thoroughly valuable contribution to the psychology of religion. With noteworthy exceptions, students in this field have not been in a position to make first-hand comparisons and inductions in the field of highly developed religions. The distinction which he draws between religious attitudes and the methods of scientific investigation has quickened his sense of the importance of the scientific method. For these reasons, as well as for its commendable reserve in making unqualified statements, Professor Woodburne's work is an example of well-directed research which, on the one side, is more than a doctor's thesis, and on the other, is more than a free speculation as to what religion may or may not be.

SHAILER MATTHEWS.

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CHAPTER I

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL METHOD IN THE STUDY OF RELIGION

THE use of the psychological method in the study of religion is of comparatively recent origin. Indeed the attempt to use any scientific method for examining religious facts is a strictly modern procedure. The first time that an educational institution attempted such a study was in 1884 when the Collège de France added Comparative Religion to its curriculum. In the first instance the proposal was met with much opposition, one of the professors remarking, "If religion be true, it is natural and you do not need to study it; if it be absurd, you do not want to study it." Since that time progress has been exceedingly rapid, and many scholars have laboured in the fields of the history and psychology of religions, greatly enlarging the stock of human knowledge in regard to these fields.

The question suggests itself as to what movements of thought made possible the beginnings of the scientific study of religion. A complete answer to the question would require a very extended study with many acknowledgments. It is impossible in this connection to do more than indicate a few of the more conspicuous influences. The age of discovery and invention gave

rise to the beginnings of induction. With Francis Bacon and Descartes the modern period in philosophy, characterized so distinctively by inductive reasoning, began. These men carried into the field of the mental processes the method of natural explanation which the astronomers had found to be very fruitful in their investigation of cosmic processes. From the seventeenth century onward, induction has been practically a synonym for scientific method, the method itself increasing in effectiveness as scientists have learned through experience the best way of using it. The use of the method of trial and error in the formulation and testing of hypotheses has been particularly serviceable in making the inductive method more objective and scientific.

Bacon and Descartes did little more than introduce the scientific spirit into philosophy, and their positive contributions are not nearly so significant as the contributions of those who built upon the foundations these men laid. The British philosophers, Locke, Berkeley and Hume made a great step forward in their critiques of the concepts of substance and cause, those concepts with which modern philosophy uncritically started. Locke attempted a treatment of the psychological origin of our ideas without metaphysical assumptions. Substance for Locke was the unknown bearer of perceived properties. The mind itself is a blank sheet on which sensation and reflection may write. Berkeley criticized the sensationalism of Locke and carried the analysis one step further. He wanted to know by what right Locke had assumed this unknown bearer. Locke's criticism of secondary qual-

ities, he claimed, was also applicable to his so-called primary qualities, and Hume added, to the mind itself as an object of knowledge. Berkeley believed that substance was a fiction which philosophy had inherited from the scholastics. Accordingly he substituted a complex of ideas for substance. "To be is to be perceived" was his formula.

The task of disintegrating the old metaphysical concepts of substance and cause, thus begun by Locke and Berkeley, was carried to completion by Hume. It was from the standpoint of the psychological principle of the association of ideas that he attacked the causal concept. He maintained that the causal connection between events which men assume is not a necessary connection intuitively recognized, neither something perceived nor yet an experience. It is rather something which is added by imagination to perception, a conclusion reached after successive observations of events in association. Perception can furnish us only with *post hoc*. It is through imagination that we conclude *propter hoc*. Hume is important for us not only for his psychological criticism of metaphysical concepts, but also for his investigation of religion. He wrote *The Natural History of Religions*, a volume whose very title is significant of the dawn of a new era. In mediæval thought "natural" and "history" were antithetical terms to "religion" and "revelation." He traced the beginnings of religion to primitive feelings of terror, fear and hope engendered by contact with nature, and these feelings, together with the contrast which he drew between the natural course of events in the cosmic order and the vicissitudes of human experi-

ence, led to the formation of ideas of higher powers which man attempted to conciliate and worship. The earliest form of religion was polytheism; and the history of religion is a history of a gradual transition from polytheism to monotheism.

The stream of reflection divided with Hume, different currents flowing in different directions. One stream flowed on through Lessing and Herder. These men continued to use the historical method in investigating the faiths of non-Christian peoples. Both of them were men of deeply religious natures and conceived of religion as a vital and mutual relation between God and man. Religion is impossible apart from revelation, and the history of religions is an account of God's revelations to man, and God's education of the human race, the revelations being characterized by a successiveness of deeper and profounder meanings as God gradually unfolded Himself to man. Both of these men had an evolutionary doctrine which anticipated that of Hegel, and which they applied to religion. God teaches one truth after another as men develop in the evolutionary process to the point of being ready for such revelations. Christianity is one step in the evolution of the highest spiritual religion. Nature and spirit are both elements in one great organism through which God reveals Himself.

Another stream which found its source in Hume was positivism. Comte, like Hume, found the origin of religion in human nature, in fear, hope and the causal impulse. Comte declared that supraphenomenal reality was unknowable to man, so that religion in , declaring the reality of God was an illusion, perhaps

even a delusion. Comte followed Hume in declaring that it was imagination which peopled the unseen world with powers. The doctrine of the unknowability of God was taken up by John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. The ground of their argument was that it is possible to know only phenomena. Religion thus introduces man to the realm of the super-experiential. The positivistic contention is that the beginning of human history gives us cultureless religion, but at the end we may expect religionless culture. An open-minded investigation of the place which religion has occupied and still occupies in human life must convince us that positivism is too doctrinaire to be *scientific*. Its only notable contribution for our purposes was the investigation of religion as a social product of human experience, a point in which it has affinity with social psychology.

In some respects the most important work which Hume accomplished was that of awakening Kant "from his dogmatic slumbers." The period of the Enlightenment found its culmination in him and his critical method. He examined the form in which the principles of reason appeared in connection with their capacity for being employed necessarily and universally in experience. His work was thus a critique, not only of the content of consciousness but of the reasoning process itself in its various functions. He examined the traditional metaphysical arguments for the existence of God, the physico-theological, the cosmological and the ontological, and showed that they were unwarranted objectifications of the principles of reason. He therefore denied the possibility of demonstrating the

existence of God by philosophical argument. In place of the traditional arguments he set up the moral argument, claiming that it is necessary for the moral life to posit the existence of God. Religion for him rested upon interpreting moral laws as divine commandments. In his work, *Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason*, he claimed that he had destroyed knowledge to make room for faith. Thus Kant contributed to the emancipation of religion on the one hand from metaphysical dogmatism, and on the other hand from theological ethics.

Another name which is associated with the newer view of religion is that of Schleiermacher. His work was of especial significance from the psychological point of view, since he found the basis of religion in the feelings. He defined religion as "the feeling of absolute dependence." From that feeling there arose the God-consciousness which provides the power needed by human nature for its moral perfection. This emphasis on feeling was the result of a violent reaction against the contemporary rationalism of the deists, and its error was the error of all violent reactions in swinging to the opposite extreme. The influence of Schleiermacher on the philosophy of religion has been twofold. In the first place he left an impression which it has been difficult to eradicate that there is a necessary opposition between the cognitive and affective factors in religion. It has been difficult for the intellectual element in religion to regain recognition since the days of Schleiermacher. But on the other hand he was one of the pioneers in the examination of the religious consciousness from the psychological view-

point, and the possibility of progress in the use of that method owes much to the work of the German theologian.

The nineteenth century saw a new impetus to the scientific study of religion coming from the side of history. The increasing use of the inductive method was responsible for a keener desire to broaden the range of human observations. A thoroughgoing observation of any human institution involves an investigation of how it came to be in the historical process, of the social atmosphere in which it was created and the order of sequence in its development. This method has been exceedingly fruitful in dealing with the facts of religion. It has rescued religion from the realm of the abstract and enabled students to deal with concrete facts. It has supplanted religion by religions, each of them related to particular social situations on the background of which they must be interpreted.

The historical method furnishes a survey of the way or ways in which human products have functioned and have altered to meet the exigencies of social situations. It also furnished the data for the work of classification and evaluation. By the use of the historical method one is compelled to appreciate the functional significance of all human creations. The mediaeval way was to try to give an account of truth through syllogistic processes; the modern scientific method investigates the worth of ideas and institutions in the historical process. That leads to an understanding of the relative character of all thought products, and of the necessity of working with a true organon. The organon to which the historical study of religion points

is that of its competency to do something for man which he needs to have done and which cannot be accomplished in any other way.

The historical method inculcates the habit of intellectual honesty. Actual problems demanding solution, concrete needs demanding satisfaction, social tensions demanding adjustment—such are the types of facts with which the historical study of religions confronts us. The deductive method is normative. It operates very well when the major premise is scientifically credible, but breaks down when called upon to explain exceptions. But the historical method is just as much interested in exceptions as in rules. Its first consideration is an accurate account of facts, the theoretical interpretation being entirely subsidiary to that. It is thus an out-and-out objective method, uncontrolled by any motive to reduce life to syllogisms. In religion this means the emancipation of the science of religion from theological dogma, and perfect freedom to observe and record the facts of religious experience without reference to *a priori* judgments.

A historical study involves the application of the genetic method. An interest in the functional value of an institution or discipline leads to an investigation of how it came to be in an evolutionary process. The present is not an isolated present, but has gathered up into it the past with all its experiences of struggle and achievement. Historical study makes it plain that no period has a right to claim a monopoly of spiritual values. But the values themselves are social achievements the meaning of which can be understood only by reference to their functional significance. That

means that the natural complement of a historical study is a psychological one. It is by the psychological method that the functional significance of an institution becomes clear. Social psychology enables us to place a religion in the social stream where it originated, and to relate the facts to the larger social whole in which the religion operates. History supplies us with a record of the facts; psychology relates them to the social consciousness of which they are expressions. The historical study has more concern with objectively observable facts, external forms and overt activities. For a scientific account of any religion the scrupulous accuracy which history demands is of the utmost importance. Already it has rescued students of religion from such unhealthy methods as manipulating facts to conform to theological theory, and of making comparisons which are as odious in religion as elsewhere.

There is no doubt that the historical study of religions has come to stay. It took a long time to emancipate it from the control of vested interests, and even at first these interests tried to assert themselves in the comparative method. A comparative study of religions may serve a useful purpose if it be carried on with meticulous scientific care, but it is exceedingly difficult to avoid the danger of being unfair. Some of the earlier studies in comparative religion were contrasts between a divine revelation, true and necessary, and human inventions, false and mischievous; but such studies are usually both unscientific and immoral. Of course the significance of the comparison is only with reference to a norm, and that implies some a-

priori conceptions with which the student begins his work. The historical study of religions is not concerned with trying to compare and contrast so much as with tracing the development of a particular religion with reference to the other phases of the life of which it forms an integral part. Historical studies are thus as a rule studies of particular sects, cults, doctrines or movements, and they are wholly concerned to know the truth about such particulars. On account of the social character of religion, now clearly recognized, and the necessity of studying each religion in particular with reference to the social life, it has latterly become a subject to which social anthropologists have devoted no little attention. Anthropologists, with their investigations of folkways, social institutions, and in short everything related to the social life, have very largely increased our knowledge of the function of religion in the social life. In so doing they have coöperated very cordially with historians, and both together have placed the student of religion under a very heavy debt of gratitude.

Anthropology and history thus furnish us with the facts in regard to religious experience. But the student is not yet satisfied; for there are certain gaps because of the incompleteness of the records. Further he would like to know what were the mental factors which determined the succession of religious occurrences, what were the causes for the origin of religious phenomena, and how the religious consciousness itself originated. Obviously these are functional problems which transcend the limits of a historical investigation, and belong to the province of that science which

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studies mental processes, individual and social—psychology. The study of historical records is of far-reaching value in enabling students to be faithful to facts. But after the facts have been assembled, there still remains the task of interpreting their significance with reference to human interests, motives and sentiments, a task which necessitates the coöperation of the psychologist.

The advance made in psychological science itself is happily coincident with its use as a method for studying the phenomena of religion. In particular the change from the faculty to the functional psychology, and the progress made in social psychology have been significant. We are learning more about the social element in personality, and the fact that the individual's consciousness, mental and moral, is realized only in a social atmosphere. The rise of religion is in the corporate life of the group. Furthermore the religion of any folk involves a socializing of the supermundane world on the analogy of its own social structure. It is thus in the life experiences of folks, considered historically and socially, environmentally and organically, that we find the genesis and value of religious experience. For behaviour is socially determined both as to origin and direction. So that history and psychology alike lead into the sphere of social investigation.

The faculty method of dealing with the mental life, involving a tripartite division of the processes, made it difficult to account for the religious consciousness. Philosophers sought first in one and then in another of the faculties of the mind or soul the dominating

influence. Descartes emphasized the faculty of judgment as a result of which man was for him little more than a cognitive mechanism and God an epistemological device. Pascal shifted the emphasis from cognition to feeling, as is evident from his famous dictum, "Le cœur a ses raisons que le raison ne connaît pas." With Kant we have a further shift, this time to the will or practical reason, and in the practical reason he found the guarantee of our faith in God, freedom and immortality. Another outcome of the faculty psychology was the tendency to keep religion as a thing apart from the other interests of life, a tendency which we see in Lotze and Ritschl. Ritschl tried to make religion quite independent of science, by declaring that religion gives us value-judgments whereas science gives us existence-judgments, as if value and existence could be separated into compartments. The great difficulty of the faculty psychologists was their compartmentalized view of life which robbed it of the fundamental fact of unity. When applied to religion it tended to make it a particular affair of one faculty instead of being a vital concern of the whole life, and thus it entailed the exceedingly difficult problem of trying to invent some principle of unity.

The transition to the functional psychology was a change from the physical to the biological approach, a change from the structural and static to the dynamic view of the mental life. The gist of the matter is that the human organism is an integral unity, psycho-neural in character, and that neither the mental nor the neural elements have any separate existence. The habit we have of talking of body, mind or spirit as if

they were separate entities serves certain practical or theoretical ends, but we never experience them in separation. Our responses to stimuli are the responses of a single integral organism. The mental and neural processes are everywhere interconnected and inter-related. A second characteristic of the functional psychology is that it places the emphasis on processes and tendencies rather than on forms, structures and states. It views the mental life as a process of adaptation through which the organism adjusts itself to the environment, and in the sphere of these adjustments there emerge the conscious attitudes, of which the religious attitude is one. The functional approach is in line with genetic study through which we are able to trace the development of the processes from simpler and native types to more complex, acquired behaviour. It is not accidental that group psychology should develop at the same time as functional psychology, for it is really one manifestation of the newer view of the mental life. The psychologist is interested in every determinant of the directions of mental tendencies, and it is easily appreciated that the traditional ways of thinking and acting—the folkways—of the society of which one is a member are probably greater than any other determinant of individual behaviour. This point of view is of profound significance for all the mental processes, including the instincts, the emotions and the attitudes, matters of first-rate importance in the psychological investigation of religion.

The functional point of view in religion means that you view the religious consciousness as an integral phase of the whole conscious life. You study the facts

of the religious life, not as elements distinct and separable from the other elements of experience, but as particular responses to definite stimuli. Religious experience is a complex of attitudes, sentiments and overt actions, each of which ought to be analyzed from the point of view of biological reactions. The experiences of life present certain situations which demand responses of a religious character. The exigencies of experience invoke feelings of need which can be satisfied only by religious means. From the functional point of view psychology investigates these experiences of felt need and examines the way or ways in which man seeks to attain satisfaction for them when he is religious.

This approach to the study of religion is of far-reaching importance. It involves little less than a revolution in method. Instead of the traditional dogmatic method which began with its *a priori* conceptions of the results which must be attained, it substitutes the method of open-minded inquiry with a readiness to accept and record whatever facts come to light. The appeal is to function rather than to origins. The interest is not that of trying to establish absolute truth or falsity with reference to the different forms and beliefs, but of seeking to understand what need was satisfied, what motive released, what tension relieved, what interest served or what emotion expressed. Religious practices and ideas can be neither understood nor explained apart from the mental and social complex in which they emerge and to which they minister. The religious consciousness is thus related to the whole conscious life, individual and

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social. This method of study has engendered a mutual understanding and sympathy hitherto unknown, while at the same time it has added scholarly contributions to the science of religion.

The mental life is exceedingly complex. The fact of complexity is one which impresses the student of the religious consciousness. This makes the matter of logical definition enormously difficult. The facts of religious experience are so multiform in their significance, their intensity, their degree of differentiation from other social facts, their cultural associations, as well as their geographical and chronological references, that the formulation of a definition of religion is increasingly difficult. One wonders, in view of the bewildering variety of phenomena that are described as religious, whether the attempt is desirable. One thing is certain. Religion, like science and art, is a collective term. There is no such thing as pure, abstract religion apart from the concrete, historical forms any more than there is pure science, pure art or pure ethics apart from the various sciences and arts and ethical systems. A definition of religion would be an abstraction of the elements common to all the concrete forms, and the task of formulating a definition is primarily logical. But inasmuch as the elements in common are chiefly mental or spiritual, while the cult side exhibits such a breadth of variety, the only kind of definition that could do justice to the situation must be psychological. Can we ascertain, with any degree of assurance, what the elements are which are characteristic of the attitude of mind experienced by people when they are religious? Such an

attempt to describe the religious consciousness is more likely to be scientifically successful than the attempt to formulate a definition. In other words a psychology of religion is more scientifically achievable than a logic of religion. It is more feasible to ascertain the attitude of mind common to all people when they are religious than to formulate a definition that will be commensurate with the great variety of individual religious experiences, practices and beliefs. It is only by this psychological approach that we may hope to ascertain the essential attributes of these expressions of conscious minds. The possibility of discovering a unifying tendency behind the multiplicity of religious phenomena is in a common attitude of consciousness which characterizes men everywhere when they are religious.

Various attempts have been made to describe the processes of consciousness when the response is religious. Religious experience is so much an affair of the total personality that it is difficult to define its psychological limits. Some have attempted to locate religion among the instincts. If the biological definition of instinctive behaviour be accepted, it will be seen that it is behaviour which does not require the functioning of the cerebral cortex and therefore belongs to a level below that of consciousness, consciousness when present being only a spectator. On the other hand it is quite possible to account for the development of the conscious attitudes out of instinctive reactions, even as it is possible to show that all acquired reactions are developed out of the material of native reactions. Though religious reactions are

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conscious, still it is possible to trace their roots in those ineradicable native types of behaviour which one calls instinctive. Other scholars have endeavoured to identify religion psychologically as an emotion or a sentiment. In either case the emphasis is on the feeling character of the experience. While it is true that the affective is a prominent part of religious experience, it is not doing justice to religion as a concern of the whole personality to identify it with feeling. Some of the psycho-analytic school refer to religion as a projection of consciousness which is equivalent to describing it in terms of the imagination. There is no doubt of the activity of the creative imagination in the operations of the religious consciousness, but to deny that there is any objective stimulus to the religious reaction is a metaphysical interpretation of the experience which it is beyond the province of psychology to make.

The psychological conclusion which seems to be best warranted from the observable facts of religious experience that are so widespread and so multiform is that religion has taken its rise within the field of man's social attitudes towards the extra-human environment. By an attitude is meant a disposition to attend or to act in a characteristic manner. Attitudes are indeed the unifying tendencies of conscious life. The attitudes indicate the way in which mental development takes place through the organization of experience. They may be grouped on one basis into habits of conservation and modification according to the human need to conserve an acquisition or to modify a type. Another basis for classification is into the

social and the mechanical, according as the object to which the attitude is directed is conceived as a person or a mechanism. Now religion is the habitual disposition to seize upon the spiritual elements in the environment, the effort to organize and conserve them in the interests of the larger life. It originates and functions within the field of social relationships, having for its reference the cosmic environment. There is no other concept, logical or psychological, that so completely describes and includes the multitude of forms and activities which are expressions of the religious consciousness.

The religious attitude is based on the assumption that the universe is amenable to social manipulation and treatment. Although it has grown out of an ineradicable impulse in life, and is a persistently appearing product of the social consciousness, yet it is not always easy to differentiate it from other mental attitudes. It is not a compartment of consciousness, and neither are our other attitudes such as the æsthetic or the moral. It is one possible aspect of a unified consciousness, the aspect which consciousness assumes when the person is socializing with his cosmic environment. But it does not preclude the presence of other attitudes at the same time or closely related in time. It is a *person* who is religious or moral or æsthetic, and he may be all three at the same time. The mental attitudes must not be conceived as existing in isolation. They are constantly intersecting and interacting, and have mutual effects on one another. This makes the task of differentiation all the more difficult. The logical task involves dif-

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ferentiating the religious attitude from the magical, the scientific, the æsthetic and the moral. This includes an examination of the relation between religion and each of the other disciplines of thought. Since each represents an activity of conscious minds, the method of approach which meets the situation most satisfactorily is the psychological.

CHAPTER II

THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND MAGIC

THE relation between religion and magic is essentially a problem of primitive culture. It takes us back to the earliest stage of human culture, and involves much that is really prehistory. This is true because religion had its origin in such lowly beginnings, and magic not only originated in but belongs to that stage of culture. It is in the beliefs and practices of the primitive races that we are able to observe religion and magic in concrete relationship. Sometimes we find the kinship persisting even beyond the primitive period, but we always find it there. The tendency is with the more cultured races to free religion as completely as possible from magic, and to repudiate magic as inadequate and spurious. The growth of scientific knowledge is particularly incompatible to the persistence of magical ways of thinking and acting. Experience has shown that religion can persist and function alongside of science; but magic cannot. Magic belongs essentially to the pre-scientific period of human history. Religion, while varying in form and in clearness, belongs both to the pre-scientific and the scientific periods. It functions alike in an age of magic and an age of science. The change from magical to scientific ways of thinking

is always gradual. We may compare the age of magic to the childhood of the race, and the age of science to full-blown manhood, in which case we must say that the adolescent period of culture is often very long. So that we actually find religion and magic in relationship not alone in savage society, but far down into the period of culture, when mankind is making the slow change from the magical to the scientific. The ultimate disintegration of magic is not the work of religion, but of science. Magic may exist perhaps side by side with religion, but not with science.

The differentiation which we make between religion and magic is the product of the higher mental processes, processes which could have come into operation only when the human race had achieved a fair degree of development. The lives of peoples in the more primitive stages of culture are compounded of a medley of customs and practices with no effort at analyzing or classifying them into various groups or concepts. In such a society it is not possible to select some elements and attach a label, "Primitive man's religion," and still others which can be captioned "The magic of primitive man," and so on with art, morality and science. To be sure we, with our analytical training, can examine this social complex, and identify certain elements which developed into the various human disciplines. But we should not infer that they were so differentiated in primitive society. The lower the stratum of society the fewer are the wants of man, and the simpler are his ways of seeking to satisfy those wants. With the increasing of population, the contact between groups of people, and the ever-present

need to secure a plentiful supply of food, crises were sure to arise. And it was the crisis which engendered the higher thought processes, as well as the practical techniques that were evolved. So long as life's needs could be supplied pretty much on the level of nature, man lived largely on the instinctive level. The earliest efforts which the human race made to tide over critical situations were crude from the viewpoint of modern man. There had not yet been accrued a body of experience whereby finer methods of adjustment could be made, and more reasoned solutions to problems attained. It is a mistake therefore to try to read back into the behaviour of the primitive races those differentiations which are so common to our ways of thinking. Life for them was an undifferentiated continuum. The elements of religion, magic, art, science and morality were all there, but none of these had achieved a distinct existence.

The particular situations where religion and magic have most frequently functioned conjointly are the occasions of the ceremonial. The central occasions for the performance of the ceremonial are the critical times in the experiences of the group. They include such occurrences as births, initiations, marriages, deaths, wars, the seasons, diseases, pestilences and unusual events. The ceremonials are a reflection of the interests and activities of the group, and the objects of the cult represent the focal points in the practical interests and attention of the community. The ceremonials belong generically to folkways or group customs, being customs of a particular design and purpose, the character of which is social and pub-

lic, because they have to do with the larger life of the group. Inasmuch as they have grown up as responses to meet the felt needs of the group, they are times of intense emotional stress. The great needs included the securing of a sufficient supply of food, the perpetuation of the life of the group, the overcoming of enemies, the control of the weather, the avoidance of danger, the care of the dead and the like. These were matters of extreme importance. The very existence of the group was believed very often to be at stake in the proper and regular performance of the ritual. Consequently meticulous care was exercised as to the details to insure that nothing be omitted that was required for the welfare of the community. Some of the ceremonies were in the nature of dramatic reproductions of the nature processes and biological processes which it was felt desirable to make certain. It must be clear that with such aims and such means of securing the accomplishment of these aims there was certain to be an admixture of religion and magic. There was religion because one of the means employed was the worship and propitiation of deities who were deemed to be in control of the forces concerning the operation of which it was desirable to make certain. The worship of gods of agriculture, war, rain, fire, luck, fertility, death and other special departments of human interest are obviously connected with vital interests concerning which man has experienced a sense of need. But there was also the attempt to bring about the satisfaction of these needs by coercion of the forces believed to be involved in a mysterious way in their operation, that is to say by

magic. Through religion men sought to influence and propitiate powers whose favour was sought; through magic they tried to coerce them. And the ceremonial might involve either worship or coercion or both together. It might be religious or magical or magico-religious.

A good illustration of the association of magic with religion in the ceremonial is in the rain-making ceremony which is practised in South India. From Vedic times there has been a tradition that rain was due to the deity Varuna (the god of the heavens, an Indo-European deity, equivalent to the Avestan Ahura and Greek Ouranos). Consequently if the rain fails in the season when it is normally due, the people are in the habit of offering sacrifices to Varuna. These sacrifices are accompanied by the recitation of spells (mantras) which are believed to have magical power in coercing the deity to send the needed rain. In one type of Varuna *pūja* that is in use the Brahmans gather and offer oblations and prayers to him. The head priest stands waist-deep in the water of a river or pond (an artificial tank will not suffice), reads from the Veda and invokes Varuna under his various names. Following this ceremony certain people are feasted with all sweet dishes. This rite is repeated for forty-four consecutive days, that is, one *mandala*, after which rain may be expected. The God Indra has also been regarded as the god of the storm whose mighty weapon is the thunderbolt, and in time of drought great sacrifices are offered to him so that he will take up the battle against Vritra, the demon who keeps the water imprisoned in the thick clouds. In the Samaveda

there is an ancient hymn, the Sakvari, believed to have the power of Indra's thunderbolt when properly recited by a Brahman priest. On account of its great power he who would *exorcise* it was compelled to retire to the jungle and observe certain regulations such as touching water three times a day, eating black food, wearing black clothes and sitting continuously in the rain when it fell. When it thundered, he muttered: "The Great One is making a noise." When the lightning flashed, he said: "That is like the Sakvari song." He was prohibited from crossing a stream without touching the water; or going aboard a ship except to save a life, and then he had to touch water. "For in water lies the virtue of the Sakvari song." Obviously the black garments and black food were mimetic of the blackness of thunderclouds. The ceremonial as well as the preparations for it were in the nature of magical practices and formulas designed to give the Brahman priest power equal to the divine power of Indra. The Atharva Veda is a collection of similar magical charms which were used in the magico-religious ceremonials to achieve the desired ends.

But in South India there are other imitative rites that are practiced for the same purpose. The Kapus of the Telugu country have a practice which is depicted by Thurston and Rangachari. In describing Jokumara worship they say:

The figure represents Jokumara, who will bring down rain when insulted by people treading on him. Another kind of Jokumara worship also prevails in this district (Bellary). When rain fails, the Kapu females model a figure of a naked human being of small size.

They place this figure in an open mock palanquin, and go from door to door singing indecent songs and collecting alms. They continue this procession for three or four days, and then abandon the figure in a field adjacent to the village. The Malas then take possession of this abandoned Jokumara, and in their turn go about singing indecent songs and collecting alms for three or four days, and then throw it away in some jungle. This form of Jokumara worship is also believed to bring down plenty of rain. There is another simple superstition among Kapu females. When rain fails, the Kapu females catch hold of a frog, and tie it alive to a new winnowing fan made of bamboo. On this fan, leaving the frog visible, they spread a few margosa leaves, and go singing from door to door: "Lady frog must have her bath. O Rain-god, give a little water for her at least." This means that the drought has reached such a stage that there is not even a drop of water for the frogs. When the Kapu woman sings this song, the woman of the house brings a little water in a vessel, pours it over the frog which is left on the fan outside the door, and gives some alms. The woman of the house is satisfied that such an action will bring down rain in torrents.¹

Another rain-making ceremony called in Tamil *Malai Soru* is performed in the Coimbatore district. Certain persons go through the village, begging food from every household. Food is given in abundance, and is placed in a wide-mouthed vessel around which the begging group dances as they sing hymns in invocation of the rain-god. After much food has been secured, it is distributed among the poor, generally the "untouchables," and the rain-makers go to the

¹ *Castes and Tribes of Southern India*, III, pp. 244, 245.

temple continuing to sing and dance. In the Tinnevely district certain tree spirits are regarded as having the power to induce rain, make the crops to grow, the herds to increase and women to beget children, the obvious significance being the association of rain with fertility. In the same district certain stones are deemed to be able to procure rain if they are dipped in water, and mantras repeated over them. The members of one sect of the Todas, a primitive tribe in the Nilgiri hills, wet their sacred stones when rain is desired, and dry them before the fire if they wish to induce the sun to shine again.

In 1908 an elaborate rain-making ceremony was performed in the Sri Anjaneya temple at Vizianagram, to appease the wrath of the gods and cause the clouds to grant rain in plenty. This ceremony was called *Sahasra Ghatta Abhishekam* (literally, thousand pot anointing), and consisted in emptying one thousand new pots of ghee (clarified butter), curds, whey and milk over the head of the idol, while the head priest recited mantras. It took five hours to complete the ceremony, and certain of the people maintained a vow to eat only fruit and drink only water until their prayers were answered. Happily for the people the rain came on the fourth day, and of course it was attributed to the efficacy of the ceremony, and the fifth day was made a day of rejoicing and feasting in which the priest-magician was accorded due honours.

The inter-connection of religion and magic is demonstrable by scores of examples such as the one given. It comes out in other ways of attempting to control the weather.* Efforts are made to compel the

sun to shine forth again when rain is excessive. When rain falls in excess, it is a common practice in South India to throw fire out of doors in the belief that fire possesses the property of preventing rain from falling. The worship of Surya the sun-god is also performed to induce him to shine again. Attempts are made to control the wind, in India prayers to Vayu being mingled with mantras, and sacrificial fires are built to stay a storm. In all of this we may observe the double effort to gain control—by gaining the good will of the deity, and by setting free natural forces through fulfilling the conditions necessary to their operation. And it is not until reflection is considerably advanced that there seems to arise any sense of incongruity between the two modes of operation.

Another typical illustration of ceremonials in which religious and magical elements are frequently fused is purificatory rites. Defilement may be the result of breaking a tabu. Tabu itself is a mixture of the two elements. It is largely associated with the idea of the sacred. But sacredness among primitive peoples is regarded as fraught with danger for any except those set apart to take care of such matters, or at times other than those prescribed for sacred matters. Consequently the idea of sanctity involving danger led to the idea of avoidance. The breaking of a tabu involved the transfer of magical force to the harm of the offender. Its *modus operandi* is such that it is regarded by most psychologists as negative magic. Defilement and purification were alike ceremonial matters, associated with the critical occasions in human life, both natural and social. Here again there

is an abundance of illustrative material in India today. The law books define the nature of impurities (*āsaucha*) and the methods to be followed in attaining purification (*suddhi*). The outstanding occasions of defilement are contact with the dead, contact with the smoke of a cremation, childbirth, menstruation, unchastity, contact with lowest castes, contact with the corpses of certain animals, partaking certain foods, contact with impure excretions, contact with certain cooking utensils, journeying across the ocean, and certain minor occasions such as sneezing, spitting, or having the hair cut. The methods of purification include the *prayaschittam* (partaking the five products of the cow), bathing in sacred rivers (especially the Ganges), sprinkling with water, rubbing with ashes, reciting mantras, offering prayers, performing religious ceremonies, fasting for a definite period, and investiture with the sacred thread. Pollution from contact with impure excretions may be removed by washing the part affected; pollution caused by spitting or sneezing by sipping water. Defilement of iron vessels by alcohol or by bodily excretions could be purified by fire; of stone or shell by burial in a pit for a period of seven days; of horn, ivory or bone by being scraped. But more serious pollutions demand more drastic treatment. The rules in regard to food are numerous and meticulous. Drinking intoxicating liquor was considered a mortal sin on a par with killing a Brahman, and offering it to a Brahman might bring on the offender capital punishment. A Brahman who had been defiled by contact with a Çudra could be purified by fasting twelve days, or by partaking

of the five products of the cow one day and fasting the next. Bathing in sacred rivers, particularly the Ganges, and the recitation of daily prayers are especially efficacious.

An account is given in the article on Kapus already quoted in the manual on *Castes and Tribes of Southern India*, which indicates the elaborateness with which purificatory rites are conducted today.

The purification ceremony for a house defiled by the unchastity of a maid or a widow is rather an elaborate affair. Formerly a Kolakkaran (hunter), a Tottiyar (scavenger), a priest of the village goddess, a Chakkilayan (leather-worker), and a Vavani Nayakkan (priest of a deity Bavani) had to be present. The Tottiyar is now sometimes dispensed with. The Kolakkaran and the Bavani Nayakkan burn some kamacchi grass, and put the ashes in three pots of water. The Tottiyar then worships Pillayar (Ganesa) in the form of some turmeric, and pours the turmeric into the water. The members of the polluted household then sit in a circle, while the Chakkilayan carries a black kid around the circle. He is pursued by the Bavani Nayakkan, and both together cut off the animal's head, and bury it. The guilty parties have then to tread on the place where the head is buried, and the turmeric and ash water is poured over them.¹

The ideas of pollution and methods of illustration vary among different groups. In Cochin the matter of pollution is worked out in great detail. A Nayar may pollute a higher caste only by touch; Kammalans (i.e. masons, blacksmiths, carpenters and leather-workers), at a distance of twenty-four feet; toddy-

¹ *Castes and Tribes of Southern India*, III, p. 248.

drawers (Iluvans or Triyans), at thirty-six feet; Pula-yans or Cheruman cultivators, at forty-eight feet; and beef-eating Paraiyans, at sixty-four feet. A low-caste man on greeting a superior should stand still and hold his right hand over his mouth lest any particle of his breath or saliva, both of which may pollute, should come in contact with the superior. Pollution is applicable to the gods also. One informant relates that in his village the image of Ganesa is turned so as to face in the opposite direction from a woman experiencing a difficult confinement, and when the confinement is over it is purified by pouring water, placing flowers and burning camphor, after which it is restored to its original position. At the beginning of every Hindu ritual a purification rite (*punya vachana*, literally evocation of merit) is observed. The following prayer is repeated on *Avani Avittam* day, and is regarded as purifying from certain forms of defilement: "Base passion did it. Virulent anger did it. Passion was the doer—not I. Anger was the doer—not I. Passion was the instigator—not I. Anger was the abettor—not I. Thus I make amends for my wrongs."

The study of animism discloses another class of phenomena which indicate how closely religion and magic are associated in the behaviour of more primitive peoples. The animist believes that the entire environment is populated by spirits, which have this in common with men, that they are willful and vacillating, but have the advantage over them in that they are not confined by a body which limits their capability of movement and location. The typical events which gave rise to the belief in animism are illustra-

tions of the magical way of reasoning. The savage knew what sort of fortunes would visit his enemies and his friends if he were in control, and consequently he assumed when he observed such fortunes visited upon others or when he experienced them himself that they were the results of an alien will, more powerful to accomplish its desires than was he. It is a common occurrence to hear a South Indian villager, whose crops are a failure, or whose household has suffered from the ravages of disease or death, exclaim, "What have I done to bring upon me the anger of the deity?" The mental attitude which traces a necessary connection between unusual events and a will of the alien power is of a piece with magic. Indeed some scholars include will-magic in their classifications of magic. We may, however, carry the matter back to the origin of animistic ideas themselves which further illustrate the magical way of reasoning. It was the observation of such mysterious phenomena as death, shadows and dreams which induced the belief that there was a spirit apart from a body, and that this spirit was not subject to dissolution in the same sense as the body.

The perennial effort for control over environing forces of all kinds naturally included the world of spirits. Spirits were regarded as amenable to both the religious and magical types of control, both propitiation and coercion, sometimes separately and sometimes together. Spirits may be either benevolent or malevolent, but the tendency is to regard them as supernatural. Some of the more common forms which animistic beliefs and practices take are ancestor wor-

ship, beliefs in demon possession and rites of exorcism, beliefs in tree spirits, fire spirits, water spirits, mountain spirits and spirits in stones with their accompanying cults, beliefs in spirits as inhabiting heavenly bodies and powers of nature, beliefs in fairies, goblins, gnomes, dryads and such tiny invisible folk, personification of abstract qualities such as luck or fury, belief in presiding genii over various departments of life, divinations, oracles and inspirations. The ramifications of animism are vast indeed; affecting, as must be apparent, so many human interests, and covering such a long stretch of human history. Indeed the influence of animism does not stop with our primitive ancestors, but pervades the social life of the great majority of human races today.

It would be possible to find many examples from the sphere of animism to illustrate the association between things religious and things magical. One field which is particularly fruitful in suggestiveness is that of beliefs and rites connected with demon possession and exorcism. The belief in the existence of malevolent spirits arises from a magical way of reasoning. The savage peoples the world about him with a myriad of fairies, ghosts and demons that haunt him and hover about him. The mishaps that he suffers he credits to the witchcraft of an enemy, or to the anger or caprice of a demon. Disease, famine, accidents, poverty, childless parenthood, abortions, visitations of fire, storm or earthquake, death or any other calamity are all alike interpreted in this way. The evidence that such beliefs are associated with magical ways of thinking is greatly strengthened by the fact

that the methods employed for getting rid of them are so largely magical. The calamities themselves are viewed as the result of black magic, and the way to overcome them often includes counter magic. Small-pox, cholera and plague are regularly regarded by the people of South India as due to the machinations of certain deities who are angry. When such pestilences break out, the community arranges for special propitiatory sacrifices and rites to stay the deity's anger. In Travancore the worship of demons is widely practised. A case is recorded of a man worshipping the image of a slave whom he had murdered in order to appease the spirit of the victim. Various types of amulets, including rolls of palm leaves and copper plates, worn about the neck are calculated to keep demons at a distance. Gardens and fields of grain are protected from the evil eye by hanging up earthen pots with spots of lime daubed on them. Houses are believed to be haunted by the spirits of people who have died there, and various ceremonies are periodically performed to prevent the spirits from harming the inhabitants. Illnesses are believed to be the work of sorcery. A case was related to me of a woman in Vizagapatam who was suffering from persistent fever and pains which travelled from one part of the body to another with no apparent reason. It was at length discovered that her son-in-law had been exercising black art by preparing pictures to represent her which he used to abuse by dislocating the limbs and otherwise crippling the body, meanwhile repeating mantras, fasting, and invoking his patron deity at dead of night.

The manner of driving out devils is also magico-

religious. There are certain men in Southern India who are renowned for their ability in such matters. This ability is believed to consist in an extraordinary control of magical power due to holiness, austerities or initiation into the particular cult by an older guru. Magicians who are about to exorcise demons will sit down with the patient in front of them. The magician makes certain geometrical figures on the floor or ground between himself and his patient, using powder of turmeric, charcoal, rice, lime, and the leaves of certain trees for drawing the designs. Some enchanted water, into which turmeric, lime and powdered rice are mixed, is prepared; in some cases the patient is sprinkled with this water, and at the same time asked to drink a small portion of it. On some occasions the magician ties a rope by a big thread in a particular way, muttering incantations while doing so, or he may drive nails in a block of wood, which is sometimes shaped into an image of a human being. The knots tied in the rope and the nails driven in the wood correspond to the number of spirits supposed to possess the person, and they are supposed to tie up or pierce the demons. On occasions the patient is beaten with the object of driving out the evil spirit. Sometimes the exorcised spirit is nailed to a tree or cast into a river to prevent its return. Many times the magician refuses to begin his work until suitable offerings are made to the deity whom he invokes and by whose aid the devils are driven out. Different deities or temples are renowned for the exorcism of different kinds of evil spirits.

One instance which has come under my observation

will illustrate the typical manner in which such rites are performed. A young Brahman lad of twelve or thirteen years was taken with strange fits of illness in which he would lose consciousness and his chest would heave with heavy breathing. The trouble was diagnosed as demon possession due to the family inhabiting a house which had been built on a site said to have been used as a burial ground for children fifty years before, and consequently haunted by evil spirits. A holy man with a reputation as an exorcist was summoned, after medical help had failed. This man prepared some holy ashes with which he drew a geometrical figure in which he wrote some magic letters, at the same time chanting mantras. Then he called on the patient to describe what he saw, and the lad described a vision containing a tank with a solitary red lotus flower, a charmingly beautiful woman, a giant and a lion. The ugly giant appeared to give chase to the boy and the magician bade him ask the woman's help. Thereupon the lion attacked the giant, but the giant soon conquered the lion, and came on towards the boy. Then the woman attacked the giant with a three-pronged spear and completely vanquished him, till he begged for mercy and promised to depart. Then the woman bade the boy always call for her help, calling her by name, promising that she would come to his assistance if he were in trouble. When the boy awoke from his trance he described the woman, the lion, the giant, and the tank, but knew nothing of the struggle which had taken place. Obviously the giant represented the evil spirit which had been the cause of his troubles for about a year.

And from the description of the woman, the boy's friends recognized her as the goddess *Prathyangiras* as depicted in the sacred books. After the exorcism the magician initiated the boy into the cult of the goddess, and he says that she appears to him daily and saves him from further demoniacal annoyances.

The phenomena associated with fetishism afford further illustration of the inter-relationship between religion and magic in primitive society. Fetishism has been defined as the worship of inanimate objects such as stocks and stones which are material and tangible, and are worshipped in their own right. In that sense fetishism may be contrasted with idolatry where the object is regarded as a symbol, and is therefore not ordinarily worshipped on its own account. The word "fetish" is derived through the Portuguese *feitico* from the passive form *facticius* of the Latin verb *facere*, to do, and therefore etymologically carries the meaning of a work of art or something artificial. Some scholars^{*} are of opinion that the word was first applied to such artificial or handmade objects as idols, images, and amulets, and that later it came to include all objects deemed to possess magical potency or bewitched. The Portuguese first coined the word in the fifteenth century when their explorers came in contact with peculiar forms now associated with fetishism in Africa. But a closer examination of the phenomena makes it very doubtful whether any definite line of demarcation can be drawn between fetishism and idolatry on the basis that the latter embodies symbolism whereas the former does not, for fetishes

^{*} A. C. Haddon: *Magic and Fetishism* (London, Constable, 1906).

are also sometimes symbolic, and idols sometimes function as fetishes. Not only so, but fetishes are sometimes regarded as the embodiment of spirits, and thus are on occasions animistically regarded and employed. At other times their function is more distinctively magical, the abode of a mysterious power capable of inducing certain results. We can witness the transition stage between fetishism and idolatry in its crudest form among some of the tribes of lowest culture in India, e.g., the Yanadis of the Madras Presidency worship stones, bricks, pieces of wood, pots of water, etc., in which leaves of the sacred nim tree have been placed. They also perform puja before rude pictures scratched on the walls of their mud houses, and before clay fetishes which are formed by simply compressing a handful of clay into some shape.

It is not difficult to appreciate the way in which primitive man would come to associate power with certain peculiar objects. Such objects included stones of a peculiar shape, e.g., those in India, in the form of the *lingam*, the symbol of the male generative organ. Stones that have been oddly perforated, either naturally or artificially, are also used; thus the *sala-grama* is another stone regarded in India as charged with therapeutic properties. Meteoric stones or rocks are likewise employed as fetishes, one which I saw embedded in the sand at a village near the sea in the Vizagapatam district being so regarded. Another type to be found in India is the footprint, in particular that of Vishnu, and hence known as Vishnu-pada, and regarded as possessing wonder-working

potency. Trees, plants and leaves are another group of fetishes in common use. Among the more common in use in South India are the fig (pipal), the margosa (nim), the sweet basil (tulasi), the mango, the banyan and the betel-nut (areca) palm. These trees are regarded as the embodiments of magical potency, and are used in charms and cures for a great variety of things. If the afterbirth of a cow be buried beneath a banyan tree, the cow ought to give more milk because the sap of that tree is milky. Darbha grass is revered as a portion of Vishnu himself, and regarded as particularly virtuous for purificatory purposes. "Nothing on earth can equal the virtues of the tulasi," say the Brahmans in their prayers. When one of them is dying, some of the plants are placed near him on a pedestal, leaves placed on his eyes, ears, face and chest, and his body is sprinkled with a tulasi branch dipped in water. Forgiveness of sins can be obtained by touching water in which the salagrama has been washed, and the Atharva Veda declares that a Brahman house without one is as impure as a cemetery. Beliefs and practices such as these are evidence of the very complex character of fetish objects, a character that is quite obviously both religious and magical. The essential idea seems to be that tangible objects may be the abodes of mysterious, if not spiritual powers. The power is believed in many cases to be due to the spirit or deity which has transferred potency to it, and hence its significance is religious. At the same time the possession and use of the object is regarded as sufficient to bring about the desired end

because the potency is resident in the object and under the control of the possessor so that its significance is likewise magical.

The treatment of the fetish is a combination of worship, coaxing and coercion. It is the object of prayer and of sacrifice, and is talked to, as though possessed of consciousness. It is, among Africans, petted when its help is sought, and beaten or otherwise illtreated when it has not done what was required. Some of them will hide the fetish when they are about to do something of which they are ashamed. It is an object of fear, and a power of protection, and may be left in charge of a shop, because no man will dare to steal with the fetish looking on. It is difficult to know where fetishism ends and nature-worship or polytheism begins, when an object ceases to be a fetish and becomes an idol or a deity. The truth is there is no definite line of differentiation. The origin of fetishism is obviously to be traced to lower grades of culture and religion. It includes conceptions that are thoroughly magical. Yet the use of material objects in worship, whether as symbols or utensils, a practice of which fetishism is one of the most primitive forms, persists throughout the history of religions even into the more cultured forms, and seems to be so integral a part of religious rites that one cannot readily conceive of its completely passing away as long as man is a sentient being.

In totemism we find further material which demonstrates the inter-penetration of religion and magic in the primitive stages of culture. Totemism has been defined by J. G. Frazer as "an intimate relation which

is supposed to exist between a group of kindred people on one side and a species of natural or artificial objects on the other side, which objects are called the totems of the human group." * It differs from fetishism in which the association is established between persons and specific objects rather than one definite class of objects. In addition to that there is a much more intimate relation between a group and its totem than between a group and one of its fetishes. In the former case the object is an integral part of the group itself and hence operates in the organization of the group. The word "totem" emanates from the language of the Chippewa or Ojibway Indians of North America, but the phenomenon is one that is widespread, being found not only in North America but in Australia, Indonesia, India, Japan, and perhaps Egypt.

Totem objects are in the vast majority of cases animals or plants, frequently the staple objects of food for the clan. The practices which are in vogue among different peoples vary so widely that it is scarcely possible to offer any generalizations as to the typical totemic features. Yet there are some features which are characteristic. One is that the life of the group is regarded as intimately bound up with the life of the species so that the life of the clan is dependent on the welfare of the totem animal or plant. This is a perfectly natural development when we consider that the totem was the staple edible object. If that particular animal or plant were to become extinct, it would involve the extinction of the group which

* *Totemism and Exogamy*, IV, pp. 3-4.

depended upon it. Examples of totem food objects are available in abundance: the totem of the Todas of South India is the buffalo; of the Oraons of Chota Nagpur the monkey; that of the Ainus of Japan the bear; of the Hopi Indians of North America maize; of the Arabs the date palm; of the Babylonians of the Persian Gulf a fish; of the Warramunga of Central Australia the cockatoo; of the Aruntas of Australia the witchetty grub; of the islanders of the Torres Straits the turtle; of British Columbia Indians the salmon. The list might be made very much larger. The totem was an indication of ancestry, as well as a basis for tribal organization. In some instances, as e.g., in Western Australia, the life of each individual of the clan was regarded as bound up with some one animal or plant of the species, but, since there was no means of knowing which one, great care was exercised in behaving properly towards the whole species for fear of offence to the particular one concerned.

Another characteristic of totemic society is exogamy. It is the rule prevalent very largely among primitive tribes that a man must find his wife from the women of another totem tribe. Thus a man of the Crow tribe could not marry a woman of his own tribe, but he might get a wife from among the Bats. Then their children would take the totem of the mother. Some scholars thought that exogamy was a constant factor of totemism, but more extended investigations have disclosed exceptions. There are tribes in Australia which are totemic but not exogamous. A still more prevalent practice is that of calling the individual by the name of the totem, and in some instances crests

or insignia which symbolize the totem are tattooed on the body or carved or painted on poles, houses and weapons, the object being to strengthen the bond of relationship.

The religious significance of totemism is manifest in the multiplicity of ceremonials which are performed. We cannot describe totemism as distinctively a religion; for a totem is not considered as a deity, nor is it an object of worship. The deliberate worship of animals and plants seems to be a different type of animism. Animistic ideas arose before the age of totemism but are to be found within that period also. Some totemic people believe that a man has more than one soul, one of which finds a receptacle in his totem. The Botaks of Sumatra hold that a man's external soul inhabits the totem animal, and consequently they will not eat the totem animal, because the soul must have this place to migrate to or else he will die. Among some tribes, e.g., the Wonghibons of New South Wales, the initiation ceremony is one whereby boys are made mimetically to undergo death and resurrection in the belief that thereby their souls are given an opportunity of taking up their residence in the totem. There are many other rites which are practised which, while they may not be said to be definitely animistic, illustrate the integral relationship between the totem and the group, a confederacy never neglected in religion any more than in any other social function. The Todas of the Nilgiri hills always slay buffaloes on the occasion of the funeral ceremonies, and bring the corpse into contact with the dead animal while the mourning proceeds.

Birth, childhood and marriage ceremonies all include some features in which the buffaloes play a part. The same is true of the ceremonies of the Ainus of Japan with meticulous regard for the bear. The sacrifice is another occasion which furnishes a striking example of the religious significance of totemism, great care being taken in the selection of the animal to be sacrificed, frequently apologies being proffered to it before slaying it, the object being to insure a plentiful supply of the totem animal or plant on which the life of the group depends. Among the Todas a buffalo calf is sacrificed and eaten, though the Todas endeavour to prevent others from knowing it, the purpose being that the animals may go to the next world in the service of the dead, or that they may insure the increase of the buffaloes, or the abundance of the crops. With them the closeness of the bond is illustrated the more clearly by the fact that the chief dairyman is also the priest who conducts the ceremonial.

Totemism is as truly magical as it is religious. The elaborate ceremonies which are so much a part of the system, and the design of which is the multiplication of the animals or plants, are suffused with magical ideas. These ceremonies are planned and performed with great care lest by departing from the prescribed forms the efficacy of the rites should be endangered. The close association between the conceptions of form and efficacy suggests a mechanical view which is essentially magical. The part given to the totem in ceremonies for purification indicates an opinion that the totem has a power in itself to accomplish the

end sought. The association of the totem again with the priest in prayers shows that the prayers are regarded more in the nature of charms than of supplications. The sacrifices of the Toda show no indication of the idea of propitiating a deity, but rather that of bringing about the desired end by the operation of a mysterious force resident in the sacrifice of the sacred animal. Though the sacrifice be offered to a deity, yet the hand of the deity is forced to grant the request for the sake of the buffalo that has been sacrificed.

Again the magical character of totemism is illustratable from the abundance of tabus. Certain Australian tribes shrink from eating the flesh of the totem animal because of the fear of the consequences. Others have more limited tabus which are attached to certain times or certain portions of the animal. The drinking of the milk of the sacred buffalo is tabu for the widow or widower among the Todas for a certain period, and the ritual of the dairy appears to be designed for the removal of tabus. A violation of the principle of exogamy is one of the worst types of tabu-breaking. It is regarded as a form of incest. The Todas, as an example, are divided into two septs, and if a man has sexual intercourse with a woman of the same sept it is regarded as incest. And the chief function of the ceremonials, as already indicated, is that of removing the uncleanness consequent on tabu-breaking. In describing the tabus associated with the totemism of the Oraons of Chota Nagpur, Sarath Chandra Roy says: "As a general rule, an Oraon must abstain from eating or otherwise using, domesticating, killing,

destroying, maiming, hurting or injuring the animal or plant or other object that forms his totem; nor must he use anything made of it or obtained from it; and, when practicable, he will prevent others from doing so in his presence. In the case of tree-totems, the men of the clan will neither go under the shade of the tree, nor cut nor burn its wood, nor use its produce in any shape." *

That brings us to a consideration of the whole matter of tabu which offers one of the most interesting cases of the mingling of ideas and practices, religious and magical. The origin of the word "tabu" is to be traced in the Polynesian language to an adjective (*ta*, "mark" + *pu*, "exceedingly") which means literally "marked off." The reason that a thing is so marked off is that it is regarded as possessed of a mysterious power which makes it dangerous. That power was called *mana*, and both on its positive side and in its negative implications it was magico-religious. It is unnecessary to refer here to cognate and parallel words in other languages to illustrate the widespread character of the notion. The marking off of the object was connected with the sanctity of its character which on the one hand must be preserved and on the other hand was a source of danger to the person who recklessly paid no heed to its special character. Tabu thus developed a meaning which is largely negative though it reposes on a positive basis. It was something marked off to be kept sacred; and therefore it was dangerous, on which account it was to be avoided. The idea readily spread so as to include

* *The Oraons of Chota Nagpur*, p. 330. *

not only things, but places and persons, words and acts, and the dangerousness and impurity came to be regarded as infectious. All of this is so very similar to magic that many scholars define it as "negative magic." The principle of positive magic is doing something that something else may be brought to pass; negative magic or tabu is the avoidance of some action to prevent some other thing from happening. Magic is designed to produce or induce certain effects; tabu to prevent or hinder certain effects. Both magic and tabu are believed to operate through a mysterious power, and both of them make use of a thoroughly mechanical technique. The mental attitudes in both cases are essentially the same, and the methods of control are alike. In both cases it is coercion and not conciliation or propitiation, the only difference being that the one operates positively and the other negatively.

There is a great number of life interests that are touched by tabu, but some of them rather more frequently than others. Certain occasions are frequently and not unnaturally for primitive people associated with ideas of uncleanness. Contact with the dead and women during the periods of menstruation and child-birth are occasions of impurity in the thoughts of many savages. Another class of tabus is more obviously connected with the idea of sanctity, such as the persons of priests and kings. The idea appears to prevail in all such cases that there is a mysterious power attached to the event, place or person which is capable of causing trouble if it be neglected or ignored. Moreover the violation of the sacred or mysterious

character automatically brings trouble upon the head of the offender. In a great number of cases the reaction is quite mechanically conceived though there are also instances where it is associated with a spirit or a deity. But in the latter case there is very little idea of personal reaction. It is quite as mechanically determined as in the cases where the mysterious power is conceived as impersonal. Thus though some tabus are definitely associated with things and persons which are religious, the mode of their operation is distinctly magical. In other cases, of course, the tabus arise before any distinction between religion and magic has been developed, and indicate that general complexity which marks the period previous to the age of differentiation.

Tabu is prevalent on a very large scale in South India today. In the villages it is very often observed most scrupulously, and the man who disregards it is treated as unclean and very often boycotted by the entire community. These tabus take a great variety of forms, like positive magic touching practically all the interests of life. There are tabued times and seasons, words, actions, events, objects and persons. There are a great many tabus attached to the circumstances under which a man may start on a journey or commence a piece of work. If hunters are starting out for game and see a column of ants crossing the path they accept it as a warning that to proceed would be fruitless. If one were to start on a journey and encounter a widow, a barren woman, a deformed person, ashes, a crow, a broom, an ass, a cat, etc., he would interpret that journey as tabu. One young man

described to me how he came home to find his father ill, whereupon he started for a physician. On starting out a cat swiftly crossed his pathway; as he entered the doctor's house, a widow came out; going for a second doctor, another cat crossed his path; again the doctor gave him the medicine at an unlucky time of the day (*rahu kalam*), and his father died. A student informed me that he had been compelled to begin to write certain public examinations during *rahu kalam*, and failed. A contractor declined to begin some repairs on my bungalow at a certain time on the pretext that at the time the workmen would begin on that particular day it would be *rahu kalam*; but I was able to consult the *panchangam* (calendar, including lucky and unlucky times) and show him that particular time was lucky, and accordingly he began the work at that time. The following is the table of inauspicious times (*rahu kalam*) when it is tabu to begin any work:

Sunday, 4:30 to 6 P.M.

Monday, 7:30 to 9 A.M.

Tuesday, 3 to 4:30 P.M.

Wednesday, 12 noon to 1:30 P.M.

Thursday, 1:30 to 3 P.M.

Friday, 10:30 A.M. to 12 noon

Saturday, 9 to 10:30 A.M.

In addition to these regularly recurring tabued times, there are special occasions which have their particular tabus. One of them is the occasion of an eclipse which is considered to be very dangerous. It is a time when pregnant women are not permitted to

go out of the house, and indeed they are kept in a room the doors and windows of which are all closed till the eclipse is over. Many Hindus will neither eat nor drink during an eclipse, even refraining from allowing an infant to drink its mother's milk, in the belief that during the eclipse everything is poisonous. An eclipse is believed to be the swallowing of the sun or moon (themselves deities) by the serpent deity, Rahu, a serpent with a head but no body, so that the sun or moon escapes at the other side. If a pregnant woman exposes herself at such a time it is believed that her child will be deformed as the result of the action of Rahu, himself deformed.

India has also tabus associated with persons or parts of persons. Among the more common are widows, barren women, non-caste persons and deformed persons. It is exceedingly inauspicious to have any of these persons cross one's pathway when starting on a journey, and may be taken as an indication that the journey will be made in vain. The widow is of course frequently held responsible for her husband's death, and that even itself is an indication of the danger attached to her person. The sterility of a barren woman may be contagious, and hence she should not be allowed to walk through a field where a good harvest is desired. Even a pregnant woman is sometimes tabu in a garden or field for fear she will take into her own body the fertility which the garden or crop ought to enjoy. A person who does not fall within the four great caste divisions is also tabu among the orthodox. He may not draw water from the village well, attend the same school with caste people, enter the temple,

or walk in certain streets. Even his shadow may be a source of pollution should it fall on a high-caste person. Should his shadow so pollute another, that person must undergo a lustration ceremony. Should he pollute a well, that would have to be purified. All of these tabus that have fallen on these unfortunate individuals are interpreted as the outcome of the operation of *karma* and *samsara*, the sins of a previous life now come to fruition. Thus the tabus are religio-magically conceived.

There are other tabus which are associated with the various parts of the body and with physiological functions. The left hand, which is used in ablutions after defecation, is considered unclean and therefore its use for receiving a gift, greeting a friend, and so forth is tabu. Even the vision of some people is considered dangerous, and many believe in the mysterious potency of the evil eye. Tabus and other magical beliefs are also associated with sneezing, yawning, itching, hysteria, epilepsy and shadows. If a person sneezes once at the beginning of an undertaking, it presages disaster; twice is auspicious. Sometimes children who do not realize the seriousness with which this belief is held will deliberately play pranks by sneezing just as a superstitious person is about to start out, for the fun of seeing him turn back angrily. A medical compounder was once assisting a doctor extract teeth when he rather clumsily broke one, but the blame was all placed on the head of an unlucky man who chanced to sneeze just as the tooth was being extracted. The fingers are snapped at the time of yawning to prevent the entrance of evil spirits into the body through the

opening of the mouth. Even the names of persons, as well as of certain objects, are tabu for certain others. A wife should not mention the name of her husband or the husband that of his wife, for fear some disaster will fall on the individual named. This tabu probably originated in the primitive belief that the name is a vital part of the person, and the fear lest its mention might lead to the exercise of sorcery on the part of others. The correct names of certain objects should not be applied to them, particularly after night falls, as it may portend evil. A snake ought to be called a rope, and salt should be called sugar.

It would be possible to extend almost interminably the list of beliefs and practices involving tabu. But sufficient mention of them has been made for the purpose of illustrating the inter-relationship of the sacred and the mechanical, the religious and the magical. In every case there is a basic notion of a mysterious power to which attaches an element of danger. This *mana* or power is something like a mother-substance out of which either religion or magic may arise according to whether it is conceived as operating spiritually and personally or mechanically. The ideas of *mana* and *tabu* are sometimes used in a sacred sense, but sometimes otherwise. Though the words are both Polynesian, the conceptions are widespread, and no conceptions in all the beliefs and customs of primitive man illustrate more conspicuously the fact that religion and magic have sprung from a common substratum, where differentiation is impossible.

Religion and magic are sometimes found in close association with each other in special persons who

embody the activating forces out of which both have sprung. There are three classes of special religious persons with whom we meet in the history of religions: the shaman, the priest and the prophet, and in all of these we can discern at times functions that are alike religious and magical. In the earlier stages, religion is very largely social not only in character but in manner of function. The group acts as a group when it is religious as it acts in any other connection. Personality, as we know it, is the product of social life, and sprang out of communal life. As life developed in complexity, it was no longer possible for the whole group to act as a unity in everything. A division of labour was inevitable, and one of the results was that upon certain individuals fell the responsibility of religious leadership. Religion was the creator, not the creation, of priests. The earliest form of religious person was the shaman variously known as witch-doctor, sorcerer, medicine man or magician. In South India the different vernaculars have a word compounded of *mantra*, the spoken charm, and a pronoun in the third person as, e.g., in Telugu *mantravadu*, "he of the mantras." This individual is the shaman who is believed to have a mysterious power that enables him to learn and disclose matters hidden to others and influence occult powers including deities, and this power which he possesses is invariably held to be the gift of a particular deity. The shaman attains his position for a variety of reasons. One is the ability of going into a trance, in which state he is presumed to be possessed of a mysterious force whereby he reveals hidden matters either past or future. A second reason is the

chance success which he obtains in doing what the people want done or in telling them what they want to be told. A third reason for his obtaining acknowledgment is a certain shrewdness that is born of experience. A shaman is a specialist in those religico-magical practices that play such a large part in primitive society such as detecting culprits, exorcising evil spirits, preparing amulets and charms, predicting the future, repeating mystical charms, working revenge on enemies, communing with the dead, etc. There are some such shamans still practising their art in Malabar, though their number is fast diminishing.

These men are given the Malayalam name "Odiyan," which literally means "he who lames" or "he who strikes one lame," a name having quite obvious reference to the black art which they are said to practise. These Odiyans belong to the non-caste people of Malabar. When one of them is about to practice his nefarious art, he is said to prepare some pills out of the entrails of a new-born calf or of a disembowelled pregnant woman, and after taking these pills he begins to repeat charms (mantras), at the same time having the power of changing himself into one of the lower animals, dog, cat, jackal, etc. Then in animal form he is said to roam about at dead of night, catching and maltreating his victim. Another type of shaman in Malabar is the mantravadi, who is associated with the worship of the goddess Bhagavathi. The duties of these men are very definitely admixtures of the religious and the magical, as they are devotees of the goddess and get their living from the part they perform in the religious rites. At the time of festivals they

stand before the idol and pray, then jumping into the air they run several times around the temple, brandishing a sword and howling at the top of the voice, whereupon they are presumed to be under the direct inspiration of the deity and able to speak as oracles. The people believe that the goddess expresses approbation or disapprobation of the conduct of the festival. If the goddess is displeased, the oracle waves his sword and strikes his hand with it, splashing blood over the body, at the same time flinging out curses till the bystanders shiver with terror and awe; if she approves he speaks words of comfort and blessing. These men profess to feel very little pain as a result of their self-torture, undoubtedly the emotional stress shifting their attention to other matters of keener interest. Somewhat similar are the fire-walking ceremonies so common in South India.

These shamanistic practices are frequently the special sphere of certain castes. The Kaniyans and Velans of Malabar are especially reputed for the knowledge of the magical art. The word *Kaniyan* is derived from the Sanskrit *Ganika* meaning an astrologer. Tradition associates the Kaniyans of Malabar with the Valluvans of the Tamil country who are the priests and astrologers of the Paraiyans and Pallans of that area. These men are consulted for advice regarding the likelihood of success or failure in all manner of undertaking, domestic and social: the causes of calamities, the likelihood of an expected child being a son or a daughter, the best way to get rid of illness, the auspicious time for sowing and reaping, the proper time to begin a journey, the advisability of buying or

selling property or making loans, the naming of children, initiation or investiture (*upanayanam*), marriage ceremonies, and exorcism of demons. Two things seem to be necessary for him to work, viz., a calendar (*panchangam*) and a bag of cowries. When anyone desires his advice, he sits facing the sun and begins by reciting charms (*mantras*) and some verses in praise of his patron deity, Subramanya, then places some of the cowries in a certain position on a geometrical diagram traced with chalk on the floor. These cowries are said to symbolize Ganesa, the obstacle-removing God, Surya, the sun, the planet Jupiter and Saraswati, the goddess of speech, and his guru or teacher. These cowries are further arranged in the compartments of the design whereupon the Kaniyan makes his predictions and concludes by worshipping the deified cowries. The Kaniyans are also skilled in the art of exorcism and when invited to drive out an evil spirit they usually go in a group to the house of the victim, masquerading as Ghandharva, Yakshi, Bhairava and other devils. To the accompaniment of music they rush in the direction of the afflicted person with the motive of frightening the devil away. Another function which these men fulfil is the making of amulets (*yantram*) which are considered valuable for a variety of ends, including counter magic against sorcery, relieving illness, curing barrenness, taming wild horses, preventing demon possession and increasing knowledge. Many of the Kaniyans know a good deal about the medicinal uses of herbs and are clever medicine men. Would it not be difficult to find a better illustration of the combination of religion and magic than in these Malabar people?

Their method of working and their devices are almost exclusively magical. Moreover with certain of their performances tabus are inflicted for specific periods as, e.g., in their attempt to cure the sterility of a barren woman; yet they associate all that they do with a deity, Bhagavati, Subramnya, Ganesa or some other, and in exorcism with demons. And their pronouncements are received by the people with due reverence as oracles of God Himself. Some of these pronouncements come in the form of instructions as to the sacrifices and offerings required to propitiate or preserve the good will of the deity. But the people believe even in the most thoroughly magical rites and in large measure they believe that they are accomplishing what they themselves do by the superhuman assistance of the deity with whom they are on intimate terms.

The shaman belongs rather to the period of magic. When magic wanes and religion waxes stronger the shaman recedes before the priest or the prophet. But such a transition is never accomplished suddenly. It may take centuries for a shaman to pass and the prophet or priest to take his place. And during the transition period we witness religion and magic in coalition with the religious element gradually gaining in ascendancy and the magical becoming progressively subordinate. Indeed it is a question as to whether the work of the priest has in any religion ever become quite free from the magical element. Certainly it is not difficult to obtain evidence from any of the living religions for the admixture of magical alloy with the gold of religion. What then is the difference between the shaman and the priest? The shaman is regarded

as having power which he can exercise directly, even over the gods, by means of the spell; the priest recognizes that any power which he exercises is a gift of the deity, to be obtained by conciliation or prayer. There is usually a rather long period between the spell as spell and prayer as prayer, a period between the magical rite to coerce the gods, and the religious sacrifice to propitiate the gods, a period in which the sacrifice is regarded as possessing a value that is magico-religious, semi-coercive and semi-conciliative.

But shamanism does not furnish the only basis for priestcraft. There are communities in which shamanism has never been practised as far as we know, and where the priesthood has grown up from other causes. In some instances the ceremonial has become exceedingly complex, and yet its cogency interpreted quite magically, in which cases efficacy depended upon the precision with which details are cared for. Here it was found to be necessary to set apart certain men whose special duties would be the care of the ritual, and such men frequently strengthened their claims by appealing to the people's fear and by mentioning that they possessed superior knowledge in regard to the will of the gods. The division of labour consequent on the developing complexity of society involved a recognition of the class of priests who should conduct the religious rites for the group. It will be readily seen that such a setting apart of a special class of men for the oversight and conduct of the ceremonials of the group inevitably tended towards a formalizing of the ceremonial. And may we not say that formalism always has a tendency towards the magical, though the

form may have arisen to meet a religious need? If the conduct of the ceremonial be in the hands of a special few, then a tendency arises to regard the ceremonial as of value for its own sake, rather than as the group's expressed desire to be on good terms with the deity. Yet it must be acknowledged that, except for a few people of a particularly reflective turn of mind, forms are necessary. They give opportunity for activistic and æsthetic phases of the religious consciousness, and serve an important function in that way. The religious problem is to guard against a shift of attitude and emphasis away from the social and spiritual towards the mechanical, away from the form as means towards the form as end in itself. This is the danger which needs to be avoided when a special priestly class is dedicated to the service of religion in the name of the group. On the other hand the increasing complexity of social life argues much for the need of certain persons who will undertake the supervision at least of the widening range of religious functions. There are temple duties such as receiving and making offerings, sacrificing, burning lights and incense, making prayers, conducting worship, guarding sacred utensils and leading public actions; there are legal duties growing out of disputes of certain kinds; there are the functions of teaching and advising; there are the making and the preserving of records concerned with the traditions and myths; there are purificatory, birth, initiatory, marriage, and death ceremonies to conduct; there are oracular duties to perform; there is the public music; and sometimes there is the work of healing the sick. It is not surprising that, with such a variety

of duties to be performed, it should be felt desirable to designate certain men to them, both for the sake of economy and efficiency. It seems to be an easy step to take to regard the office of priest as giving its holder a secret and irresistible power and to credit him with powers magical and miraculous.

Such a growth in the power of the priest may be observed in India. The literature of the Yayur and Atharva Vedas and the Brahmanas in particular indicate a strong tendency to develop the magical elements. Sacrifice and offerings developed into a kind of bartering with the gods on the principle of *do ut des*. The sacrifice was a mechanical art operating with its own power of coercion, and the desired result was sure to follow. The sacrificial hymn was called *brahman*, and this word developed in meaning till it came to signify the magico-religious power believed to be exercised by that hymn, and then it was interpreted as a cosmic power having these particular manifestations. And the priest who possessed knowledge of the *brahman* and the *mantra* increased in influence and power in the community until his power was regarded as magico-divine. An ancient Sanskrit legend says: "The universe is subject to the gods, the gods are subject to the sacrificial charms (mantras); and the mantras are in the hands of the Brahmins. Hence the Brahmins are the real gods though they live on this earth." The Catapatha Brahmana gives voice to the same belief: "Verily there are two kinds of gods; for, indeed, the gods are the gods; and the Brahmins who have studied and teach sacred lore are the human gods. The sacrifice of these is divided into two kinds; oblations con-

stitute the sacrifice to the gods; and the gifts to the priests to the human gods, the Brahmins, who have studied and teach sacred lore." ⁶ A story ⁷ is told of an illustrious sage who was impaled after being falsely accused of theft but who continued in the practice of austerities for many years upon his stake, even without food. He could remember only one sin, that in his childhood he had pierced a tiny fly with a blade of grass. The holy man was much incensed at the extremity of his punishment. He was cursed to be born again as a Çudra, and such was the power of the Brahmin's curse that even the divinest power had to submit to it.

It is not only the priestly caste but also the non-Brahmin-caste priests who are believed to possess magico-religious powers. They are usually associated with a particular deity or temple, and conduct the worship (*pūja*) for those who are followers of the deity. But their functions also include the conduct of innumerable magical ceremonies such as rain-making, lustrations, exorcism, birth ceremonies, initiation ceremonies (*upanayanam*), marriages, death ceremonies, detecting culprits, building ceremonies, and so forth. In many instances the priests associated with minor deities and village temples are very difficult to differentiate from the shaman, so thoroughly magical are their ways of working. The one element which seems to merit their designation as priests is their association with a deity.

A third type of special religious person is the

⁶ II, 2, pp. 2, 6.

⁷ Recounted by Carpenter in *Theism in Medieval India*, p. 150.

prophet. In primitive religions we think of the prophet as the person who is ecstatically possessed of the god as a result of which possession he is considered to speak on behalf of the deity. He is closely associated with the seer who apprehended the divine will by means of trances, visions, dreams and auguries. The distinction between priest and prophet is that the former is concerned more with the ritual and the latter with physical matters. With the introduction of cultural elements, there arose the concept of inspiration, the prophet being regarded as one inspired or possessed by the divine spirit. The Hebrew religion and Islam furnish examples of prophecy in the more developed stage where the inspired man uttered messages of political, moral and social righteousness as well as of religious import. The forerunner of the prophet was thus often the shaman or *mantravadu*, who worked himself into a state of ecstasy by various means—shouting, leaping, running, brandishing swords, dancing, drinking intoxicants, and so on. And when the ecstatic state came on, his mutterings were regarded as the word from the gods. We are accustomed to think of prophecy as a distinctive religious phenomenon, but we need to remind ourselves that its origin has been out of functions that were largely magico-religious.

In India there is another type of special religious person in whom we may find further illustration of religion and magic in association, viz., the *sadhu* or *yogi*. This is a class of persons who have elected the ascetic life as the best expression of the religious consciousness. And asceticism is regarded by many as a

means of obtaining super-human power of the most astonishing kind. Sometimes this power is called miraculous and sometimes magical, the distinction being due largely to whether or not it is associated with a deity. Some ascetics carry with them long iron rods with pointed ends, the reason being that iron is regarded as peculiarly virtuous for driving off evil spirits. There are four types of yogas or ascetic practice which are regarded as bringing power: (1) *mantra yoga*, frequent repetition of particular words expressive of deity such as "Om," regarded as of magico-religious value; (2) *laya-yoga*, concentration of the mind on an object such as an image of a god, leading to absorption with the object of thought; (3) *raja-yoga* or breath control with the object of control of the mind; and (4) *hatha-yoga* or the promotion of concentration by bodily postures, fixating the vision, etc. In addition to the yogas there are six commandments and six prohibitions which are enjoined on ascetics. The commandments have to do with begging for food, bathing, contemplation of the image of a deity, saying prayers, practicing purity and performing formal worship. The prohibitions are against sleeping on a couch, wearing white clothes, speaking to or thinking about women, sleeping during the daytime, riding on an animal or in a vehicle, or permitting the mind to be agitated. Then there are special purificatory rites performed by sadhus which are calculated to furnish an increase of power; drawing a thread through the mouth and one of the nostrils to cleanse the nasal passage; swallowing a long piece of cloth and drawing it out after one end has reached the stomach; and cleansing the throat with

a long brush. The result of these various practices is regarded as including an achievement of mystical power which may be exercised in various ways. Sadhus are reputed as miracle mongers who can cast out devils, heal diseases and poison bites, transmute metals, interpret dreams, predict the future, bring rain and perform incredible physical feats. Such is the reputation which they enjoy that many believe that their magical power is transferable. There is a practice among neophytes of yogis of preserving a small piece of the cloth which the yogi has worn and which is regarded as having attained some of the sacredness of his character. Or sometimes an impression of his foot is taken with red mud on a cloth and similarly preserved. These cloths are placed by the devotee on the head after bathing, where they are kept for about five minutes as a mark of veneration and in the hope that some of the sacred power will thereby be transferred. Probably the curse of a yogi is even more greatly feared than his blessing is cherished. The power that is attributed to him is one of the clearest living examples of a magico-religious *entente*.

The facts so far presented have been illustrations of the multitudinous occasions when religion and magic are found juxtaposed. We have seen that the two are found in such a close association in the experiences of primitive peoples and sometimes well down into cultural times, that it is well-nigh impossible to separate or differentiate them. The question arises as to whether there is a period in human history when either of them is prior to the other. The question of priority is one on which anthropologists have come to different conclusions, so that there is no general consensus of

opinion to which reference can be made. It is interesting to observe that our English word, magic, is derived, through the Latin *magia* and the Greek *μαγία*, from the Persian *magi* or priests of Zoroaster. This indicates that in one of our earliest sources for the study of religion and magic we find them in association. The present study would indicate that the Indian materials confirm the Persian, and what has been found true of these countries is abundantly illustrated from widely different regions.

No less a name than that of Sir J. G. Frazer is associated with the view that magic is of greater antiquity than is religion, and that religion arose as it were upon the ruins of magic. When man learned that the environment was not amenable to magical control, he turned to religion; and it seems to be Frazer's hypothesis that religion is only a halfway house between magic and science. This author views magic as "nothing but a mistaken application of the very simplest and most elementary processes of the mind, namely, the association of ideas by virtue of resemblance and contiguity." In contrast with this he holds that "religion assumes the operation of conscious or personal agents, superior to man, behind the invisible screen of nature," and consequently resting "on conceptions which the merely animal intelligence can hardly be supposed to have yet attained." ^a Frazer summarizes his position as follows:

In magic man depends on his own strength to meet the difficulties and danger that beset him on every side. He believes in a certain established order of nature which he can manipulate for his own ends. When he

^a *The Golden Bough*, abridged, pp. 54 f.

discovers his own mistake, when he recognizes sadly that both the order of nature which he has assumed and the control he had believed himself to exercise over it were purely imaginary, he ceases to rely on his own intelligence and his own unaided efforts, and throws himself humbly on the mercy of certain great invisible beings behind the veil of nature, to whom he now ascribes all those far-reaching powers which he once arrogated to himself. Thus in the acuter minds magic is gradually superseded by religion, which explains the succession of natural phenomena as regulated by the will, the passion, or the caprice of spiritual beings like man in kind, though vastly superior to him in power.*

In spite of that, Frazer acknowledges—he could scarcely do otherwise—that religion and magic are often found side by side. Yet he explains that when such is the case the gods are treated as amenable to magical control.

It is true [he says] that magic often deals with spirits, which are personal agents of the kind assumed by religion; but whenever it does so in its proper form, it treats them in exactly the same fashion as it treats inanimate agents, that is, it constrains or coerces instead of conciliating or propitiating them as religion would do. Thus it assumes that all personal beings, whether human beings or divine, are in the last resort subject to those impersonal forces which control all things, but which nevertheless can be turned to account by anyone who knows how to manipulate them by the appropriate ceremonies and spells.¹⁰

We have seen how true this is in India where the whole universe is regarded as subject to the gods, as the gods

* *Ibid.*, p. 711.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, abridged, p. 518.

are subject to the mantras. In describing the myth of Adonis, Frazer gives another illustration, where he says "the old magical theory of the season was displaced, or rather supplemented by a religious theory. For although men now attributed the annual cycle of change primarily to corresponding changes in their deities, they still thought that by certain magical rites they could aid the god." ¹¹

Andrew Lang is one of the severest critics of the theory of Frazer that magic is prior to religion. His criticism includes several noteworthy points: (1) finding a race that has magic but no religion would not prove "that it did not once possess religion of which it has despaired"; ¹² (2) we have not the data for determining the relative priority of religion or magic historically; ¹³ (3) Frazer's theory rests on a definition of religion that is too narrow; ¹⁴ (4) we can find religion and magic highly developed alongside one another, as e.g., in India and Japan; (5) Frazer's theory makes the existence of religion depend on the failure of magic, a very negative and quite inadequate basis. It would take us far afield to go into the details of Lang's criticisms of Frazer, since a very respectable proportion of his volume on *Magic and Religion* is devoted to that end. Lang is of the opinion that it would be quite as easy to establish a case for the hypothesis that magic is a degenerated offspring of religion, but he wisely refrains from dogmatism, and contents himself with

¹¹ Ibid., p. 324.

¹² *Magic and Religion*, p. 47.

¹³ Ibid., p. 48.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 48.

showing the fallacy of trying on a historical basis to establish the priority of either to the other. And as we shall observe presently, social psychology offers no better basis than history for either conclusion. We ought to observe that Frazer's definition of religion is "a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life."¹⁰ Lang says that by religion he means

What Mr. Frazer means—and more. The conciliation of higher powers by prayer and sacrifice is religion, but it need not be the whole of religion. The belief in a higher power who sanctions conduct, and is a father and a loving one to mankind is also religion. But this belief, if unaccompanied, as in Australia, by prayer and sacrifice, cannot be accounted for on Mr. Frazer's theory: that religion was invented, for worldly ends, after the recognized failure of magic, which aimed at the same ends fruitlessly. It is only by limiting his definition of religion, as he does, that he can establish his theory of the origin of religion.¹¹

Another criticism of the theory of Frazer, a criticism which is very incisive, is that of Dr. F. B. Jevons. His position is that Frazer's hypothesis grows out of a mistaken understanding of the evolutionary process. It seems like irony for Jevons to say that Frazer's theory was a mistaken application of the evolutionary hypothesis, after Frazer had described magic as a mistaken application of the laws of association. Jevons summarizes Frazer's treatment as an evolutionary description whereby "gods were assumed to have developed

¹⁰ *The Golden Bough*, abridged, p. 50.

¹¹ *Magic and Religion*, p. 69.

out of fetishes, religion out of magic, and prayer out of the spell." "To disprove this," says Jevons, "it is not necessary to reject the theory of evolution, or to maintain that evolution in religion proceeds on lines wholly different from those it follows elsewhere."¹⁷ A clearer understanding of the evolutionary process will disprove either of the theories that "religion is developed magic, or magic degraded religion."¹⁸ The evolutionary process is dispersive, and has been so from the very beginning. Jevons quotes from Bergson who has compared the evolutionary process to a shell which bursts into fragments the moment it is discharged rather than to a cannon ball which follows one line. If social evolution is like biological evolution, then it is neither necessary to attempt to derive religion from magic, nor magic from religion. Man has oscillated between the two from the very beginning, and the wider separation which we now witness is the result of the dispersive force of evolution which has so long been operative. It must be admitted that the criticism of Jevons is based on a view which satisfies the facts that anthropology has disclosed, as well as regards the character of social and biological evolution.

Another critic of the Frazer theory is Dr. R. R. Marett. He maintains that "Frazer's account of magic is too intellectualistic, and this is why he makes magic and religion utterly distinct in their psychological nature, so that, like oil and water, though juxtaposed, they will not intermix; and so that religion has to be credited by him with an independent and later

¹⁷ *The Idea of God in Early Religions*, p. 123.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

origin." ¹⁹ It has already been observed that Frazer regards magic as a misapplication of the principle of the association of ideas. Marett's criticisms of the interpretation are very poignant. In the first place, he shows magic is much more than an affair of misapplied ideas, or, for that matter, of ideas at all. It has a very decided emotional content that at times is nothing short of violent passion. In the second place, he decries the antiquated associationism to which Frazer still clings, and which involves a much more metaphysical than psychological account of the associative tendencies. And third, he points out that "magic proper is all along an occult process and, as such, part and parcel of the 'god stuff' out of which religion fashions itself." ²⁰ On account of its interest in the occult and the supernatural, an interest which it has in common with religion, it is easy for it to pass into religion, for the spell, to take a particular example, to pass into prayer. Marett's own considered view is that, though it may be useful to hold religion and magic apart in thought, they may legitimately from another point of view be brought together, because in actual social experience they so frequently occur together.

Any criticism that may be offered of the hypothesis of Frazer needs to be guarded lest it appear to be not fully appreciative of his incomparable services to the cause of anthropology. There is no assembly of materials extant which deals with the problem of the

¹⁹ *The Threshold of Religion*, p. 29.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

relationship between religion and magic which is anything like as significant as *The Golden Bough*. So that if one take a critical attitude towards the work, it must be critically appreciative of his magnificent contribution, if it be also critically censorious of his psychological interpretation. It need hardly be said that *The Golden Bough* is a veritable mine of information, and even the abridged edition is a most valuable treasure house. It is because of our profound appreciation for the work of the author that one laments the fact that he continued to labour with an outworn psychology. His interpretation of magic in terms of association is a relic of the days when psychology still suffered from the domination of metaphysics. The use of the associative tendencies of the thought processes is a very suggestive method of treatment for purposes of classification. The change in the terminology of association from "laws" and "principles" to "tendencies" and "processes" is suggestive of the change in the whole standpoint of psychological science from metaphysics to biology. Marett is obviously much more scientific in explaining magical associations as due to interested attention rather than mistaken applications of metaphysical laws of thought. The mistakes of magical associations are errors to us not because we are keener students of metaphysics, but of physics and the other empirical sciences. It is the advance of science, not of metaphysical speculation, that has contributed the most to the dissolution of magical associations.

Frazer seems to think of magic as the forerunner of

religion and of religion as the forerunner of science Magic is explanation in terms of an occult force which man can manipulate for his own ends. When he finds that method fails, he substitutes an explanation in terms of spiritual beings who regulate natural phenomena by their will, passion and caprice. Science returns to the magical type of explanation as in terms of an underlying principle of order in nature, only in science that order is described on the basis of exact observation of the phenomena themselves. Frazer has clearly understood that there is a fundamental likeness between the magical and scientific view of the world, and that the religious viewpoint is different from both of them. Perhaps the most discerning criticism of the position is that unfolded by Höffding in his *Philosophy of Religion*. He points out that one distinction between religion and science is that the latter explains while the former evaluates, and that explanations which one sometimes finds associated with religious beliefs are indications of a tendency for religion to leave her own rightful sphere and enter the domain of science. Now explanation is placing an event in a causal series, showing its connectedness with other events. Here we may observe the kinship between magic and science. Magic like science places a phenomenon in causal relationship to something else. It very frequently mistakes temporal sequence for causal sequence—*post hoc ergo propter hoc*. But the point to be observed is not so much the fact that it represents the same interest which we find in science. The trouble with magical reasoning is that its inferences are based on evidence that is insufficient. It is some-

times ready to generalize on a single fortuitous particular, to base a law on one interesting observation. The scientist frequently proceeds in his task by much the same method, but he attains more permanent conclusions because of a wider range of observation and experiment, and a more critical analysis of significant data.

The logic of magic, as we have seen, bears striking resemblance to the logic of science. So is it with its psychology. The attitudes and techniques involved are near of kin. In each case they are mechanical. Magic and science both proceed on the understanding that if certain causal factors are set into operation, certain other results are inevitable. Neither the magician nor the scientist as such assumes a social attitude towards the environment by prayer, sacrifice or offering. If they be social, it is not as magician or scientist, but as religious persons. Neither magic nor science denies the possibility of a social attitude towards the universe, but such an attitude is of no service to them. Their method of approach to problems is through and through mechanical, and that is so even when they are dealing with living organisms, or deities. The magician, as we have seen, sometimes seeks the accomplishment of the desired end by way of the deity, but when he does so he treats the deity as quite as amenable to direct action or coercion as a force of nature or a human being. The deity does what the magician wants, not because he is conciliated or propitiated but because he is compelled to do so by the inevitable action of forces which the magician sets in operation. The philosophy of magic is mechanism, but, like all mechanisms, magic

is the embodiment of someone's purpose. The purpose is control—control of the environment whether that environment be regarded as nature forces, human beings, or divine beings. And the method of control is mechanical.

Dr. Bronislaw Malinowski has made a suggestive differentiation of magic from religion:

We have taken for our starting point a most definite and tangible distinction: we have defined, within the domain of the sacred, magic as a practical art consisting of acts which are only means to a definite end expected to follow later on; religion as a body of self-contained acts being themselves the fulfilment of their purpose. We can now follow up the difference into its deeper layers. The practical art of magic has its limited, circumscribed technique: spell, rite, and the condition of the performer form almost its trite trinity. Religion, with its complex aspects and purposes, has no such simple technique, and its unity can be seen neither in the form of its acts nor even in the uniformity of its subject-matter, but rather in the function which it fulfils and in the value of its belief and ritual. Again, the belief in magic, corresponding to its plain practical nature, is extremely simple. It is always the affirmation of man's power to cause certain definite effects by a definite spell and rite. In religion, on the other hand, we have a whole supernatural world of faith: the pantheon of spirits and demons, the benevolent powers of totem, guardian spirit, tribal all-father, the vision of the future life, create a second supernatural reality for primitive man. The mythology of religion is also more varied and complex as well as more creative. It usually centres around the various tenets of belief, and it develops them into cosmogonies, tales of culture heroes, accounts of the doings of gods and

demigods. In magic, important as it is, mythology is an ever-recurrent boasting about man's primeval achievements.²¹

The position of Malinowski is on the whole in agreement with the thesis here defended, except that the attempt is made by the present writer to state the differentiation in terminology of a more psychological character.

The history of human thinking activity indicates a constantly recurring socio-mechanistic antithesis. At times this antithesis has become so sharp that some people have feared that there was a fundamentally irreconcilable dualism in the character of the cosmos. The attitudes which man assumes towards his environment admit of classification into one or the other—the social or the mechanical. By an attitude is meant a mental and motor tendency toward a certain type of activity. It is a set of the psycho-physical organism. In the main these dispositions are that of treating the environment either as organic and social, or as mechanically manipulatable. Magic, like religion, belongs to the sphere of attitudes. They are ways of thinking and ways of acting rather than the definitive contents of any particular thoughts or actions. They are habitual dispositions to endeavour to control the universe in the interests of life. But, whereas religion is found in the realm of the social attitudes, magic is typically mechanistic. Its method of control is mechanical and occult. It proceeds on the assumption that if one be apprised of the appropriate occult means,

²¹ "Magic, Science and Religion" in *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 81.

the matter of securing the desired end is quite simple. Magic is thus a means of control, mechanical and occult, the origin of which is referable to the pre-scientific period in human history when men believed not only that anything might happen, but that anything might be induced to happen if one knew the proper means for bringing it to pass. Religion, on the other hand, regards the cosmic environment as amenable to social control and seeks to achieve its felt needs by such means as conciliation and propitiation. Magic regards the environment as impersonal; religion, as personal. It may be objected that magic concerns itself with human beings and deities. Even so, they too are controllable by a force that is treated quite impersonally. If that power is set into operation, not even the gods can prevent effect succeeding cause. But religion regards the universe as amenable to prayer, sacrifice and offering, which are the means of approach to a socially conceived environment.

This differentiation which it has been attempted to unfold is the work of culture. It is not to be found in the earlier strata of social life. When we investigate the behaviour of peoples in the primitive stages of history (pre-history), in so far as we can infer from anthropological remains we find that the different attitudes have not yet clearly evolved from the instinctive origin. Life is more impulsive than reflective. No sense of incongruity is experienced in making use of both attitudes together. Propitiation and coercion go hand in hand. Impersonal forces and personalized powers are not separated. In other words, life at that stage is an undifferentiated continuum. Religion and

magic, science and art and morality are all there, but none of them functions in its own right or independently. It is with the development of reflection that consciousness develops the ability to generalize, abstract, differentiate and classify. Obviously the distinctions we have endeavoured to indicate are the products of the higher mental processes, and consequently the differentiation of religion from magic has been possible for us only because the powers of logical inference are so far advanced.

CHAPTER III

THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE

It has been shown that magic is logically the forerunner of science. In both cases they arise out of a mechanical attitude towards the environing universe, and function by means of mechanically manipulated techniques for control. The fundamental difference between magic and science has reference to the validity of their observations of the behaviour of the environment, and the consequent methods of control. In both of them the forces of the environment are conceived as following the determinations of cause and effect. Magic, belonging to the primitive period of human culture, treats the sequences of causes and effects as determined by an occult power that may even be capricious. There is no particular reason why the same type of effect should be expected invariably to follow on the same type of cause. Anything may happen on the theory of magical causality. Not so with science. The causal sequence of events of the scientist is considered to follow a regular procedure. Causality has reference to a necessary and regular connection between events in a time series. The scientific conception is that events are connected in causal series in such a way that the antecedent or subsequent existence of one may be validly inferred from the existence of another. It is

not necessary in this connection to deal with any of the philosophical treatments or critiques of the causal category. The important thing to note is the difference between the magical and scientific treatments of the category. Both assume that certain events follow certain others necessarily without the intervention of any will, human or divine. But magic is defective in its knowledge of the manner in which events are causally associated, because it has reached its conclusions on insufficient observation of the facts. Both regard the sequence of events as determined by mechanically operating laws, but magic has regarded such laws as exhibiting an occult force (*mana*) which may be controlled by anyone who has been initiated into the method of its mysterious working, whereas science regards such laws as resting on the principle of the uniformity of nature and expressing the highest degree of probability. Magic may thus be described as pre-science. When the observation of the workings of the natural forces has advanced sufficiently far to make generalization and induction possible, scientific laws are formulated, and magical explanations are relegated to the scrapheap. Magic, as we have abundantly observed, may exist alongside of religion, but science brings about its disintegration.

There are a number of familiar examples of the way in which magic has been the forerunner of science, and science the destroyer of magic. Alchemy was the antecedent of chemistry, astrology the predecessor of astronomy, witchcraft the forerunner of medicine, and animism the precursor of psychology. An assistant in a meteorological observatory in South India was once

described as an astronomer from 10 A. M. to 10 P. M., and an astrologer from 10 P. M. to 10 A. M. But that is unusual. We seldom find magic and science in association in one person. "No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other." Magic has been described variously as "bastard science" (Frazer), "occult science" (Tylor) and "pseudo-science," but probably the description involving the least difficulty is "pre-science" (Foster). The significant matter is that the scientific attitude perpetuates the magical, while ridding the minutiae of irrational elements. Its rationality is due to the thoroughness of its observations which makes valid explanation possible. The problem which the scientist wishes to solve is whether events which are connected are *necessarily* connected, and therefore thoroughness of observation is a prime requisite. Professor Carveth Reid tells of an Esquimo who was hunting with the group for seals. Hunger had driven him to go back to the hut for food, and he was returning to the hunt with the ham bone of a dog in his hand when he saw a seal, killed it, and thus stayed the crisis. Ever afterwards that group hunted seals with the ham bones of dogs in their hands. No scientist would reach such a conclusion of causality as did the magically minded Esquimo. Temporal associations are not necessarily causal associations. In neither case is the relation between antecedent and consequent given, but it has to be discerned by the method of analysis and inference. But the magician makes his inferences on a paucity of data with an emphasis on the extraordinary,

whereas the scientist reaches his conclusions after summoning all available data and observing the degrees of regularity and recurrence in the relations between antecedent and consequent. It is the unusual and the abnormal which attract the attention of the magically minded; whereas the regular and the normal constitute the important data for the scientifically minded. But magic affords a primitive form of the causal category and is pre-scientific in that it declares that one event is on account of another because it follows it in time. The ultimate aim with the magician is the control of the environment, and his explanation is only incidental; the aim of the scientist, too, is control, but explanation occupies a far more fundamental place in his scheme.

There are some respects in which magic is also the precursor of religion. While maintaining that the magical attitude is essentially mechanical, and consequently the logical antecedent of science, we must not ignore the other elements. It has been pointed out that magic belongs to that primitive period in the history of culture when the processes of differentiation had scarcely begun to function. For that reason it need not surprise us to find that magic has evolutionary associations with religion as well as with science. It is logically a mechanical attitude, but it is far from being always logical, so that social elements creep in, elements which are more akin to primitive religion than to primitive science.

One such element is the occult. As Marett has pointed out: "Magic proper is all along an occult process, and, as such, part and parcel of the 'god stuff' out of which religion fashions itself. And more than

this, by importing its peculiar projectiveness into the vague associations of the occult it provides one, though I do not say the only centre round which these associations may crystallize into relatively clear, if ever so highly fluid and unstable forms.”¹ This occult element is given a different name by various peoples, the most familiar being probably the Melanesian *mana*. The concept of *sakti* in India, while it covers a wider significance, is used to connote the mysterious power that is resident at once in the magical formula or rite and the deities of religion. *Mana* or *sakti* is a transcendental power capable of both religious and magical interpretation. *Mana* denotes a mysterious influence or power, in a sense supermundane, ascribed to objects, including persons, which behave in a striking manner. The word *sakti* originally conveys the idea of the active energy of the deity in Hinduism, but since the god is portrayed as transcending all qualities, this power is attributed to the female consort. The wives of Vishnu and Siva are accorded most important functions as the divine energy of the gods. Sarasvati is the *sakti* of Brahman, Lakshmi of Vishnu, and Parvati of Siva. The creative and fertilizing powers of the deities are thus pictorially represented by their female consorts. But in popular usage this same word *sakti* is used of power in a general way, and is applied to the efficacy of a magical charm or rite. Such and such a *mantra* is spoken of as one possessed of *sakti*; the sacrifice is also described as having *sakti*, and *yoga* practices are referred to in a similar way. This common usage of the word in both religion and magic

¹ *The Threshold of Religion*, p. 66.

would seem to indicate a correspondence in some measure to the Melanesian *mana*, a transcendental power which may infuse objects and persons in either a religious or magical sense.

In regarding persons and objects as possessing a mysterious potency the control of which gives control over the objects themselves, magic adopts a world view which has greater affinity to religion than science. The world view of science, as has been shown, rests on the principle of the uniformity of nature. But the world view of magic is based on man's conception of man. The universe, like man himself, is capricious. To be sure, many of primitive man's magical ideas are bound up with animistic conceptions. He believed that the whole environment was peopled with spirits like himself in being whimsical. These spirits were the abodes of occult power, and they could use this power for good or ill according to their wills. Professor J. H. Louba suggests a classification for magic² in which the principle of will-effort or efficiency is given a place. With the progress of culture and the consequent articulation of morality and religion, this idea of will-effort becomes clarified gradually of the idea of caprice, and is interpreted as more orderly and moral. The notion of coercion gives way to that of propitiation and conciliation. In both cases the environmental force is regarded as possessed of a will which is fraught with possibilities for the weal or the woe of human beings; and the rite, whether religious or magical, is designed to avert the dangerous and promote propitious possibilities. In that sense the magical attitude contains

². *A Psychological Study of Religion*, pp. 159 ff.

elements which are capable of development into the religious attitude.

The genesis of religion and science in the social life thus leads back to the time when life was not organized into articulated attitudes and techniques such as we know. In primitive life that which we call magic bulks large. In a sense it was primitive man's religion, his science, his morals, and his art. Yet in another sense it persists in a measure alongside of all of these, though less in the company of science than the others. The important thing to notice in this connection is that, genetically speaking, the relationship between religion and science is one of a common source—the complex of primitive social life in which things that we describe as magical play so important a part.

As the effort to secure control of the environment by magical means broke down, there grew up on the one hand the method of science, and on the other that of religion. Yet both had their roots in some measure in the earlier attempts at control which were more vague and fanciful. A good deal of the reasoning of primitive man was by analogy. Natural phenomena were interpreted as the actions of superhuman agents who were regarded as possessing much the same sort of endowments as man. In the thunder primitive man thought he heard the voice of a god. Eclipses, earthquakes, rainbows and such phenomena were taken as divine portents, symbols which were charged with divine meanings. When the sea became tempestuous and lashed its shores, they believed that Neptune was angry. When famine, sickness and death visited them, these, too, bespoke divine anger. The whole process

was one of analogical reasoning through which the volitions and motives that prompted human activities were carried over into the supermundane world to explain the inexplicable. Such reasoning was so fused with "god stuff" that it is thoroughly characteristic of primitive religion. Nevertheless it was also primitive man's way of explaining natural phenomena, especially the unusual, and so was the antecedent of scientific explanation.

I

The relation between religion and science is a problem of function as well as of genesis. Religion functions in our spiritual adjustments to and modifications of the extra-human environment. Science functions through our mechanical adjustments to and modifications of the extra-human environment. It has been shown in a preceding chapter that the common element amid all the bewildering forms of religion must be sought in a common attitude of mind which induces man, under changing conditions, to develop such heterogeneous forms of religion. And that attitude was described as a social attitude towards the environment. In contrast with that, if we study all the facts pertaining to the various sciences—observations, hypotheses, laws, etc.—we shall find another bewildering mass of data, so heterogeneous in form that we find it impossible to achieve a definition. Here, too, we must conclude that the only possibility of establishing a concrete universal is in terms of a common attitude of consciousness which characterizes men when they are creating the various forms of the sciences. This

attitude is the antithesis of the religious or the social attitude. Its view of the environing universe and its method of seeking to control it are alike mechanical. To put it pictorially, religion treats the universe as a person, and science treats it as a machine. To be sure, some religionists would deny that they regard the universe personally, as some scientists would deny that they regard it as a machine. But it may be maintained that the attitudes assumed are of these types, whatever may be world views of the particular persons who are religious or scientific.

This differentiation between religion and science from the psychological viewpoint was most clearly enunciated by Dr. A. C. Watson in a number of articles* which appeared in the *American Journal of Theology* in 1916 and 1918. He says:

There are the two types of environment, the human and the non-human, and the two types of reaction or attitude, the social and mechanical. Within the sphere of social attitudes towards the human environment, morality develops; within that of the mechanical or non-social attitudes towards the non-human, science; within that of social attitudes towards the non-human, religion. The social and non-social attitudes towards the non-human are not contradictory. Physical, mechanical manipulation and control of the environment only serve to enlarge that environment, and beyond the scope of achieved mechanical control forever reaches the realm of the larger organic attitude, the social attitude. In science meanings are abstracted from departments of experience for the sake of more adequate control, and this control serves in turn to

* "The Logic of Religion" and "The Primary Problem for an Empirical Theology."

produce richer meanings. A mechanical interpretation of nature is not an end in itself. It is but a means of solving problems and problems solved make for fuller and richer experience.⁴

It is clear from this penetrating analysis that religion and science operate in the same environment, viz., the extra-human. Indeed religious and scientific attitudes may both be aroused by the same stimulating object in the environment. One of the best helps for understanding the differentiation in function is to observe the different reactions evoked by the same situation. In 1924 a very heavy monsoon on the west coast of India resulted in the flooding of large districts in Malabar with a consequent devastation of property and a considerable loss of life. The Government of Madras at once appointed a special officer whose duty it was to organize relief for the sufferers on a scientific basis. Inquiries were also made into the causes of the flood with a view to ascertaining whether anything could be done to avert similar devastation in case of heavy rain again. But there was no service in going to men and women whose houses had been washed away and whose children had been drowned to explain, in meteorological or other scientific language, the causes of the flood. What they wanted was to know whether there was any meaning in the disaster, whether there was any value to be obtained by relating it to the will of God. The man who could go to the sufferers with relief for their bodies and a message of religious consolation for their souls was the sort of person they

⁴ A. J. T., "The Logic of Religion," XX, pp. 98, 280.

needed. There was a place for science and a place for religion, and no necessity for any conflict.

Another example is in the way people of India behave in the presence of disease. There are some who have considerable faith in medical science, and immediately seek an opportunity to consult a qualified physician to prescribe for their ills. They may not know anything about leucocytes, antibodies, poisons or antidotes, and yet their attitude towards disease may be the scientific or mechanical attitude. On the other hand there are many simple folks who are firm believers in the activities of spirits, and who account for disease as due to maleficent powers of whom they live in constant dread. The problem for such people becomes one of placating and conciliating these powers to persuade them to remove their curse so that the disease may abate. The means used may be the sacrifice or votive offering, or it may be magical devices such as spells and charms. At other times resort is made to exorcism, disease being equated with demon possession. There are, of course, a good many who see nothing incongruous in using medicine, magic and religion all together, in the hopes that one or all together will achieve the desired end.

A further illustration of the differences in attitudes is the viewpoint of different people in regard to eclipses. Thousands of young men and women who attend the schools and colleges are taught that eclipses are the phenomena of complete or partial obscuration of one heavenly body due to the shadow of another. They learn that such phenomena are calculable with mathematical precision so that the geographical limits

within which they will be visible and the time limits for their occurrence may be predicted for years or even centuries. Even the Indian astrologist is able to predict with remarkable nicety the time of approaching eclipses. But the traditional account of eclipses is associated with animistic conceptions, the heavenly bodies being regarded as belonging to the world of the gods. An eclipse is regarded as due to the swallowing of the heavenly body by Rahu,^a the great serpent demon among the planets. Since Rahu's head was severed from his body, it enables the sun and moon to escape after they have been swallowed. Rahu being a demon, the time of an eclipse is regarded as fraught with danger. Various fastings and ceremonial ablutions, as well as other rules to be followed, are prescribed for the period. Yet here again we see many educated men, including students of the physical sciences, at one and the same time giving a scientific account of eclipses and observing the ceremonials associated with traditional astrological animism.

^a The story of Rahu's jealousy of the sun and moon is as follows. When the gods were assembled to receive the nectar of immortality (*amrita*) at the churning of the ocean, Rahu was not included in the invitations. But he stole in, unbeknown to anyone, and sat down between the sun and moon, holding his cup over his head. When the divine liquid was being poured, a few drops were poured into the cup of Rahu who greedily drank it. Meanwhile the sun and moon recognized him and reported his presence to Vishnu. His head was at once cut off by Vishnu to prevent the ambrosial liquid from going down his throat. Hence he lives headless, and when he attempts to wreak his vengeance on the sun and moon by swallowing them, there is no body to complete the process, and they escape. Enough of the immortal liquid passed down his throat for his tail to live on also, though separated from his head. His tail is called Ketu, "brightness," and is regarded as the progenitor of numerous bright meteors and comets.

In religion and science we are not concerned with two environments, but rather with two attitudes towards and two techniques for controlling the same environment. The assumption of the social or religious attitude does not preclude the assumption of the mechanical or scientific attitude, nor vice versa. The typical procedure for the religious man is prayer, sacrifice or votive offering, a means whereby he can come into helpful social relationship with his cosmic environment. The typical procedure of the man of science is measurement, mechanical manipulation or explanation, another method of controlling the same environment. There is every reason to assume the validity of both methods of control and no reason to suppose that either of them is prejudicial to the other. Whenever conflict is presumed to have arisen, it is not a conflict between science and religion as such, but more likely a conflict between science and magic which is associated with religion. It may indeed be a conflict between one set of scientific notions and another, as for example two cosmologies, the one associated with the mythology or the sacred scripture of a religion, and the other the outcome of modern scientific investigation. But between religion which furnishes the social method of control and science with its mechanical method there need be no quarrel. Far from being at variance with one another, they may complement each other, and together furnish man with a more balanced view of life and the cosmos.

In the summer of 1924 a group of forty-five eminent scientists and religious leaders in America came together to discuss the relations of religion and

science. The result was a statement the purpose of which was to correct the erroneous impressions which are current today among certain groups of persons. The first is that religion can be identified with mediæval theology; the second that science is materialistic and irreligious. The statement is worth quoting in full.

.

We, the undersigned, deeply regret that in recent controversies there has been a tendency to present science and religion as irreconcilable and antagonistic domains of thought, for in fact they meet distinct human needs, and in the rounding out of human life they supplement rather than displace or oppose each other.

The purpose of science is to develop, without prejudice or preconception of any kind, a knowledge of the facts, the laws, and the processes of nature. The even more important task of religion on the other hand, is to develop the consciences, the ideals, and the aspirations of mankind. Each of these two activities represents a deep and vital function of the soul of man, and both are necessary for the life, the progress and the happiness of the human race.

It is a sublime conception of God which is furnished by science, and one wholly consonant with the highest ideals of religion, when it represents Him as revealing Himself through countless ages in the development of the earth as an abode for man, in the age-long inbreathing of life into its constituent matter, culminating in man with his spiritual nature and all his God-like powers.

II

A second way of differentiating between religion and science is to describe the former as an evaluatory and

the latter as an explanatory attitude. We must give to Professor Höffding the credit for clearly enunciating this difference in dealing with epistemological matters in his work on *The Philosophy of Religion*. Science concerns itself with questions of identity, rationality and causality. "Existence is unrolled before us as a great web of inter-related and continuous elements." * Science, moreover, has adopted the view that "all changes in existence are transformations from one form of life to another, transformations which take place according to definite quantitative relations." The scientific task is thus to add to the human stock of demonstrable knowledge which is very largely accomplished through the examination of particulars. Over and above this legitimate human aim there is another that demands attention, namely, the conservation of values. "Even if we could suppose the idea of science to be completely realized, the question as to the persistence of value would still remain open." † Herein, according to Höffding, lies the function of religion. Religion "grows up out of life itself, springs out of the basal mood of man in his struggle for life, out of the resolution to hold fast, under all circumstances, to the validity of that which he has learnt from experience to be of the highest value. The hypothesis that religion consists essentially in faith in the conservation of values here naturally recurs. . . . The religious interest moves us to a conception of being as the home of the development and conservation of values." ‡ Applying

* Pp. 244, 245.

† Ibid., pp. 244, 245.

‡ Ibid., pp. 92, 93.

this definition of religion to the idea of God he says that "God, as the object of faith, means the principle of the conservation of values, throughout all oscillations and all struggles, or, if we like to call it so, the principle of fidelity in existence." *

The differentiation which Höffding has made is valid within limits. If we recognize these limitations, we may appreciate the service which he has rendered in pointing out an important difference. The first criticism against the doctrine concerns the definition of religion. "Faith in the conservation of values" is an essential element of religion, but not all. Religion surely concerns itself with the creation as well as the conservation of values. The question of values is undoubtedly of immense concern to it, but it is unfair to assume that all of its values are donated and none of them achieved. The second criticism is that we cannot draw the line as sharply as Höffding suggests. He seems to assume that religion is not concerned with problems of rationality and causality and that science is not troubled about values. This is of a piece with the logic which attempts to separate into water-tight compartments value-judgments and judgments of existence. Surely no serious student of the sciences would maintain that he is not interested in values. The truth is that science seeks to contribute to the fullness of life as religion does, only it seeks to do so by means of a different method. The Copernican astronomy was necessitated by the problems for navigation growing out of the voyages of Columbus and Magellan. There is one cherished value which is the particular

* *Ibid.*, p. 134.

concern of science, viz., truth. Dean Inge has put the matter very clearly:

Valuation is as much a fact of our nature as sense-perception, and cannot be separated from it. If we think the matter out, there is no fact without value and no value that is not a fact. All that we perceive, we perceive as having value. Unity and conformity to law are part of one of the ultimate values, inherent as ideals in our minds. The statement sometimes made that science observes facts without valuing them is untrue, and it introduces great difficulties into philosophy because it seems to justify the error that it is possible to build up a world by purely quantitative standards. All knowledge is of the *quality* of whatever exists. But judgments of quality are related to universal standards which are part of the texture of the mind. It is very important to insist that the world as known to science is just as much a kingdom of values as the world known to religion. The difficulty is that the values are not the same.¹⁰

On the other hand religion frequently feels that certain scientific explanations threaten traditional values, and it is jealous to guard those explanations which will preserve what it regards as worthful. The position that religion gives us value-judgments whereas science gives us existence-judgments was taken by Albrecht Ritschl.¹¹ It is a position that can scarcely be vindicated because experience does not disclose to us any sharp antithesis between the two types of judgment. The two matters of existence and of value are constantly interfused. Any judgment, whether it be of

¹⁰ *An Outline of Christianity*, "Religion and Science," IV, p. 6 (footnote).

¹¹ *Justification and Reconciliation*, pp. 207, 614, 616.

value or not, implies some sort of existence in that which is under judgment. And the process of judging involves analysis and classification which implies the use of certain norms as a basis for evaluation. Just so, the process of thought discloses a constant intermingling of the religious and scientific interests, and the differentiation of them cannot be achieved by attempting to erect a barrier, even a logical barrier, between their functions.

Despite these qualifying statements, it must be cordially admitted that the differentiation made by Höffding is serviceable. Explanation is essentially a scientific undertaking, and explanation means placing an event in a series so that it will be related causally or logically to the other members of the same series. The scientist carries on his work, in which he deals with such concepts as time, space, number, motion and cause, on the tacit assumption that, if he were to overtake his task completely, there would be nothing inexplicable in the environment. If such a time ever arrived, the question arises as to what would become of religion. It has not infrequently happened that religion has thought it necessary to set up religious explanations in opposition to scientific explanations. In these cases the religious explanation was the first in the field and was originated because of scientific agnosticism in regard to certain matters. Mediæval theology seized on the conception of Aristotle of a First Cause, himself uncaused, a Prime Mover, himself unmoved. When Galileo stated the law of the pendulum as an instance of self-motion, there was at once a conflict with those who clung to the mediæval

idea of God-originated motion. The struggles of the sciences for freedom have been due to the fact that their natural explanations have run counter to pre-scientific explanations which had religious sanctions behind them. Another mediæval conception was that religion was concerned with ultimate causes in contrast with science which was concerned with proximate causes. (Granting the distinction to be valid, what would take place if science made such progress as to be able to give a thorough causal account of phenomena without the necessity of reference to first causes? If religion conceived of her task as that of giving super-mundane explanations as opposed to scientific explanations, her very existence would be threatened.

But religion has discovered that there are other things to be done for life than explaining phenomena. After science has completed her work, be it never so perfectly done, there still remains the religious undertaking of reading meanings and extracting values. A thoroughgoing bacteriological account of a disease may be of immense value to a pathologist, but it offers no consolation to a mother who has lost her child. An explanation in terms of economics or politics of the Great War may be highly interesting and instructive, but it does not heal the wounds of hearts which have been deprived of loved ones. An explanation of the failure of rains and consequent famine serves its purpose in scientific circles, but the Indian villager who cannot see food in sight for his children is more concerned with relating the famine to the operation of supernatural powers whom he seeks to conciliate. The advance of science does not spell the jeopardizing of

religion because religion is able to do something for man which science can never do. It is able to find

Tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
Sermons in stones, and good in every thing.

Religion, as Höffding puts it, meets two of the pressing needs of life which cannot be satisfied by scientific means. The first is "the need to collect and concentrate ourselves, to resign ourselves, to feel ourselves supported and carried by a power raised above all struggle and opposition and beyond all change," a need which he thinks is developed in mysticism and monotheism. Then secondly, "within the religious consciousness another need makes itself felt, more or less energetically and in the rhythmical interchange with the first need, i.e., the need of feeling that in the midst of the struggle we have a fellow-struggler at our side, a fellow-struggler who knows from his own experience what it is to suffer and to meet resistance."¹² Science can never give to us the sense of consolation in life's sorrows and of comradeship in life's struggles. It cannot give us the consciousness that our moral and spiritual yearnings and strivings are of cosmic significance. These are values which can be achieved and conserved only by faith.

Faith may be intimately linked with science, and may persist in spite of science. Faith is an adventure into the realm of the inexperienced and the undemonstrated. For the majority of thinking people it is difficult to have faith in a project which is scientifically impossible. The facts which come to light through

¹² *Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 162, 163.

cosmology, physics and biology cannot be utterly neglected by religion. The conflicting views which arise in the minds of some people are due to the sciences making discoveries which render literal interpretations of religious mythologies precarious. In such cases there are two possible reactions. One is to treat the religious myth as an analogy, a procedure with considerable justification because religious ideas are so often expressed in the language of analogy, the language of qualitative similarity. The alternative course is to cling to one's faith in the credibility of the myth. It may be argued that, whereas the sciences give us the normal and regular way in which phenomena occur, sometimes occasions have arisen wherein God has temporarily set aside natural law to work a miracle.

The problem of miracle is one of the greatest perplexities in bringing about a working agreement between religion and science. Many scientifically minded people feel that the belief in miracle could arise only in an age of scientific agnosticism. They believe that the universe is characterized by regularity, and that any other belief would necessitate regarding it as a chaos rather than a cosmos. There are natural laws which have not yet been discovered, and the scientific task is to bring the whole of the phenomenal world increasingly within the scope of natural explanation. Belief in miracle arises when something takes place which cannot be subsumed under any known law, and therefore has to be referred to divine interference. To say that an event is a miracle is to explain it by referring it to God. But explanation is primarily

the task of science, so that when a natural explanation is achieved, the reference to the supernatural becomes unnecessary and irrational.

A comparison of definitions of miracle proposed by different authors is illuminating as indicating the difficulties experienced with the concept. One method of definition is, as indicated, to identify it with the inexplicable, or to say that it is an event which cannot be subsumed under any recognized law. This is the position of Professor William Adams Brown. Others make the same position somewhat more explicit, describing a miracle as an event in accordance with a divine law which is not yet known to man. The late Professor W. N. Clarke and Professor H. C. King use the word in that sense. The traditional definition as given by David Hume and many other writers is in terms of a violation of the natural order by the immediate efficiency or direct volition of God. Among the writers who feel the religious urge to retain the concept there is a tendency to obscure its meaning by defining it less precisely. Schleiermacher spoke of miracle as "the religious name for an event." Professor N. Shaler in his *Interpretation of Nature* described it in the phrase "the latent in nature." And Wendland characterizes it as "something in which God objectively acts." The definitions of the more modern writers, of which only a few have been given, are symptomatic of a conflict between the religious urge and intellectual interests in the mind of the modern man. He wants to be scrupulously fair to science, and yet he is unwilling that religion shall be robbed of any of its values. The idea of miracle cannot quite

be dismissed, as Höffding tends to do, as a religious interference in the scientific task of explaining. It has persisted in religions, to use his own phrase, because of man's "faith in the conservation of values." It has been a real value of judgment for the religious consciousness of many people, as is obvious from the definitions of Schleiermacher and Wendland. It has been an event in which man has felt God to be present in a special way. As Goethe said, "Miracle is the beloved child of faith."¹⁰

Nevertheless the problem of miracle is exceedingly complex. It involves problems of literary, historical, scientific, metaphysical and religious characters. The majority of miracles in which men believe are recorded in sacred texts which they regard as revelatory. From the literary point of view the problem is inextricably interwoven with that of revelation. The question which has to be faced concerns the character of the record in which the account is found. Was it designed to be a narrative, or a parable, or a poem? Must the interpretation be literal, if it is to be fair? The historical problem is concerned with evidence, and with the truth of the record as a matter of fact. The scientific problem involves the question of possibility, and the relationship between the event recorded and our knowledge of the behaviour of nature under similar conditions. The metaphysical problem relates the phenomenon to one's view of the universe, and to the type of world in which such events could occur. Religion is concerned with one's view of the nature of God, and with whether the character of one's faith is

¹⁰ "Das Wunder ist des Glaubens liebstes Kind" (*Faust*).

such as to need or even to admit of such divine interventions. The matter may be made more explicit by means of a concrete illustration. The Ramayana contains a legend of Hanuman uprooting one of the peaks of the Himalayas and carrying it to Ceylon. The literary problem concerns the character of the epic. Is it written in the language of exact science, and did the writer anticipate that it would be so interpreted? Or is it the language of poetry and analogy, intended to stir the imagination and inspire the religious consciousness? If some of the writers of ancient scriptures, Hindu or Hebrew, were to revisit the earth in the twentieth century and find men contending for the scientific accuracy of accounts which they obviously intended as poetic expressions of religious values, surely they would be unable to suppress a feeling of pathetic amusement. The historical problem is concerned with the facts. Did Hanuman actually uproot the Himalayan peak and bear it to the South, and what is the supporting evidence on which we can base such a conclusion? The absence of historical evidence coupled with the apparent religious motive of the writer prevents us from readily consenting to the account as a record of fact. Science asks a further question: Is there any possibility that such a remarkable feat could be accomplished as that accredited to the monkey-deity? The answer is fairly obvious. The method or device has not yet been disclosed that would come anywhere near satisfying the demands of scientific possibility. Philosophy inquires as to the worldview of the writer of the Ramayana. Was the environment to him a cosmos? Was it a uni-

verse? Was it a one-world world like the world of Sankara? Or did he conceive it according to the *dvaita* interpretation? The metaphysic of a traditional belief in miracle is always dualism, if it be logical. Finally, what conception of God has one who believes that He can or does or ought to resort to such extraordinary means of acting to accomplish His purposes for mankind? Does the tradition of Hanuman uprooting the mountain and bearing it to Lanka satisfy the demands of the most profound moral and spiritual life? This is an analysis which can be applied to any tradition in any scripture, and it cannot but impress us with the exceedingly complex character of the miracle problem.

It is not many years since apologists of religion resorted to miraculous accounts in defense of the supernatural character of their revelations. The deity of Jesus or of Krishna was established by reference to the miracles associated with their names. A missionary of my acquaintance was lecturing to educated Hindus on the deity of Jesus and made use of the accounts of his miracles for apologetic purposes. At the conclusion of the lecture the chairman, a Hindu, in thanking the lecturer pointed to the parallelism, "You have established the deity of Jesus by his super-human power," he said. "So we, too, defend the deity of Krishna by his miracles." As an example he quoted the account of Krishna's sporting with the Gopi maidens. But the last twenty-five years have witnessed a reversal in the procedure. Nowadays instead of miracles being adduced in evidence of supernatural power, the miracles themselves have become the problem. Instead of attempting to prove that

Jesus and Krishna were divine because they were workers of miracles, apologists endeavour to establish the credibility of their miracles on the ground of their supernatural personalities. Another evidence of a consciousness that miracles are problems for rather than aids to faith is in the attempt to establish their credibility by showing them to be within the range of scientific possibility. König in the article on "Jonah" in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible* quotes from various sources accounts of whales and sharks in substantiation of the Jonah story. From one source he quotes the story of a whale hunter, James Bartley, who in 1891 is said to have been swallowed by a whale which was captured and killed the following day. The whale was cut open and Bartley removed from its stomach where he lay in a swoon but still alive. It was with difficulty that consciousness was restored to the sailor and it required three months of careful nursing before the unfortunate man's reason was restored. There have been many parallel attempts to justify the credibility of miracles. In support of Jesus turning water into wine it is maintained that every year on a score of Galilean hill-sides water is turned into wine as the rain descends, and the grape vines, drinking the moisture from the soil, convert it into the juice of the grape. In India it is argued that the big cannon of the Great War is a scientific verification of the truth of the great arrows which Rama flung at his demon enemies. So also the aerial combats of the war sustain the credibility of the account in the Mahabharata of the fight wherein the Pandus conquered their enemies by aerial chariots.

Ravana's aerial car, described in the Ramayana, is also validated by modern triumphs in aviation. What, then, is the significance of the procedure? On the one hand it illustrates the fact that the position of miracles has altered from one of apologetic value to one requiring apologetic defense. On the other hand it tends to rob miracle of its traditional meaning, for if its credibility be established by natural processes, then it ceases to be divine intervention and becomes natural instead of supernatural.

The problem of origins is another problem which has brought about tension between religious men and men of science. Back of that lies the theory of cosmology. The traditional Hebrew view of the cosmos was geocentric, the earth being flat, supported by pillars at the four corners, and overarched by the canopy of heaven. Hindus have been less precise in their descriptions, and different systems and periods have developed somewhat different views. One of the most familiar views is the Ramayana account, which is akin to the Hebrew, the earth being pictured as flat, while it is supported at the four corners by four immortal elephants. How did the world come into being? The Hebrew explanation is contained in the first two chapters of Genesis in which it is described as an act of creation. There is more than one Hindu account, but the commoner method of explanation is also in terms of creation, the creator going under different names, Prajapati, Swayambu Narayan, Swayambu Brahman, and sometimes Non-being. In the Brahmanas there are various accounts, but they usually begin by some such statement as "In the

beginning was Prajapati, nothing but Prajapati; he desired 'may I become many'; he performed austerities, and thereby created these worlds." In the Upanishads the tendency was to substitute some metaphysical principle for Prajapati, such as Brahman, Atman, or Non-being, and to interpret the universe pantheistically. In the Puranic literature cosmography goes into great detail, describing numbers of upper worlds, of hells, and of regions around the universe.

The older cosmologies, which we find reflected in the literature mentioned, functioned satisfactorily up to a certain point. The Hindus had a tabu on crossing the ocean so that they did not encounter the difficulty experienced in the western world. The old Ptolemaic system operated fairly satisfactorily until the era of discoveries and exploration. But Columbus' finding of the new world (1492) beyond the supposed limits of the earth, and Magellan's circumnavigation of the earth (1519 to 1521) that hitherto had been supposed to be flat, upset the older notions. It was the pressing human need for a new astronomy to meet the demands of navigation that created the crisis. The man who rose to meet it was Copernicus with his heliocentric doctrine which at once came into conflict with the Church that had placed its imprimatur on the geocentric doctrine. The story of the persecution of Bruno and Galileo is a familiar one. Ten years after the martyrdom of Bruno (1600) the newly invented telescope of Galileo established the truth of that for which Bruno had been burned. The struggle was a long one but eventually the new cosmology won a complete

victory, so that the religious susceptibility of no one seems to be injured by the fact that the accepted cosmology is not the same as the one held by the Hebrews and by the Christian Church until modern times.

The older cosmology made the earth the centre of the universe and regarded man as the centre of interest in the earth. The universe was anthropocentric as well as geocentric. The earth was thought to be stationary, the sun revolving about it. And man was as static as the world in which he lived. Copernicus began the revolution in thought by the destroying geocentric doctrine. Darwin completed the destruction of the older cosmology by attacking anthropocentrism. The chief value in the newer view of things was that it was dynamic in contrast with the statical view which had prevailed.

The evolutionary concept is one which can be traced in one form or another back to the Greeks. They were much concerned over the problems of being and becoming, some holding the one to be real and the other appearance, and others reversing the processes. Heraclitus believed that there was no permanence, but all was flux and flow. Anaximander taught that man originated from a fish and used to be an aquatic animal. Aristotle's philosophy of evolution was logical rather than biological, the chief tenet being that what is implicit in lower forms becomes explicit in higher forms. Descartes and Leibnitz hinted at the probability of higher forms of life springing by gradual processes out of the lower. It remained for Charles Darwin and Alfred Wallace to give the theory a more scientific formulation on the basis of biological investi-

gation. In present day usage the term evolution means "that existing plants and animals have been derived by lineal descent from previously existing forms that were unlike them."¹⁴ As Thomson and Geddes have put it, . . . "changing order, orderly change, and this everywhere in nature inorganic and organic, in individual and in social life—for this vast conception, now everywhere diffusing, often expressed, rarely as yet applied, we need some general term—and this is Evolution."¹⁵ The term is thus of sociological as well as of biological significance, and bears the meaning of process and progress as applied to both organic life and social life.

The hypothesis of evolution has been the cause of much disturbance in the minds of many religious people. This is due to its running counter to the account of origins contained in the sacred scriptures. The Hebrew account tells us that God created the heavens and earth, the great lights, the various animals and man. It does not tell us whether He first made matter and then gave it form, or whether He gave form to matter already in existence. In the account of man it records that "God created man in His own image," and formed him "out of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul."¹⁶ Obviously this account is at variance with that of organic evolution, and various methods have been suggested for solving the problem to which it has given birth. One

¹⁴ J. M. Coulter: Art. "*Evolution*," in Mathews and Smith: *Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*.

¹⁵ Thomson and Geddes: *Evolution*, pp. viii f.

¹⁶ Gen. i. 27, ii. 7.

way of dealing with the dilemma is the easy method of denying that there can be any truth in the evolutionary theory. The Genesis account is part of a divine revelation, and the biological account is nothing more than a mere guess, designed to rob man of his dignity and God of His power. This view implies the right of religion to offer explanations, or the supposition that the account in Genesis is of scientific as well as religious worth. It is virtually akin to the magical or pre-scientific attitude which accounts for origins by references to the occult. A second solution that has been proposed is that we may accept the evolutionary account in so far as man's body is concerned, but that needs to be supplemented by a religious account of his conscience and soul. When the appropriate place in the evolutionary process had been reached, God breathed into man the breath of life and he became a soul. Thus man's moral and religious nature is held to be still the product of divine creative activity. It is a method of compromise, admitting the scientific account up to a certain point, and thereafter questioning it. The third alternative is to admit that science has a right to give us an account of the origin of the whole man. The second alternative proposed implies a psychological dualism between body and soul which modern science cannot admit. The functional conception of an integral psycho-physical organism has displaced the faculty notion of body, mind and soul, separate from one another. On this view man is believed to have risen gradually from lower orders of life until he has attained control of the very nature to which he owes his existence. The criticism some-

times levelled at this point of view is that it pushes God out of His universe and tends to a frigidly mechanistic world view. This criticism is answered by insisting that it affords a basis for a very profoundly religious interpretation. God is in His world, creatively active in the on-going processes. The concept of creative evolution does justice on the one hand to the transcendence of God which the creationistic doctrine was in danger of overemphasizing, and on the other hand to divine immanence which is quite as essential to the religious consciousness. When applied to the questions of social betterment the concept of evolution affords a much more hopeful approach than other doctrines. Even the creationist will talk about the world *growing* worse, and despairingly admit his inability to prevent it. But the evolutionist believes in the possibility of changing the environment and changing human nature for the better, and his hope leads him to an enthusiastic coöperation in all schemes for social amelioration.

But what about the conflicting explanations of revelation and science? Is there any way in which this apparent dilemma can be resolved? If they both are considered as explanations, there is not. And there is nothing to be gained by trying to argue the incompatibility out of existence. It must be remembered that both of these accounts of origins are hypotheses. When it is maintained that evolution is a "mere guess," a hypothesis being nothing more than a highfalutin name for a guess, it should not be forgotten that the cynicism is equally hard on the creationistic theory. The author of the Epistle to the

Hebrews stated that "it is by *faith* we understand that the worlds were created by the command of God."¹⁷ In the nature of the case demonstration or evidence is impossible. So that what we have is not fact versus guess, but one hypothesis versus another, with the whole weight of scientific testimony on the side of evolution. In a recent pronouncement of the American Association for the Advancement of Science the following resolutions were adopted:

(1) The Council of the Association affirms that, so far as the scientific evidences of the evolution of plants and animals and man are concerned there is no ground whatever for the assertion that these evidences constitute a "mere guess." No scientific generalization is more strongly supported by thoroughly tested evidence than is that of organic evolution.

(2) The Council of the Association affirms that the evidences in favour of the evolution of man are sufficient to convince every scientist of note in the world, and that these evidences are increasing in number and importance every year.¹⁸

Is the correct procedure for science, then, simply to apply the *tu quoque* argument? There is a much better way. It is to recognize that Genesis and the Brahmanas are religious books and were never intended as scientific treatises. The great conviction of the authors was that somehow behind the facts and phenomena of Nature there must be a designing intelligence. They are both elementary forms of the cosmological argument. The great numbers of living scien-

¹⁷ Heb. xi. 2.

¹⁸ *Nature*, July 11, 1925, p. 69.

tists who are profoundly religious men bear ample testimony to the fact that it is possible to believe in evolution and at the same time appreciate the postulates of faith that, back of all these cosmic processes, or in them, there is God. The scientist explains the universe in terms of an evolutionary process; the religious man finds meaning and value in it in terms of God. Each has his distinctive contribution to make to the enrichment of life, and there is every reason why they ought to coöperate towards that common purpose.

It must never be forgotten that religion is experienced in the same environment as science, and that it is an environment increasingly capable of scientific interpretation. If the scientific view of the universe, which is becoming increasingly complete in detail, were giving us a picture incongruous with the life of religion, it would be fraught with danger. But in truth scientists claim to be discovering a new homogeneity in the material universe. Physical factors are reducible to electrons and protons and waves in space, over against which we have the mental facts. "It is an impressive fact that one system of formulation suffices in the chemico-physical world from the smallest particles to the stellar universes."¹⁰ If the researches of the biochemists should one day be rewarded with the crowning success that would enable them to manufacture protoplasm, the homogeneity of the universe would be still more evident. As matters stand, the sciences have clarified our view of the

¹⁰ J. Arthur Thomson: *Science and Religion*, p. 57.

universe so as to make a rational view of religion more tenable. The universe as depicted by modern science is not unfriendly to the man with religious aspirations.

III

A third method of differentiating between the religious and scientific attitudes is to point out that religion is concerned with life in its totality, whereas science concerns itself with particular problems and situations. There is no single science that deals with the whole of phenomena or experience. Each science specializes in some problem or group of problems and employs the conceptions and the technique which will enable it to describe the phenomena with which it is concerned. It devises appropriate instruments or tools which are designed to further the processes of control and manipulation. The test which applies alike to its mental tools and physical tools, that is, its concepts and its instruments, is their capacity or efficiency to further the problem-solving and controlling processes. It is inevitable that the sciences should increase the sum total of knowledge by piecemeal additions. Scientific knowledge always comes bit by bit, never in large lumps. That is because each science takes as its field of inquiry a definite group of phenomena, and seeks to explain the facts observable in that field, and to devise methods for bringing the field more completely under human control.

It is possible to summarize the stages through which scientific inquiry proceeds, as follows: First there is the pre-scientific period in which the consciousness of problems has not yet become articulate. In this stage

man reacts unreflectively and uncritically to his environment, and seeks to gain control by magical and animistic means. Indian people who have not had cultural advantages on their first contact with scientific inventions, such as the railway, telegraph, gramophone, motor-car, etc., have frequently believed them to be the work of mischievous spirits. It requires time and experience for critical reflection to begin before they can adjust themselves to the new situation. There is a tendency for the old attitude to persist into the second stage when the consciousness of the problem begins to emerge. Facts are manipulated in a relatively crude way and organized without much precision. There is the curiosity to know more about the mysteries that are just beginning to unfold. But this sense of mystery is still attached to the world of spirits and gods, and man feels that all phenomena are in some way associated with them, particularly when the explanations for phenomena are not yet forthcoming. One of the popular ideas among Hindus is that each department of life comes beneath the ægis of a protecting deity. Sciences have their occult side as well as their more familiar and practical aspects. This is the stage where critical differentiation is beginning to dawn. At a third stage there is an augmenting of rational criticism and explanation. The facts which have been observed are analyzed, classified, and correlated in so far as they will admit. Special attention is given to sequences and possible relationships. Then hypotheses are framed as a method of bringing together various elements in experience so as to allow no facts to remain isolated. Strictly speaking hypothe-

ses are unverified or only partially verified guesses, so that term is also applied to that which has not been completely demonstrated. These hypotheses are put to the test in the laboratory of the science, and if they are confirmed by experiment, are considered to be demonstrated. If exceptions occur, then new hypotheses are framed which endeavour to take account of the older hypotheses, and the observed exceptions. This period of experimentation and rigorous research is the final stage of the inquiry. The hypothesis which has been obtained inductively is now thoroughly tested deductively, significant facts are observed, and an orderly coherent view of phenomena gradually built up.

Scientific inquiry is always concerned with particular problems. To be sure, one effect of an inquiry is to obtain a certain solidarity of effort. Though the problems attacked are individual, modern science proceeds on the understanding that any person who fulfils the required conditions may make the same observations which the scientists claim to have made. Scientific workers have no monopoly of scientific facts. Accounts of demon possession, evil effects from inauspicious omens, operations of the evil eye, black magic, and the like, which are so prevalent in India, cannot be made the object of scientific inquiry until they can be so integrated with ordinary experience that any man who so desires can observe and analyze them. That is one of the difficulties with events that are placed within the category of miracle. But when a scientific problem confronts the world, there is a corps of workers ready to lend their efforts towards

effecting a solution. Scientific inquiry is a great coöperative enterprise, each man contributing his bit to the solution of the problem and frequently never surviving to enjoy the fruit of his own efforts.

So far the sciences have developed only so as to provide man with a technique for a mechanical manipulation of a fraction of his environment. Each particular science is limited much more, and comprises within its range a much smaller group of phenomena. That means that the scientific attitude is always and necessarily selective. One evidence of the selective character of scientific procedure is that the achievement of a thorough technique depends on the situation's being repeated with sufficient frequency to enable the observer to obtain the required data for generalization and analysis. The mechanism of human observation itself is a guarantee of the essentially selective nature of the process. Professor G. H. Mead has put the matter in this way:

The scientist always deals with an *actual* problem, and even when he looks before and after, he does so in so far as he is facing an enquiry into some actual problem. No actual problem could conceivably take on the form of a conflict involving the whole world of meaning. The conflict always arises between an individual experience and certain laws, certain meanings, while others are unaffected. These others form a necessary field without which no conflict can arise. . . . The attitude of the scientist never contemplates or could contemplate the possibility of the world in which there would be no reality by which to test his hypothetical solution of the problem that arises. . . . The world of the scientist is always there as one in which reconstruc-

tion is taking place with continual shifting of problems, but as a real world within which the problems arise."¹⁰

The scientist deals with particular problems in a world which he regards as real and coherent. He assumes coherency whether he definitely posits it or not. He argues by analogy that 'because particular observed instances have certain elements in common they will be alike in other respects. The argument from analogy forms the ground work of hypothesis formation. Pre-scientific explanations also were largely based on this principle. Primitive man regarded thunder as the voice of his deity. The Hindu interprets the red rays of the rising sun as due to the blood of slain rakshasas, thunder as the crack of Indra's whip, lightning as manifestation of the fire god, Agni, comets and meteors as the operations of Ketu, and eclipses as the swallowing of the sun or moon by Rahu. The principle of analogy as applied in modern science is the same but the observations are more thorough and references to the occult are eliminated. The purpose of analogy is inference, but since it yields only probable conclusions it needs to be supplemented by experiment and more careful observations. As B. Bosanquet pointed out it is more important to *weigh* the points of resemblance than merely to count them."¹¹ Only thus is it possible for analogy to pass beyond the stage of argument from particular to particular to that of generalization which will do justice to the particulars.

¹⁰ Art. "Scientific Method in Creative Intelligence."

¹¹ *Logic*, II, p. 99.

Religion also makes use of the language of analogy. As Höffding says: "We do not cease forming ideas even when we have reached the limit of all knowledge, where no further clear and uncontradictory concepts can be formed. The religious need is particularly impelled to construct ideas at this limit. If we examine these ideas a little more closely we shall see that they all owe their origin to analogy."²²

The justification of analogy in either case is to be found in its serviceableness. If by analogies predictions and calculations are more readily made, then they are useful to the scientist. If they enable us to understand the meaning of life better, so as to be able to achieve its higher values, then they are serviceable to the religious consciousness. The analogy is one of the most valuable instruments in religious epistemology, and the perennial effort of man is to find what God is like. If the religious analogy simply leads from one particular to another it is no different from any other kind. But if it leads to more general concepts, to metaphysical interpretations, it must be the outcome of careful weighing of the data and consideration of the relationship between the data and other achieved knowledge.

It is characteristic of the religious attitude that it is concerned with life in its integrity, and regards its activities as of cosmic significance. The religious attitude is less selective and more sweeping than the scientific. It looks upon the environment with which it is trying to establish helpful social relations as a unity, whereas the scientific attitude, seeking for

²² *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 70.

mechanical control, regards it as a plurality. To be sure, the unity which the religious attitude assumed is variously characterized. Sometimes it is interpreted pantheistically as in the Vedic and Dravidian religions, sometimes pantheistically as in the Upanishads (the Vedantism of Cankara), and at other times monotheistically as in Islam and Christianity. Nevertheless it is a cosmos and not a chaos, a universe and not a pluriverse. And religion seeks to put man into relationship with the extra-mundane environment in its wholeness.

The means whereby men endeavour to establish helpful social relationships with their cosmic environment vary with the cultural state of the people. Among primitive races flattery, bribery and gaudy gifts are employed to that end. The natives of Africa will sometimes beat their fetishes when they do not attain the ends they desire. The Dravidian of South India discards his idol when it has ceased to be useful to him. The real purpose of the idol is symbolic, and it appeals powerfully to the consciousness of those who have not learned to use mental imagery. Among Protestant Christians the practice of idolatry is not condoned because such images are regarded as belittling God. The Protestant prays to one who is unseen, but the illiterate Indian villager cannot understand how a man can carry on prayer and worship with no visual images present. He finds the physical image a reënforcement to his faith, and regards it as giving stability to his religious exercises. The visual object enables him to keep his mind on the power which it symbolizes. The difference between the pre-cultural

man and his more sophisticated brother is not, as is sometimes supposed, that the former uses images while the latter does not. It is rather that the former thinks he must have concrete physical images to carry on his worship, while the latter contents himself with mental images. Images are the material of the thought processes, and it is inevitable that we use some sort of imagery—visual, verbal, or what-not—to carry on the processes. But that is by the way. The point to be observed in this connection is that the person regards the object of his worship as of cosmic significance, whether the forms be primitive or sophisticated. The means employed may be flattery, bribery, or even abuse; they may be social and philanthropic service; or they may be largely interpreted in ethical terms. But religion in any case interprets the world as a totality or unity in terms of social relationships which are established with a view to living with it so as to secure the maximum of satisfaction for the spiritual life. One of the most inspiring of modern conceptions of the religious life is that it is a partnership with God in undertakings that are of cosmic worth. God's tasks are real tasks, and His need of human help is real. So that man is God's comrade in working out purposes that affect the ultimate character of the universe, and God is man's comrade sustaining and strengthening him so that he may do his part.

IV

A fourth way in which it is possible to differentiate between religion and science is to say that the former

is concerned with the qualitative, and the latter with the quantitative."²² Friedrich Daab in his essay, "Religion and Science," says: "Religion experiences; science calculates. Religion creates; science discovers. Religion ventures; science weighs."²⁴ The differentiation seems to be valid. If science is to furnish us with a mechanical technique for the manipulation of the environment, it must utilize the methods of calculation and measurement. This is not only true in regard to the physical and mathematical sciences, but mathematical accuracy is the desideratum for all scientific work. Modern philosophy, beginning with Descartes, has endeavoured to apply the scientific method to its problems, and to be studiously accurate in all of its processes. Measurement is a typical scientific procedure and one which obviously demands accuracy of observation, record, and calculation. On the other hand the method of organization for social control is that of living through experiences, taking risks if that seems desirable, and seeking to interpret the experiences qualitatively. Temperature, cloth and even intelligence are capable of being measured, but not so mother's love, or patriot's zeal, or soldier's courage, or grace of God.

The great reason that the sciences work quantitatively is that mechanical control is possible only through scrupulous accuracy. Quantitative observa-

²² B. H. Streeter in his recent work, *Reality*, has emphasized this point, making it the basis for an epistemological differentiation.

²⁴ *Die Religion erhebt; die Wissenschaft berechnet. Die Religion schafft; die Wissenschaft entdeckt. Die Religion wägt; die Wissenschaft wägt* (art: Religion und Wissenschaft) in *Das Suchen der Zeit*, V. (1909), p. 123.

tions lead the way to the understanding of sequences both chronological and logical with a view to establishing causal relations. Hypotheses and laws are built on the basis of these observations, and their function is instrumental. Through them we achieve our control of the environment. The control of the present and of the future is made possible by the calculated data of the past. Religion however, is, characterized by a venturesomeness that transcends scientific calculation. It is more apt to venture to manipulate tools forged out of untried materials. To be sure, science has its faith also and makes adventures in the field of hypothesis and experiment, but in so doing it builds with the calculated data of the past. Religion is more creative, and is constantly constructing new tools and new values. The calculations of science are made on the basis of the past; the adventures of religion are frequently made in spite of a past that would seem to indicate failure.

Religion, being social, deals with both parties of the religious relationship as persons. Now it is characteristic of personality that the method of calculation is decidedly limited. One can predict with a great degree of certainty what a mechanism will do under certain conditions. But such predictions in regard to persons are liable to be quite upset. A person is characterized by the conative ability to react quite differently to a stimulus at different times and just because of that fact radical behaviourism can never be a satisfactory interpretation of psychological facts. When we are dealing with reflexive and instinctive behaviour we can predict the future fairly accurately

on the results of the past; but the method breaks down when applied to conscious conations. The religious attitude, involving a relationship conceived in personal terms, ventures very often to neglect the quantitative element, and to undertake a line of action based on the experienced needs of life and its interpretation of the power or powers with whom it is socially related. It would be a one-sided view of truth to consider it as all mechanically calculable. Many of the most cherished truths of human experience have been achieved in social rather than mechanical processes. We may admit that the knowledge of God is not comparable to such a geometrical formula as that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. Yet in the field of social experience we may attain a certainty that science could neither discover nor question because it has not the necessary technique for such investigation.

One of the difficulties that has arisen is in regard to the concept of infinity. A number of modern philosophers, including William James and James Ward, have argued that God must be finite. The great human problem which has led to that postulate is the problem of evil. The presence of evil in the world makes it exceedingly difficult to reconcile the omnipotence of God with His goodness. Goodness cannot be abandoned without an entire loss of faith, so the concept of infinity is given up. William James gave expression to this view in the following passage:

The only way to escape from the paradoxes and perplexities that a consistently thought-out monistic universe suffers from as from a species of auto-intoxica-

tion, the mystery of the fall, namely, of reality lapsing into appearance, truth into error, perfection into imperfection; of evil, in short; the mystery of universal determinism, of the block universe eternal and without a history, etc.—the only way to escape, I say, from all this is to be frankly pluralistic and to assume that the superhuman consciousness, however vast it may be, has itself an external environment and consequently is finite. . . . The line of least resistance then, as it seems to me, both in theology and philosophy, is to accept along with the superhuman consciousness the notion that it is not all-embracing, the notion in other words, that there is a God, but that He is finite either in power or in knowledge or in both at once.*

Mathematical physics is tending to substantiate the view of the universe as finite. The labours of Einstein have led to actual computations of the dimensions of the universe. Its circumference has been estimated, very hypothetically, as about one hundred million light years, the equivalent of about six hundred million million million miles. The weight of it also has been computed at about 1,054 grams, or about one hundred trillion times the mass of the sun. The universe of the relativists is a four-dimensional curved world with space and time interpenetrating. Probably the powers of imagination of most people are so limited that a universe as vast as the computations of Einstein and his coworkers is practically infinite. He is left wondering what could be outside such far-off limits. It is apparent, however, that the old ideas of space and time as absolute must be abandoned, as also the older notions of matter and motion. Cer-

* *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 310 ff.

tainly the resultant picture of the universe appeals to one's sense of wonder quite as much as one in which the magical and the miraculous function more. There is no escape for the religious man, nor should he desire it, from adjusting his thinking concerning spiritual values to this view of the universe that is presented by modern science.

It is sometimes argued that the concept of infinity originated in mathematics, and is not strictly a religious notion. It is defined as the "conception of any sort of mental object as having *quantity* which cannot be exhausted by any succession of experiences, however prolonged."²² When we describe a quantity as infinite we mean that it exceeds any boundaries or values which the human consciousness is able to span. When the concept of infinity is thus applied to God, it is intended to describe His transcendence, but being a quantitative term it does not really express any religious value. Religion is an affair of the practical life, and it makes practically no difference to men whether we suppose that God is infinite or finite, so long as we find in Him those spiritual qualities for which the heart of man longs. Furthermore Zeno the Eleatic many centuries ago showed by his antinomies that the concept contains logical pitfalls which it is impossible to escape. However true it may be that the concept may have originated with mathematics and is largely a term of quantitative significance, it must be responded that such is scarcely the whole

²² Baldwin: *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, art. "Infinite and Infinity."

truth. In the minds of most people the infinity of God has reference to His qualitative transcendence. Whether the reference be to His knowledge, His power, His purity or His love, it means more than simply that God possesses all of these things without quantitative limitation, and bears the significance that they are also qualitatively incomparable. The truth is that neither quantity nor quality is a *ding-an-sich*. Any attempt to separate them sharply, the one from the other, would be as invalid as the attempt to discriminate sharply between value judgments and existence judgments. It is not possible to rule out the concept of infinity from the idea of God as being a purely mathematical term and therefore falling solely under the purview of science. For many people it is expressive of the transcendence of God, a value which they cherish greatly and without which His divinity would suffer. The fact that the human consciousness cannot adequately comprehend the meaning of the concept is for them all the more reason for associating it with God.

An object is known through its qualities, whether it be an object of scientific interest or a religious object. It is not possible, therefore, for science to ignore qualities entirely, any more than it is possible for religion to be altogether oblivious to the quantitative. The differentiation is valid within the limits of general attitudes and tendencies. But it must not be supposed that it can be erected into a high boundary wall to prevent trespassing on either side by the other party. The *Weltanschauung* of any person or group

is determined by the interaction of both the religious and scientific aspects under the guidance of philosophical criticism.

V

It has been suggested that religion and science may be differentiated on the basis of their typical activities or expressions. The typical expression of the religious life is mysticism, that of science is logic. Here again we have a distinction which is in a sense a corollary of our original differentiation, viz., that the religious attitude is social and the scientific is mechanical. The typical procedure of the social is mysticism, and of the mechanical is logic. Another way of expressing it is to say that the religious attitude is one of participation while the scientific is criticism.

Mysticism takes many forms, but they have this in common that the mystic seeks for a life of intimate communion with God that culminates in absorption. It represents the attempt of the religious consciousness to understand the nature of religious reality, and, having conceived it to be amenable to social relationship, to enter into fellowship therewith. Sometimes the emphasis is on the metaphysical and speculative side, and sometimes on the personal and practical. There are many degrees of intensity, concentration, ecstasy and absorption in the experiences of the mystics. Yet in some form or other the experience is characterized by the conviction of a real contact and vital communion with God. The mystic life is described by all mystics as one which gradually expands, and there is a remarkable similarity in the

descriptions of mystics of different religions concerning the manner in which the mystical life is developed or the stages of the process. J. B. Pratt describes²⁷ it as involving three stages, (1) the negative or purgative stage in which the mystic seeks to be purified by the processes of inhibition and asceticism; (2) the positive, meditative or illuminative stage which consists of using various devices of auto-suggestive tendency such as meditation and the assumption of physical postures as in Yoga practices; and (3) the ecstatic or unitive stage in which the mystic loses consciousness of the world of sense either wholly or partially, and enters a rapturous state in which the consciousness of God is unique and ineffable.

All of the higher religions have their mystics. India has been a home of mysticism for at least as many centuries as there is historical record. The Upanishads have taught that the highest achievable religious experience is the complete absorption of the individual soul (*atman*) in the cosmic soul (*Brahman*). "Thou art that"—*tat tvam asi*—is the formula which expresses the goal of all striving. The Yoga philosophy is the school of thought which has worked out a system of practical discipline whereby such an ideal may gradually be realized. The control of the breath, the recitation of mystic syllables, and the use of certain bodily postures are all designed to aid the processes of contemplation whereby the goal may be achieved. The Sufis are the mystics of Islam. The movement originated in Persia but spread into India and other Muslim countries. The Sufis aspire to a

²⁷ *The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 363-429.

mystic absorption in God through the bond of an ineffable love. The dominant desire of the Buddhist is the conquest of all desire, and its attendant ills. The method whereby that is to be achieved is mystical, the annulment of all worldly ties such as those of family and friends (*via negativa*), the association with the *sangha* of those like minded, and meditation on spiritual affairs. In Plotinus and other Neo-Platonists we see the same type of discontent with the world and its knowledge, and the effort to aid the spirit in its procession back to its divine source. Christianity has had many mystics, especially in the middle ages. The Christian, like other mystics, thought that the liberation of the spirit involved the mortification of the flesh. Some of them, like Simon Stylites, went to excesses in negative ascetic practices. Others, like Brother Lawrence, thought "the most excellent method . . . of going to God was that of doing my common business purely for the love of God," and through the life of service have tried to "practice the presence of God." The social character of the mystic experience is brought out frequently in the analogies which they use, among the most frequent being that of marriage, God the bride and the mystic the groom, or among Hindus God the guru and the mystic his disciple.

Mysticism is particularly typical of religion because it is so completely an expression of the social attitude towards the extra-human. It is the essence of participation. The characteristic attitude of the worshipper in prayer, sacrifice or votive offering is practically the same as the mystical. He is a participant in social activities, not simply with his fellow worshippers but

with God. And such participation gives him a sense of union and communion which may lead even to an experience of rapture. Mysticism might almost be described as the concentration of that participating attitude which characterizes all real worship, and in that sense it is the soul of religion.

In contrast with all this social, mystical experience the typical procedure of science is analysis and criticism. Science by means of analysis and critical reflection enables us to deal more efficiently by mechanical means with fragments of experience. The technique which it develops is the mental and physical machinery of the theoretical and practical sciences. Its mental machinery is largely devised in the laboratory of logic, and the tests which it imposes upon itself as well as upon other disciplines are logical in character. Scientific knowledge is achieved only by the rigidly logical method of scrutinizing, analyzing, classifying, and synthesizing. The psychological explanation of the fact that people sometimes "go up to the temple to pray" and to worship, but come away feeling that they have failed is that they have adopted the scientific attitude of analysis and criticism instead of the religious attitude of participation. No one can deny the immense service of criticism to the various human disciplines including religion itself. Nevertheless it must be admitted that criticism is not a religious exercise any more than worship is scientific activity. God is not to be found either in the scientist's laboratory or at the end of the syllogism. Yet God is found and known and communed with. He is found in the deeper social experiences when men, in the sense of

utter dependence, reach out in faith and venture to trust. There is nothing to be gained by the scientist who complains that his critical methods do not give him God. He who would know God and deepen his religious experience must do so by means of social processes such as prayer and worship. And faith establishes her validity in that truth and values are achieved by a method which could never be attained by logical processes.

I stretch lame hands of faith and grope,
And gather dust and chaff, and call
To what I feel is Lord of all,
And faintly trust the larger hope.**

VI

It has sometimes been maintained that human experiences are separable into two groups, the one subjective and irrelevant to science and the other objective and scientific, but without religious significance. To begin with we must be guarded against making the distinction between the subjective and objective too radical. The vast majority of human experiences involve a subject-object relationship, and are irreducible to either element alone. Having made that qualification, we may admit that the religious attitude is the more subjective and the scientific attitude the more objective of the two.

The scientist evinces a certain amount of subjectivism in selection of the objects for his investigation. And some scientists display a considerable

** Tennyson: *In Memoriam*, LV.

amount of subjectivism, particularly when dealing with mental and social sciences, in the treatment of their data. But it must be admitted that such subjectivism always jeopardizes a man's scientific work, for the typical scientific procedure is to select and classify only such elements as can be the objects of clear observation and inference. The sum total of the elements with which scientists deal is the objective world. His endeavour is to get behind all subjective matter, all interpretation to the facts as they appear at first hand. "The scientific man," says Karl Pearson, "has above all things to strive at self-elimination in his judgments, to provide an argument which is as true for each individual mind as for his own. The classification of facts, the recognition of their sequence and relative significance is the function of science, and the habit of forming a judgment upon these facts unbiased by personal feeling is characteristic of what may be termed the scientific frame of mind." "

I recently met a lawyer searching in the library of the University of Madras for data from which he could decide a legal point involved in whether or not a *gopuram* was an essential in a Hindu temple. He said he could find many descriptions of gopurams, and some interpretations, but these matters were of no value for his immediate inquiry. Obviously, though he was dealing with the institutions of a religion, his inquiry was scientific, and he was quite right in insisting on its thorough objectivity.

On the other hand the religious man deals with values, meanings and interpretations which are per-

" *The Grammar of Science*, p. 6.

sonal matters. The religious relationship is a relationship between persons, and since the Other of that relationship is spiritual but not corporeal, it is inevitable that it should be more subjective. It is a curious animadversion to imagine that to describe an attitude as subjective is to condemn it. A subjective attitude is personal. It emanates from a person, but not without reference to the experiences of the past. Even the sciences must admit their debt to personality without which they would never have come into existence. They have to give an account of psychological facts as well as physical, so that the distinction between religion and science on this basis is relative but not absolute. On the other hand the vast majority of religious people would be very much dissatisfied with any view of the universe which questioned objective existence in God. Nevertheless an objective existence in religious reality is not something which can be checked by the processes of sense-perception. It is a matter of faith, the demonstration of the validity of which is its functional worth in human experience. The claim of validity for the religious object is a problem of metaphysical rather than physical consideration. And here again the boundary cannot be rigidly demarked. The differentiation sometimes put forward that science deals with the physical and religion with the metaphysical is not even a half truth, for metaphysics is dependent for its worth on the scientific method. What are atoms, molecules, electrons, vitamins, etc., but the metaphysical assumptions of the scientist concerning which he can establish validity and objectivity only by their functional

worth? Even time and space, two concepts of first-rate importance to scientific investigation, are metaphysical and not objective.

In psychological language we may say that the scientist makes more use of sense-perception, and the religious man of imagination. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the scientist and the religious man each makes a characteristic use of the imagination. By imagination we mean the flow of reinstated sensory experiences in consciousness, and we must carefully guard against presupposing images to be structures of the mind. Sense-perception is, of course, the basis for imagery, and the manner in which images appear and fuse in consciousness is determined by the combined influences of the various stimuli, external and internal, operating on the subject. The scientist in the observational processes depends much on the accuracy of sense-perception, but in the formation of hypotheses he designedly combines images in the trial-and-error method of attempting to solve his problem. In achieving that end, however, the scientist is very careful to combine his imagery with precision of reference to the problem in hand and the kinæsthetic manipulation desired. In contrast with that the religious man is aiming to control his environment by social means for spiritual ends, and the manner in which he combines imagery is with reference to that end. In science images need to be combined with reference to calculations involved, and any inaccuracy destroys the value of the results. In religion felt needs guide our procedure, and the processes of association are often determined by the social mind. The ele-

ments of the imagery are always to be found in the experiences of the past, but the association of them may be novel and eccentric. We have had sense-perceptual experiences of monkeys, elephants, lions and men, but a Hanuman, a Ganesh or a Narasimha are the products of the creative activity of the religious imagination. So also the conception of a heavenly Father is a construct of the image-forming tendency of consciousness, the elements of which have been acquired in sense-perception.

"It is preëminently the external world," says J. T. Merz, "that is the subject of all methodical and communicable knowledge and gives rise to what we term science. This deals almost exclusively with distribution in space and succession in time as the properties of definite things and events. It relies on, and works with the atomizing or dissecting process."²⁰ Since the sciences deal with the external world, handle their data methodically, and aim at communicable knowledge, there is a minimum of danger of scientific solipsism. The scientist believes that he is acquiring knowledge of the external world and not of mere states of his own consciousness. F. H. Bradley stated the argument of solipsism as follows: "I cannot transcend experience and experience must be *my* experience. From this it follows that nothing beyond myself exists, for what is experience is its (the self's) states."²¹ Sometimes the psychological character of religious experience has been pushed so far that it has resulted in a solipsistic interpretation. It is suggested

²⁰ *Religion and Science: A Philosophical Essay*, p. 85.

²¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 248.

that we may have an idea of God, but cannot establish the fact of any reality external to the mind. Prayer in that view becomes a healthful exercise in auto-suggestion, but nothing more. The argument is subject to all of the extravagancies and fallacies of solipsism. It assumes that a cognitive state can have itself for its own object; it neglects well-known truths that anyone knows are external to one's own consciousness; it neglects the stimulus-response relationship in the mental life; and it takes no account of other selves which are conscious. There seems no valid ground for arguing that such a universal experience as the consciousness of God, though it is admittedly subjective in the good sense, would have no stimulus other than a state of consciousness. We have at least the pragmatic retort that the person who assumes the opposite, who assumes that there is no reality to stimulate the sense of God, comes to grief just as surely as the man who denies the existence of a post and tries to walk through that part of space, where the post is imagined to be.

The historical struggle between the scientists and the representatives of religion is in the last analysis a struggle between two world views. Science offers us a world view that is naturalistic. It presents us with a world the behaviour of which is calculable by the formulas of determinism. Religion holds up before us the picture of an ideal world, a world in the process of becoming, a world which we build out of the images created in response to our experienced needs. Each is enlisted in the service of life, the more abundant life. Their serviceableness to life, each in its own

way, is the best apologetic that can be offered for them. Each is the outcome of an ineradicable tendency in human life, and each is able to offer a service which the other is not fitted to render. No ultimate conflict is possible between them because we need them both in the struggle for existence, for each is a contribution to the larger life. There is no need to prophesy about a "survival of the fittest," they are best understood through the doctrine of "mutual aid." The following quotation from William James puts the matter in his inimitable way:

Science gives to all of us telegraphy, electric lighting, and diagnosis and succeeds in preventing and curing a certain amount of disease. Religion in the shape of mind-cure gives to some of us serenity, moral poise and happiness and prevents certain forms of disease as well as science does, or even better in a certain class of persons. Evidently, then, science and religion are both of them genuine keys for unlocking the world's treasure house to him who can use either of them practically. Just as evidently neither is exhaustive or exclusive of the other's simultaneous use. And why, after all, may not the world be so complex as to consist of many interpenetrating spheres of reality, which we can thus approach in alternation by using different conceptions and assuming different attitudes, just as mathematicians handle the same numerical and spatial facts by geometry, by analytical geometry, by algebra, by the calculus or by the quaternions and each time come out right? On this view religion and science, each verified in its own way from hour to hour and from life to life, would be eternal.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 122, 123.

VII

It is perfectly obvious that the progress of the scientific method has resulted in the disintegration of the antecedent magical interpretation of the universe. The modern man does not believe that this is a world in which anything may happen, much less may be made to happen. The undifferentiated continuum of primitive mentality has yielded to a finely articulated and increasingly rationalized view of the disciplines of life. The influence of the sciences has been in the direction of liberating life from the fetters of arbitrariness and caprice. While science makes no claim to solving all the problems of life, it has made it patent that unscientific solutions are untenable. This new freedom makes it possible for ethics to achieve new concepts of righteousness, and religion new meanings and motives, both of which involve enlarging hopes and responsibilities. It does not detract from the adventure of religious faith to know that it is experienced in a world that is in many respects calculable as to its behaviour, but it makes of it what Mr. Wiggam describes as "a greater and finer art and an adventure filled with meaning." Science has immensely enriched life by giving us control over physical and social forces that minister to health and happiness, and, in doing so, far from hampering religion, it has freed it for a more unembarrassed devotion to its spiritual task. The opposition in some quarters to freedom in the teaching of modern science is in the last analysis an attempt to retain the old magical world order as if it were the only one in which religion could function. Science is offering to religion a world

of surpassing beauty and wonder, a world that is dependable and intelligible, and who shall deny that such a world offers richer meanings and a profounder conception of the meeting of God in human experience? If it were possible to have an experience of God in the old world of alchemy, astrology and sorcery, surely the possibilities are richer far in the new world that science is interpreting to us.

One of the most characteristic features of modern science, and one to which religion must always be sensitive, is the scientific temper. That temper may be described as a single-minded devotion to and an unflagging zeal for the truth. The scientist believes it to be his privilege and duty to harness every available force in the environment for the enrichment of life. His faith carries with it far-reaching implications. It means for one thing the willingness to abandon any instrument, physical or mental, that has ceased to be serviceable. It involves a readiness to experiment fearlessly and conscientiously for the sake of discovering the best means of curing human ills and reconstructing life on a larger plane. The experimental method and attitude have succeeded admirably in the physical and natural sciences, and have cleared away much that was confusing and irrelevant to the particular problems under advisement. The result has not been the deletion of all mystery from life, but rather a clearing of the issues so that we may have a much clearer conception of the nature of our problems. It is not an indication of irreverence but rather of adventurous faith that carries this experimental temper into the field of religion. The knowledge of God is not innate, and it

is only as we live adventurously and with minds wide open to truth that we learn the reality of God in experience. Religion has nothing valuable to lose and everything to gain by its contact with the scientific temperament. For both of them are in search of the truth and the whole truth. There ought therefore to be the most cordial coöperation between them. Such coöperation for religion means association with the best knowledge about the behaviour of nature which is God's workshop. The discoveries of science are in some respects akin to divine revelations. Man has learned that the sciences are putting into his hands increasingly the means for answering his own prayers, and for winning salvation from some of the things that obstruct and prevent the attainment of abundant life. There is a great truth in Mr. A. E. Wiggam's contention that "the social organization of science is simply the technical administration of the love of God."²²

Truth from any source ought to be welcomed alike by the man of science or the religious man. Both claim to be seaching for truth, each in his own way, and each should welcome the truth that is discovered by the other.

The Truth is in the Universe,
In earth and sea, in sky and air,
In man and beast, and holy book,
The truth is everywhere,
For God is truth.

The recognition that there is truth in the world without and truth in the heart of man should be hearty and

²² *The New Decalogue of Science*, p. 134.

fearless. Some truth is revealed as we manipulate our environment in mechanical ways; other truth comes only as the soul of man reaches outward and upward socially. But unless the universe be incoherent and discordant, there should be no ultimate conflict between the truths of science and the truths of religion.

There are certain particular truths which the scientist has discovered, truths in regard to the character and constitution of the universe in which we live, that ought to be cordially welcomed by the religious man, because they help him to understand the character of the world in which he lives and experiences the presence of God.

(1) One of the most obvious truths to which science has given emphasis is that the universe is orderly, that it is a cosmos and not a chaos. As Professor J. Arthur Thomson has said: "There can be no loopholes in a cosmos." ** Events are calculable with remarkable precision, and we are able to make plans in great minuteness and expect to carry them to fruition. The recurrence of the seasons in regular succession, the periodical alternation between day and night, the motion of the heavenly bodies in their orbits, the conditions of life and of death—all of these and many other facts impress us with the amazing regularity that characterizes the phenomenal world. There was no fact that left a deeper impress on the Greek mind than the harmony of the universe, though some of them thought it was due to blind necessity. It reminded Carlyle of a perfect clock, the handiwork of

** *Science and Religion*, p. 218.

the divine Craftsman who could sit outside of it all and revel in the contemplation of His creative skill. But to the religious consciousness order and harmony testify to the precise reverse of blind necessity. In spite of all the subtle arguments of a Kant, the average human mind finds it difficult to imagine a harmonious design without a designer. A purely mechanistic theory explains nothing—neither the existence of the mechanism, nor the energy that drives it. The religious man believes that there is intelligence and purposiveness at the heart of the cosmos; otherwise it would not be a cosmos. Harmony and order are tokens of the immanence of God as well as of His transcendence. They speak to us of a God who is ceaselessly active, creatively and redemptively active in His universe. We make our plans for the future, and continue at our appointed tasks with no fear of the machinery going to smash or the cosmos order being suddenly reversed. There is no danger of cosmic lawlessness, for God is at the heart of things.

(2) Another great truth which science has disclosed is that the universe is characterized by development. It is tragic that certain religious people so interpret the word "evolution" that they hold it to be impossible to believe in evolution and be religious. To many others, on the contrary, it is much more serviceable to the religious consciousness than the creationistic hypothesis. Renewal, growth, fertility, contingent perfectability, mutual aid, these are all conceptions which are significant at once for religion and science. Dr. Faunce says:

The doctrine of evolution, rightly understood and interpreted, is today one of the most powerful aids to religious faith. It has delivered thousands from perplexity amounting to despair. It has supplanted the old paralyzing conception of a "world-machine," a world mechanical and lifeless, grinding human destiny without end. In place of that soulless mechanism we have a growing organism. In the words of John Fiske, "The simile of the watch has been replaced by the simile of the flower." A developing world, still in the process, ceaselessly unfolding, still to be shaped by human purpose and effort—that is the inspiring conception now placed in the hands of the church by modern science.⁸⁵

To those who conceive of the kingdom of God as cataclysmic the conception of evolution is doubtless unwelcome. But many find vital religious value in the psychological notion of unfolding personality, progressing more and more towards the ideal person—God Himself. It is surely possible to grow in grace, in *bhakti*, in divine wisdom, in truth, in virtue, in character. The Hindu and Buddhist think of an evolution of the *atman* (individual soul) till it be absorbed in the *Brahman* (world-soul). And the Christian believes in the possibility of growth in grace and in the knowledge of God. "First the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear" was the analogy whereby Jesus pictured the manner in which God's kingdom is established. Many men find it a most inspiring conception to think of the evolutionary process as evidence of the immanent activity of God.

⁸⁵ Art. in *World's Work*, March 1923.

A fire mist and a planet,
A crystal and a cell,
A jelly-fish and a saurian,
And caves where the cave-men dwell;
Then a sense of awe and beauty,
And a face turned from the clod;
Some call it evolution
And others call it God.

(3) Science teaches us yet another great truth, namely that the development of the universe is not aimless, but purposeful. In other words it is development plus direction. To be sure, the man of science cannot answer in full the question as to what purposes are involved in the development of the universe. Yet in spite of paucity of knowledge, there are many scientists who insist that there is overwhelming evidence for teleology. The astronomer does not know the end, but believes that the evidence points to a regularly ordered development in the universe. The biologist finds many facts in the structures and functions of living organisms that indicate purpose. The social sciences, such as ethics and sociology, can marshal a host of facts to support the same contention. All of this is valuable for the religious man. Yet we cannot neglect the fact that there are many others who claim to be unable to find any evidence for purpose in the external world. Dean Inge thinks that "the dispute about teleology is a dispute about nature's method, religion not being vitally concerned." He describes it as "a quarrel between two scientific theories: the Aristotelian theory that the 'nature' of anything is to be found in its completed development, and the modern

theory of natural selection." ³⁶ After all, perhaps the greatest argument for purpose comes from quite another sphere—the sphere of faith. The religious man is happy that so much scientific evidence can be adduced for purposefulness. But even if there were less, he would claim the right to say—the right of faith to say—that since he believes this is God's world it is a world that throbs with purpose. The scientific agnostic may defy him to prove his claim. He can at least retort that the reverse is much more improbable and unprovable, and that until the mechanistic theory be proven, he can claim the right to his faith. The universe is "a realm of ends" to use Professor James Ward's happy phrase, a realm of ends in which "God is love indeed, and love creation's final law." ³⁷

(4) Another truth about which science is able to teach us much is that the universe is wonderful. Those who have read ever so little of the science of astronomy must have been filled with the sense of wonder as they have contemplated stars whose numbers are in the millions, and of distances of millions of miles. For practical human purposes such incomprehensible calculations are equivalent to infinity. We know for example that the light of some stars, travelling at the rate of 186,000 miles per second, takes at least 200,000 years to reach us. There are probably stars, the light of which we enjoy at night, which have long since been extinct. Can we ponder such facts, and be dead to the sense of wonder? In contrast with a universe of such magnitude, the Psalmist might well exclaim, "when I

³⁶ *An Outline of Christianity*, "Religion and Science," IV, p. 5.

³⁷ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 453.

consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained; what is man that thou art mindful of him? and the son of man that thou visitest him?"** Or, if we turn to the anatomy and physiology of the human organism, and study the nervous system in all the intricacies of its organization, the cerebral cortex with its nine billions of cells, or one little organ like the ear or the eye and its niceties of adjustment, can we remain unmoved by the wonder of the mechanism and its adaptations? Even the observation of a tiny flower in the minuteness of its detail and the delicacy of its beauty truly fills us with wonder, as it did Tennyson.

Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies,
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.

The sense of wonder is surely very much akin to the spirit of reverence. It is this sense which makes belief in miracle for so many people an end to religious faith. Our English word "miracle" which literally means "something wonderful" expresses the wonder of the man of faith which drives him on to the God, who, he believes, is at the heart of it all.

VIII

The recognition that science is unfolding great truths which religion must welcome does not mean that religion is in any danger of being supplanted by science

** Ps. viii. 3, 4.

as a way of life. Science has neither the technique nor the knowledge ever to become a substitute for faith. For there are other great truths which are discoverable only by the processes of faith, and there are facts of experience which are revealed only as men believe in God and act in accordance with their belief. Furthermore the experiences of the human race in the long run have made it abundantly evident that science has no right to question these revelations, because they are neither discoverable nor criticizable by scientific methods. The truth is that science has seldom questioned religion as a whole, but only certain aspects of belief have come in conflict with scientific knowledge. Professor A. N. Whitehead has reminded us "that religion is the expression of one type of fundamental experiences of mankind; that religious thought develops into an increasing accuracy of expression, disengaged from adventitious imagery; that the interaction between religion and science is one great factor in promoting this development." ** Faith is just as dynamic as science, and cannot be disintegrated because of advancing scientific knowledge. We do not look forward to a "non-religion of the future" as the Positivists do, but to a faith emancipated from embarrassing associations with magic or decadent science, ever achieving new values and enlarging man's vision of God.

(1) The religious man insists that this world is full of meaning. It is more than a continual succession of ground and consequence, more than a concourse of molecules and electrons in a material mass, more than

** *Science and the Modern World*, p. 273.

a mass of adaptations of organisms to environment, more than a process of metabolism within a living organism. It is more than a mechanism, more than a material world. It is a world in which there are social facts as well as mechanical, spiritual facts as well as physical. We men are just as truly spiritual beings as physical organisms. And the great power by which the whole creation moves is a spirit.

Religious faith in Providence is the outcome of man's insistence that the world shall have meaning. Man persists in reading meanings in earthquakes, famines, floods, disease, war, death, and all sorts of pestilential experiences. The creed of naturalism is not enough to enable us to be patient and courageous in times of trouble. But there is meaning also in our pleasures and successes. Adversity is understood as God's chastening, and prosperity as His bounty. Thanksgiving for the rain in due season, the abundant harvest, the happiness of our homes, the loyalty of our friends and the liberties of our democracies is man's recognition of the hand of God in benevolence. The religious man is humbled by his failures but not disheartened; he is encouraged by his successes but not conceited. Whatever life may have in store for him, of good or of ill, he believes it is ultimately significant, and can be turned to service for the development of faith. This is the faith that understands the sun shining on the evil and the good and the rain descending on the just and on the unjust as the providential goodness of a heavenly Father. It was such a faith as made Whit-tier sing,

I know not where His islands lift
Their fronded palms in air.
I only know I cannot drift
Beyond His love and care.

(2) Furthermore our faith leads us to believe that this world must afford a home for a man with spiritual aspirations. Science has taught us how the birds and the beasts and the flowers adapt themselves to their environments. It may even inform us how man, the psycho-physical organism, makes his adaptations to environment. But it is only by faith and experience that we can learn the possibilities of a life lived in the sense of comradeship with God. How can we know that our ambitions do not mock us, that our strivings are not all in vain, and that our ideals are not mere fantasies of the imagination? It is by faith and experience under the guidance of faith that we can be relieved of such despair. It would certainly be intolerable if we were left despondent of the possibility of spiritual achievement. But we believe that God and the universe are on the side of the man who is striving for the highest values, that love and hope and goodness will eventually triumph over hatred, error and evil. And we frankly acknowledge that there is no scientific method by which we can demonstrate this. Yet we insist on the right of our faith and as William James put it, we deny the right of any pretended logic to veto our faith.

There are people whose outlook on the world is pessimism. They believe that the processes of nature indicate more of the tooth and the claw than of the helping hand. The struggle for existence is marked by

keen competition in which the weaker are despoiled by the stronger. It is impossible to decide a problem of this kind by amassing scientific evidence. But the man of faith would not accept the decision of pessimism, even if he were persuaded that the weight of scientific testimony was on its side, which is not the case. If he were not an optimist believing that

God's in His heaven;
All's right with the world,

he would be at least a meliorist, believing in the possibility of making the world safer and better for his children, and of coöperating with God in His task of righting the world's wrongs and of overcoming its evils.

(3) A third great truth that transcends scientific truth is that this is God's world. We refuse to believe in a dualism between the natural and the supernatural. By faith we understand that the supernatural is thoroughly natural, and that the natural is shot through and through with the supernatural. We refuse to admit that cosmic processes are all physically determined and mathematically calculable, for cosmic processes are not all or only mechanical. Indeed our faith leads us to believe that the things that matter the most are not the facts and phenomena of the physical universe but the struggles, tasks, and values of the moral and spiritual world. We refuse also to believe that the moral control of the universe is divided between two powers, one of good which we call God and one of evil which we call the devil, and that the latter power is temporarily in the ascendant.

To admit that the world is thoroughly bad and that we are powerless to improve it is to rule God out of His universe and admit defeat. God need not destroy the world by a cataclysm to defeat the evil. He can do it in and by us, his human comrades.

The world is characterized by imperfections enough without admitting that the moral and the religious struggle is hopeless. How else would progress be possible? But the presence of imperfection does not spell the defeat of God. Because God is at the heart of the universe, the religious man believes that evil can be overcome, man can be redeemed, and love can emerge triumphant from the struggle of the ages.

CHAPTER IV

THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND ART

"THE problem of our time," says Dr. Percy Dearmer, "is no longer the reconciliation of religion with science, but the reconciliation of religion with art."¹ Whether this be the judgment of a prophet or of one whose particular interest is art, it is at least the opinion of one who understands the nature of the problem concerning the relationship between religion and art. He believes the problem is due to a general misunderstanding that has arisen between artists and religious people, an aloofness by which each is suffering. A study of history discloses the fact that this spirit of aloofness is of fairly recent origin, for religion and art have been very intimately associated in the past. Moreover a critical examination of their services to one another and to human life leads us to believe that Dearmer is correct in speaking of the loss of contact between the two as due to a "misunderstanding."

We have had abundant occasion to observe already that the life of primitive peoples is psychologically describable as an undifferentiated continuum, and that with the beginning of reflection that continuum was resolved into the various attitudes and techniques which we now describe as religion, art, science and

¹ *Religion and Art*, pp. 3 f.

morality. That being the case, there is bound to be a similarity in our method of approach to the four principal problems under investigation. As has already been observed with reference to magic, religion and science, so now we may observe in regard to art, that in the pre-cultural stage there was no art *per se*, though there were present the elements, along with the elements of other human disciplines afterwards to arise, out of which art took definite form. As Yejö Hirn says, "The more one studies art, especially primitive art, from a comparative and historical point of view, the more one is compelled to admit the impossibility of deciding where the non-æsthetic motives end and the æsthetic motives begin."^a It would be equally true to say that the study of religion in its primitive manifestations makes it difficult to dissociate the religious from the non-religious motives.

There are three senses in which the word art is ordinarily used: (1) the production of beautiful objects by the skill of artists; (2) the production of artificial objects by artisans in contact with natural objects; and (3) the attitude of consciousness in which we appreciate the beauty of certain objects. The third usage, viz., as an attitude which man takes to certain elements in the environment, is the important meaning for a logical or psychological study, and it may even be interpreted so as to include the first, viz., the production of beautiful objects or the carrying on of activities such as painting, sculpture, music, and so on. The basic idea is that in art, in a similar fashion to what we have observed about religion and science, we are

^a *The Origins of Art*, p. 14.

concerned with an attitude of consciousness rather than with any particular things consummated or objects produced. To be sure, every mental attitude is conative in tendency, and is accompanied by appropriate overt activities. Nevertheless the overt expressions of all of them are so varied that it is difficult to find any elements common to all except the psychological antecedents and determinants.

William James once remarked that "religion is a collective term like government." The same remark is applicable to art, science and morality. Each of these words is a generalization from a wide divergence of activities and form of expression. There is no religion, but there are many religions. So also there is no art, but there are several arts and innumerable expressions of the æsthetic attitude. The same assertion applies to science and morals as well. This is, of course, the precise reason that logic has to wait on psychology in respect to the differentiation between them, and the definition of each of them. It follows also that when there are so many forms of both religion and art, the possibilities for inter-relationship are many and diverse. It is a historical fact that they have been found associated at innumerable times and under many circumstances.

Many theories have been propounded in regard to the origin of art. Plato believed the world of things was a copy of the world of ideas, and that the artist, who imitates, copies that which is itself a copy. So that art is doubly removed from reality. Aristotle followed Plato, making imitation the source as also the means of enjoying art. The Greek conception of

imitation also characterized early French and English theories. With Shaftesbury, e.g., it was regarded as the "strictest imitation of nature." But in the case of these interpreters of art the suggestions as to origin were always subsidiary, the dominating interest being that of working out a theory of its functions. The interest in origins is really a modern development, characteristic of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and may be taken as one indication of the increasing scope of the scientific method of inquiry in all departments of human thought. The question takes us into two fields: (1) the anthropological, in which we study the beginnings of art in the social life of the race; and (2) the psychological, wherein we investigate the impulses and instincts which have given rise to the æsthetic attitude and its activities. It is fairly obvious that art is valuable both to the individual and to the race, so that both of these fields of inquiry as to origins are fruitful. We shall consider the problem first from the social point of view, and then the individual, not forgetting however that the distinction is only relative.

I

In accounting for the relation between religion and art in the primitive stage three theories have been proposed; that religion arose from art, that art was born from religion, and that both religion and art have a common origin in the pre-cultural stage of human history. The theory that the religious consciousness springs out of the æsthetic consciousness is supported by Professor Collingwood. He treats the subject from

the point of view of the life of the spirit which is an indivisible whole within which such distinctions arise. Art is the earlier stage in that life, and is incomplete and an error. It is content with imagining, but the spirit demands something higher. It demands assertion and the actual discovery of reality, which is the task that religion accomplishes for us.

There is a primitive grade of religious experience in which all fantasies tend to be asserted as real [says R. G. Collingwood]. We have spoken of the *seer* of ghosts and fairies as an example of rudimentary art; the *believer* in ghosts and fairies is the paralled example of rudimentary religion. In this primitive stage it is not easy to distinguish the two. . . . The point at which a child begins to ask whether stories are true, and passes through the crisis of learning to disbelieve in fairies, is by no means an early stage in its development; and when it arrives, it indicates the emergence of religion from art, of the primitive religious consciousness from the primitive æsthetic consciousness which is its soil and its source; till then the question whether a given fantasy was real or unreal had simply not occurred to the mind; that is, art had not yet given birth to religion. For ultimately, religion cannot mean the assertion of all fantasies as indiscriminately real. That is impossible, because they are in open conflict one with another. The assertion of some as real involves the denial of others, and religion is this polarized activity of assertion-denial as applied to the world of fantasies.*

This is all very idealistic and may fit well into the author's "map of knowledge," but is it true to the facts

* *Speculum Mentis*, p. 113 f. Cf. also the same author's *Outline of a Philosophy of Art*, pp. 88 ff.

which we discover in investigating the life of primitive peoples? Such an investigation would confirm one short sentence in the extract quoted, probably more than any of the other remarks, "In this primitive stage it is not easy to distinguish the two." The truth is that at that primitive stage there was no interest in trying to "distinguish the two."

The precisely opposite view is that art has sprung out of religion, and one of the champions of the theory is Professor Emile Durkheim. He states it as follows:

It is a well-known fact that games and the principal forms of art seem to have been born of religion, and that for a long time they retained a religious character. We now see what the reasons for this are: it is because the cult, though aimed primarily at other ends, has also been a sort of recreation for men. Religion has not played this rôle by hazard or owing to a happy chance, but through a necessity of its nature. Though religious thought is something very different from a system of fictions, still the realities to which it corresponds express themselves religiously only when religion transfigures them. Between society as it is objectively and the sacred things which express it symbolically, the distance is considerable. It has been necessary that the impressions really felt by men, which served as the original matter of this construction, should be interpreted, elaborated and transformed until they became unrecognizable. So the world of religious things is a partially imaginary world, though only in its outward form, and one which therefore lends itself more readily to the free creations of the mind. Also, since the intellectual forces which serve to make it are intense and tumultuous, the unique task of expressing the real with the aid of appropriate symbols is not enough to occupy them. A surplus generally remains available which

seeks to employ itself in supplementary and superfluous works of luxury, that is to say, in works of art.⁴

This doctrine of Durkheim which treats of art as a kind of "surplus" from the imagined world of religion reminds us of the view that appeared in Plato, Schiller, and Herbert Spencer that the æsthetic feelings and activities arise from the discharge of the surplus energy of the organism. But the nineteenth century for the most part swung away from that inferior conception of art to the view that art, the entire process of expression, is not a luxury but a necessity, a necessity, as Mr. Clutton Brock put it, for "the escape from banality."⁵

Somewhat the same point of view is voiced by Professor Della Seta in his splendid work on *Religion and Art*. He believes that all of the art of the human race has been essentially religious. Even the more primitive forms were magico-religious, and the definitely secular expressions in almost all cases are linked in some manner with religion. "Art will then never rise and develop among men," he says, "unless it has a foundation in religion. Art absolutely profane in origin, art born to satisfy the æsthetic taste of the spectator, art which seeks for expressiveness rather than for the material unity of its products, even if this be a spiritual utility, is inconceivable in human history and has absolutely never existed."⁶

Perhaps there is always a danger in trying to account

⁴ *Les Formes Élémentaires de la Vie Religieuse*, trans. by J. W. Swain, p. 381.

⁵ A. Clutton Brock and Others: *The Necessity of Art* (1924).

⁶ P. 35.

for origins on a unitary basis. Paradoxical as it may seem, it may be that Collingwood, Durkheim and Della Seta are all right in certain cases. It may very well be that the æsthetic attitude should sometimes lead on to the religious and other times that the reverse would happen. But it is questionable whether any of these writers gets back to early enough beginnings. If we go back to primitive society in the pre-cultural stage, we are not likely to be debating whether art springs out of religion or religion out of art. It will be apparent that there was a period earlier than either in which the elements of both, along with elements which we would now differentiate as magic, science and morality, existed but not in separation either practically or logically.

The beginnings of art take us back to the period of pre-history. In the caves of France and Spain there are a great many drawings, the antiquity of which is unquestioned. Pre-historians have to reckon in geological time, and these drawings are usually regarded as belonging to the upper palæolithic age. Marett records overhearing a question put to M. Cartailhac, the great savant, when he was lecturing on these very drawings, about their exact age, and he replied, "Perhaps not less than 6,000 years ago and not more than 250,000." ¹ The people of that age used stone and bone tools only, and the art which they produced is associated with these two materials. In some of the caves in the Pyrenees there are various drawings and paintings. The Aurignacians were in the habit of

¹ *Anthropology*, p. 24.

making the outlines of human hands on the stony surfaces of the caves. They also used paint, black and red, which was dusted on the wall between the outspread fingers of the left hand. The drawings indicate that occasionally they lopped off a finger. Here anthropology comes to the aid of pre-history by furnishing parallels among known primitive races, the reasons for whose practices are known. Certain Australian natives still practice the art of stencilling hands on the walls of caves, and they, too, have the practice of lopping off a finger or a finger joint occasionally.^a Some people assert that they have no motive beyond amusement, but one can hardly believe that fingers are lopped off for amusement. The motives in other cases are known to be the warding off of impending evil from the family or the cattle, and sometimes as a symbol of mourning.^b

Another form of Palæolithic art was the reproduction on the cave walls by means of sharp flint of those game animals which were the object of man's thought, because he lived by the hunt. The animal provided meat for food, and skin or hide for clothing. The maintenance of the life processes depended therefore on the success of the hunt. It is not surprising that, since man was so dependent on the animal, he should think of it by day, dream of it by night, and in the crude beginnings of his artistic activity make it a subject for reproduction. The question which interests us is whether or not there was any motive beyond that

^a Ibid., p. 49.

^b M. C. Burkitt: *Our Forerunners*, pp. 27 f.

of amusement. This is discussed in an interesting summary by Professor Burkitt.¹⁰ He thinks the evidence points to "three and only three conceivable motives for the cave art: (a) decoration, in which may be included permanent records of successful hunts; (b) the desire for self-expression felt by artistic natures; (c) the requirements of magic or ceremonial ritual." There are some facts which seem to lend credence to the first two motives but it is Burkitt's conclusion that the third is the only one which really fits the situation. He points out that it is not reasonable to suppose that a human being who desired to paint a rhinoceros should light his poor lamp, worm his way into a fissure of the cave, and scramble to a height of ten feet from the ground on the shoulder of a friend or by means of chance holds on the wall, either for purposes of decorations which would never be properly seen or to express himself, because that could have been accomplished with much more ease. Moreover mutilated hands would be a curious kind of decoration or mode of expression for an artistic temperament. In the absence of historical data for appraisal of cave art, anthropology, by the study of parallels in known primitive peoples, and psychology, with its penetration into motives and their overt expressions, should be our guides. On these grounds it is apparent that the only satisfactory explanation which fits the case is that cave art was part and parcel of things magical and ceremonial. The people of that age obviously lived by the hunt, and there is reason to believe that the paint-

¹⁰ Ibid., Chap. X.

ings of animals were symbolic and mimetic of the processes by which life was sustained. When we find paintings of bison with arrows piercing them in vulnerable places, it is reasonable from what we know of the operations of mimetic magic that the painting might be regarded as a means of obtaining an influence over the animals represented. It was doubtless regarded as a method of control to insure a successful hunt, with the added possibility that it might have been regarded as a means of increasing fertility in the animals. At any rate representations of animals unfit for food are very exceptional, and they may be explained as also a means of control in the interests of getting rid of dangerous beasts. The African Bushman made similar paintings of ostrich hunts which are known to have served the ends of mimetic magic. In the *Trois Frères* there is a representation of a marked figure alongside a natural pulpit or window which dominates a frieze of engravings. This is strongly suggestive of a sanctuary, as Burkitt points out, "where ceremonial ritual was performed above and witnessed by an audience beneath."¹¹ It is his conviction that cave art must have been produced by artists of the medicine man or sorcerer type. The masked figure in the case mentioned is that of a man disguised as a stag, a practice known to be associated with magic and sorcery. The decorations engraved on the bone and stone tools would also point to evidence of the motive of magical control in the case of home art.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

The association of magic and art is due, according to Della Seta, to the fact that plastic art is so eminently fitted to the practice of magic.

Magic embraces the whole of the wide field of the means by which useful benefits may be attained. These means are countless; from the simple thought to the expressed word, from the mimetic movements of one's own body to actions done by others, all may be, if the intention is present, instruments of magic. Man who wishes ill to his enemy can wish him ill by merely thinking it or can express the wish in an imprecation; he can reproduce by a mimetic action of his own person, or can carry out upon objects or other beings, ceremonies which tend to the same end, for the indispensable element in a magic function is the will to succeed in the intent. But plastic art by its very character, by its capacity for reproducing in its formal aspect all that exists in nature, offers more than any other field of intellectual activity, prime material for the practice of magic.¹²

There is a good deal of data from the observations of known primitive peoples which is illustrative of the same intermingling of the elements known to us as art, magic and religion. W. Wundt discusses the decorative combs used by the Senoi and Semangs of the Malay Peninsula. These combs are decorated by geometrical designs and are, without doubt, works of art. But in its earliest use "the comb is clearly less an article of adornment than a means of magic. It serves particularly as a sort of amulet, to protect against sickness demons. For this reason the ornamental lines in their various combinations are regarded as referring

¹² *Religion and Art*, p. 40.

to particular diseases. The marks which a Semang woman carries about with her on her comb are really magical signs indicating the disease from which she wishes to be spared. . . . In Malacca the combs are carefully preserved; the drawings made upon them render them sacred objects."¹⁸ Wundt gives similar illustrations from the decorations on bows and blow-pipes, designed as magical aids to successful hunting. Such a practice was observed by the Bakairi of Brazil. "The freer the sway of the imagination," he says, "the easier is it to see the figure of a demon in any decoration whatsoever. . . . For according to an ancient law of magic, the demon himself has a twofold rôle—he both causes the sickness and protects against it. Just as a picture is identified with its object, so also is the drawing that represents or portrays the sickness demon regarded as the demon itself. Whoever carries it about is secure against its attack."

The dance is another form of art which at the primitive stage was intimately associated with magic and the ceremonial. Originally the dance was a method of obtaining magical control, and very early it became even a portion of the cult. Among hunting peoples the dance was a common form of expression in which there was the imitation of animals. The Australians, e.g., have mimetic dances in which the emu, the frog and other animals, but particularly the kangaroo, are imitated. The imitation of animals in the dance witnessed a remarkable development in the totemic period, as one might expect, when the various social groups identified their lives with different totem animals.

¹⁸ *Elemente der Völkerpsychologie*, trans. by E. L. Schart, pp. 101 ff.

Sometimes the dancers were masked to represent the animals, while others imitated the hunters. The enacting of a successful hunt in the dance at once gave pleasure to the group and was deemed to be of magical value in insuring a successful hunt on the morrow. War dances also served the twofold function of play and magical control. In these dances the dancing warriors rush to the attack of imaginary enemies—a preparatory reaction for the attack on real enemies—and rejoice over their mock victory. While they dance, they sing and dramatize such actions as grinding an enemy to dust, gouging out his eye, tearing out his entrails, devouring his flesh or drinking his blood. In any case these exhibitions were deemed to be magically significant in insuring victory in the real battle that was to ensue. Another type of mimetic dance in which magic and art are intertwined are the vegetation or fertility dances. In most other dances only the men partake, but in these the association between fertility in vegetation and fertility in human nature led to mixed dances. Some of these dances developed into wildly orgiastic affairs and from our ethical standards are indecent and repulsive. But, with the people themselves, though they doubtless had play value, they were thought to be magically efficacious in insuring good crops.

Illustrations of the type given might be multiplied many times from the behaviour of primitive people. The importance of them, moreover, is far-reaching. They make it abundantly evident that primitive man knew no such distinctions as those we make. The one object might be of æsthetic, magical and ceremonial

value all at once; and the one activity, such as the dance, may have been and, indeed, was of artistic, magical and ritual significance. We have no concern with trying to discover whether art preceded religion or the reverse. The fact is that there was no differentiated art and no differentiated religion here. But the logic which is involved in primitive man's belief that like produces like moved him to activities that were at one and the same time artistically expressive, religiously valuable, and magically potent. Jane Harrison has a correct view of the matter, and has included some further points of evidence that are worthy of careful note. She writes:

Among the Huichol Indians, if the people fear a drought from the extreme heat of the sun, they take a clay disk, and on one side of it they paint the "face" of Father Sun, a circular space surrounded by rays of red and blue and yellow which are called his "arrows." . . . On the reverse side they will paint the progress of the sun through the four quarters of the sky. The journey is symbolized by a large crosslike figure with a central circle for midday. Round the edge are beehive-shaped mounds; they represent the hills of earth. The red and yellow dots that surround the hills are cornfields. The crosses on the hills are signs of wealth and money. On some of the disks birds and scorpions are painted, and on one are curving lines which mean rain. These disks are deposited on the altar of the god-house and left, and then all is well. The intention might be to us obscure, but a Huichol Indian would read it thus: "Father Sun with his broad shield (or 'face') and his arrows rises in the east, bringing money and wealth to the Huichols. His heat and the light from his rays make the corn to grow, but he is asked

not to interfere with the clouds that are gathered on the hills."

Now is this art or ritual? It is both and neither. We distinguish between a form of prayer and a work of art and count them in no danger of confusion; but the Huichol goes back to that earlier thing, a *presentation*. He utters, expresses his thought about the sun and his emotion about the sun and his relation to the sun, and if "prayer is the soul's sincere desire" he has painted a prayer. It is not a little curious that the same notion comes out in the old Greek word for prayer, *εὐχῆ*. The Greek, when he wanted help in trouble from the saviours, the Dioscuri, carved a picture of them, and, if he was a sailor, added a ship. Underneath he inscribed the word *εὐχῆ*. It was not to begin with a "vow" paid, it was a presentation of his strong inner desire, it was a sculptured prayer.¹⁴

"There are many instances of dramatic ritual the purpose of which is as yet a matter of discussion," says Professor Hirn. "With regard to some of the symbolic dances representing hunting or fishing or the movements of game animals, much may be said for Mr. Farrar's view that the object of the pantomime is to make clear to the deity a prayer regarding the things imitated."¹⁵ The notion of sculptured prayers, painted prayers and prayers in pantomime may be out of the ordinary for the Protestant Christian. But it is a legitimate question to ask why a sculpture, a painting, or a dramatic enactment may not be as effective vehicles of expression for prayer as a poem or

¹⁴ *Ancient Art and Ritual*, pp. 24, 25.

¹⁵ *The Origins of Art*, p. 285. Professor Hirn is here referring to Farrar's view as outlined in his *Primitive Manners and Customs*, pp. 65 f.

a prose composition. Nor does there seem to be anything in the Christian conception of God to lead us to suppose that God would not be moved just as effectually in the one case as in the other, if the prayer be sincere.

It would be difficult to classify the Huichol prayer-disks, if we were trying to read our differentiations into primitive man's consciousness. As decorated surfaces they would be called specimens of primitive art; as symbols for ritualistic use, they would be classed as the paraphernalia of religion; as instruments of insuring fertility and protection, they would be considered as magical devices. There are innumerable examples from all over the world of social products which are the embodiment of all these elements, but which in the thinking of the people themselves were not differentiated as any one of them. The early Greeks¹⁴ painted, on the prows of their ships, eyes which were believed to enable them to find their way through the water. Both the Egyptians and the Greeks carved eyes and ears on the heads of their stone idols to enable them actually to see their votaries and to hear their prayers. Such is the meaning of the Psalmist's taunt concerning the idols of the heathen. "Eyes have they, but they see not; they have ears, and yet they hear not." The truth is that these elements that we call religious and æsthetic were in pre-cultural life part and parcel of one another. We know that even with cultural peoples there is a complete intermingling of these elements, that religion is æsthetic and art is

¹⁴ Ernest A. Gardner: *Religion and Art in Ancient Greece*, pp. 11, 12.

religious with little thought of separating them. The religious ceremonial is enacted, frequently in musical expressions, and in ordinary experience no one thinks of them separately. It is not surprising, therefore, if in pre-cultural life, when custom and impulse predominated and reflection played so small a part as a determinant of human activities, we should find a complete interfusing of the elements. The separation of them is the product of a logical process which we expect to find only where culture and reflection are far advanced. The further back we go, the less evidence do we find of any effort to make distinctions, and the more evidence do we find that life was a complex of heterogeneous and indistinguishable elements.

The occasions of the ceremonial in primitive life were also occasions for artistic expressions of various sorts. The religious consciousness, like any other form of consciousness, is an integral unity of cognitive, affective and conative elements. It is misleading to think of religion as concerned with only one phase of life to the exclusion of the others. Now the ceremonial gives an opportunity for the activist element of consciousness to express itself. It enables the religious person to do something, and doing is a primordial fact of life. What is done is, of course, intimately associated with what is known and what is felt. Our awareness of a given situation and the manner in which the situation affects us have much to do with determining our course of action. The element of feeling bulks quite large both in the religious consciousness and the æsthetic consciousness, calling in both cases for expressive movements. It often happens that the same

expressive movements serve the purposes of both the religious and the æsthetic feelings. The mimetic dance, the ecstatic dance, the *sankirtan*, sculptural decorations and various other overt expressions have thus come to fulfill the double purposes of religious and æsthetic expression. In the Chaitanya movement of Bengal we have examples in point. Chaitanya at the very mention of the name of Krishna would sometimes fling himself with ecstatic abandon into dance and song, and one of the characteristics of the movement has been the *sankirtan*, a congregational type of singing rather infrequent in Hinduism. The Chaitanya movement is a form of the *bhakti* religion, that type of Hinduism which seeks for salvation through faith in and devotion to a personal God. The dance of ecstasy and the *sankirtan* are at once expressions of the æsthetic consciousness and of *bhakti*. Indeed, as we shall see, it has often happened that art furnished the only appropriate vehicles for expressing the religious emotions, and that religion has mutually served art by calling forth its best.

Our thesis is that in primitive life there is no such differentiation as that which reflective thinking makes between religion and art. The same expressions and activities embodied elements that we classify at one time as religious and again as artistic. The ceremonial served to give expression to consciousness at once in its religious and æsthetic aspects. It sometimes even transpired that the same person was at once artist and priest, or at least artist and shaman. Nowadays we sometimes find religion and art in intimate association, and at other times we find them existing sepa-

ately. But even where they exist side by side, man's reflective processes enable him to say which element is artistic and which is not. How has it transpired then that in the social life the differentiation has been effected? How is it that we are able to hold apart in our thinking elements which originally did not exist separately and were not imagined in isolation? The answer to this question is to be found in the way in which man's logical processes have developed, and we are beginning to realize that these processes have developed in response to great social urges. The ability to analyze and classify various elements in experience has developed with reference to felt needs, as life has increased in complexity, and the need for a division of labour has been experienced. In the pre-cultural stages, life was vastly more simple than it is today. The group acted as a unity in eating, drinking, working, playing, singing, dancing, sacrificing and worshipping. But as that primitive simplicity disappeared, it was not possible for the group to act corporately in regard to all the things in which it was interested. Certain people had to be set apart for various occupations, and hence there emerged class divisions. Thus can we account for the origin of the priest. Religion is not the invention of priests, as some have superficially thought, but religion has brought about the priesthood, as life increased in complexity so that the group had to set apart certain people for the conduct of the ritual. Similarly, we may think of the drama, the dance, the song and other types of art that now exist by themselves, as becoming independent forms of art as the growing complexity of social life neces-

sitated the separation of various groups for various tasks.

The way in which this separation takes place has been illustrated by Jane Harrison¹⁷ by the manner in which the Greek drama evolved from the Greek ritual. It must be noted first that the word for ritual was *dromenon* which means "thing done," and the word *drama* also means "thing done," so that philologically from the Greek at least religion and art were very closely akin. The *dromenon* was a redoing or a pre-doing of some activity for practical purposes. The drama was also a representation but not with any necessary practical import in view. In real life the Greek hunted and ploughed and sowed for the sake of the food he needed. In the Spring Festival, the acts of the *dromenon* were regarded as efficacious in guaranteeing the return of the food supply. The Dithyramb continued to be enacted with an enthusiasm so long as the belief survived that it really helped to insure the return of spring. But the decay of faith in the efficacy of the rite resulted in its gradually passing from *dromenon* to drama. The rite persisted as something pretty to look at or as play. Another feature that contributed to the transition was the introduction of the theatre or spectator place to the orchestra or dancing place. The original orchestra was big enough so that all the people might participate, since they all desired to take part in a rite on which the return of spring depended. But the theatre was a spectator place with seats rising tier on tier above the circular orchestra or dancing place in the centre. Under the

¹⁷ *Ancient Art and Ritual*, pp. 135-140.

new conditions the ceremonial or *dromenon* came to be enacted by a few while the majority of the people sat and watched. It contained all of the elements of the original rite, though gradually it came to be more of a play and less of a serious nature. On the other hand there was a growing recognition that the return of the seasons in regular succession was due less to the efficacy of any things done by the people, and more to the operation of a deity. So that at the same time that the ritual was passing into the drama, there was a definitely religious development in the sacrifice of holy bulls, prayers and worship of the gods. The old *dromenon* which combined religion and art was disintegrated, the drama continuing from it and growing out of it on the art side, whereas sacrifice and worship evolved from it on the side of religion.

II

The problem as to the origin of religion and art may be considered also from the standpoint of individual psychology. At the outset we have to oppose any doctrine of a religious or an æsthetic instinct. An instinct is a coördination of reflexes, neurally integrated, and effecting an organic response characteristic of the species, and in some manner capable of subsequent modification. The term is used correctly to describe a certain type of behaviour that is somewhat more complex than the reflex and yet which does not necessarily involve the operation of consciousness. It belongs to the terminology of biology, and is used by psychology as a biological science. Those writers who refer to religious, æsthetic, scientific or moral instincts are using the word instinct in a loose, unscientific sense. To

describe them as such would be equivalent to referring them to mental processes below the level of consciousness. Nevertheless the effort to identify them with the instinctive life is intended to express an important truth, viz., the fact that each of these disciplines of thought has grown out of and is associated with fundamental life interests. It is more correct to refer to religion and art, science and morality, from the psychological standpoint, as attitudes. Each of them represents a disposition to respond in a characteristic manner to environmental stimuli. Each has arisen within the sphere of mental attitudes, and each has achieved a technique appropriate to its ends. An attitude is a conscious and habitual tendency to react in a characteristic manner to certain types of stimuli. At the same time we may acknowledge that the attitudes are of instinctive origin. So long as the environment is able to supply the fundamental needs of the organism and no crises or tensions arise, we can respond to the environment at the instinctive level. But the presence of a situation that cannot be met satisfactorily by an instinctive response calls for reflection. Activities that have been achieved as the result of conscious reflection tend to follow certain types, as experience discloses the satisfactoriness or otherwise of various responses. It has been found, as we have seen, that under certain circumstances satisfaction is experienced from responding mechanically to the extra-human element in the environment. Consequently a disposition so to act under similar circumstances has been developed, and we call it the scientific attitude. Similarly it has proven to yield satisfaction when we respond socially to the stimuli of the extra-

human environment, and the disposition so to act under similar circumstances is what we designate as the religious attitude. In an analogous way a certain kind of satisfaction has been experienced from responding characteristically to certain environmental stimuli which impress us as beautiful, by singing, dancing, playing, drawing, etc. The disposition so to act under circumstances of this type is known as the æsthetic attitude.

The fundamental interests of life are food and sex. Food is necessary for the preservation of the individual, and sex is necessary for the perpetuation of the species. The struggle for existence gathers around the effort to secure satisfaction for these two basic human needs. It has sometimes been supposed that the important human disciplines, such as these under consideration, have arisen each in association with a specific interest or instinct of life. Religion, for example, has been treated as an irradiation of the sex instinct,^{1*} and science as the outcome of processes associated with the securing of food. But it is truer to the facts of experience to say that each of the attitudes is concerned in some way with all of the interests of life, and endeavours to enrich man's instruments for a successful manipulation of the environment so that these needs may be met. The urge of the food instinct may lead at times to attempts at magical control of the sources of supply, at other times to scientific control of the same, still again to the dance of the seasons, and yet again to sacrifices and offerings for conciliating the deities who are deemed to be in control. So also the

^{1*} E. Sturbeck: *Psychology of Religion*; W. I. Thomas: *Sex and Society*; and E. S. Ames: *The Psychology of Religious Experience*.

drive of the sex instinct sometimes results in magical rites of fertility or sex tabus, at other times in efforts at scientific birth control, again in mimetic dances, and still again to religious ceremonials to insure fertility. Religion and art, magic and science were primarily evolved as means whereby man might enlarge his control of the environing universe. Each in its own way was designed to help along the life processes, to contribute to the fullness of life. E. Grosse emphasized the close association between primitive art and the activities of the hunter,¹⁰ and showed that it had practical value in the struggle for existence. The history of religion from primitivity discloses an interest in developing the social attitude towards the extra-human environment not only for the sake of spiritual enrichment or future blessedness, but for the help that comes in the immediate present.

The older psychology thought of the mind as composed of the faculties of knowing, feeling, and willing, which were separable from one another not only in analysis but in function. The newer psychology studies the mental life in terms of integrally coördinated processes and functions. It recognizes the utility of analyzing the mental life into processes of cognition, affection, and conation, but regards any segment of behaviour as involving an element of each of the three processes. Religion, art and science have all suffered in analysis at the hands of those whose psychological equipment was of the faculty type. Science has been identified with knowing (Latin *scientia*, knowledge). Religion has been interpreted variously in terms of knowledge (doctrine or dogma), feeling

¹⁰ *The Beginnings of Art*, trans., New York, 1897.

(emotion), and action (the cult). Art, like religion, has been interpreted in terms of all three processes. It will help us to guard against one-sided interpretations if we remember that we are not dealing with either entities or abstractions, but with persons who are sometimes scientists, sometimes artists and sometimes religious persons. Since the mental life is a unity, we ought to be able to discover the various functions and processes in any of the attitudes. The fact that religion and art have in turn been interpreted through each of the primordial mental processes should be an indication that all of the elements are present, and that any theory which is to satisfy must do justice to the unity of all of them in personality.

Religion involves the knowing process. The Hebrew prophet taught that the knowledge of God is more than burnt offerings. The Christian religion has not only emphasized the importance of the knowledge of God, but has frequently laid much stress on correct doctrine. Islam has followed the Hebrew religion in giving a vital place to the law. Buddhism, too, has considered the *dhamma* as one of the essentials of religion. And Hinduism has provided a *jnana-marga* or way of knowledge among the paths to blessedness. One of the modern esoteric movements has taken as its motto, "There is no religion higher than truth." A great many statements and claims that have been made in the name of religion have subsequently been proved to be false, and yet the people who believed them asserted them to be true. The important matter functionally is to understand what people have

meant in asserting these things as truths. We must bear in mind that historical fact is not the only kind of truth. Truth is able to stand even in the presence of criticism, but it is not fair to expect all truths to be reducible to a dead level. Some truths assert mere existence, whereas others are concerned more with values. Religious truth surpasses historical fact in the same way that a value judgment transcends an existence judgment. But what about art? Art also makes a claim to truth. Keats wrote:

Beauty is truth, truth beauty—that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.

And Browning sang:

The rest may reason and welcome,
’Tis we musicians know.

Truth in the guise of beauty may not be logical truth, but as has already been observed in regard to religion, logical truth is not the only type of truth. Indeed, great artists are convinced that the truth which they obtain about the universe is more in accord with the nature of reality than scientific truth or any other kind of truth.

To quote Browning again:

Or say there’s beauty with no soul at all
(I never saw it—put the case the same).
If you get simple beauty and nought else,
You get about the best thing God invents:
That’s somewhat: and you’ll find the soul you’ve
missed
Within yourself when you return Him thanks.

And Wordsworth's faith was

That Nature never did betray
The heart that loved her; 'tis her privilege
Through all the years of this our life, to lead
From joy to joy: for she can so inform
The mind that is within us, so impress
With quietness and beauty, and so feed
With lofty thoughts.

Kant, Schopenhauer, Hegel and Croce all believed that art is, in a sense, a form of knowledge. Hegel referred to it as the presentation of truth in sensuous form. And Kant said that the truth of art is universally communicable, though it is not demonstrable. It is the truth of values, theoretical truth rather than practical, emotional truth rather than factual.

The element of feeling is also present alike in religion and art. In the earlier stages the emotion of fear bulked very large, as is evident in demonolatry and all sorts of ceremonies designed to avert impending evils. Marett²⁰ is not convinced of the old proverb that "*primus in orbe deos fecit timor*," and is of opinion that awe is the most characteristic religious feeling. In awe he would include wonder, admiration, interest, respect and even love, perhaps. In modern times there has been a strong tendency to emphasize the feeling element in religion. Thomas Hobbes' dictum is familiar: "The feare of things invisible is the natural seed of religion." Schleiermacher defined religion as "the feeling of absolute dependence," and others have followed his lead. An analysis of religious experience will make it clear that feeling is present not only as a motive to religion, as in the feeling of depend-

²⁰ *The Threshold of Religion*, p. 13.

ence or of need, but also as a characteristic of the religious consciousness in operation, as in reverence and worship. Nor is it necessary to refer to the discharges of emotional frenzy which periodically characterize religion, for even the ordinary experiences of the religious life have an affective element. The feelings sometimes find appropriate expression in art as well as in religion. One school of æsthetic philosophy interprets art from the hedonistic point of view, and certainly there is no denying the pleasurable effect of beauty and the painful effect of ugliness. No artist ever accomplished anything really great unless he felt deeply. For art is an expression of fine emotions, profound sentiments, and they can be portrayed faithfully only by those who feel them deeply. Some of our most cherished values are felt rather than known, and it is the sublime business of art to give expression to some of the felt values of experience. Professor E. F. Carritt has stated the matter thus:

The aim of art is to reconcile the world, or some bit of the world to our faculty of "feeling," our judgment of valuation, to show it as something worth living in and through: to show being (the kind of being men have) as worth while in a place so good, or even in a place so bad. It does this by making us imagine in particular situations the delightful and noble activities which the artistic creation expresses. So every new revelation . . . is doubly valuable; it makes us love a particular thing, before indifferent to us, and it thereby confirms our predisposition—without which the artistic process would never have begun—that the world is capable of being regarded as beautiful, as a place worth our while, if only we will regard it disinterestedly, free from the brute will to live in it. . . . This is not to make

the aim of art moral or instructive. The artist may not falsify his reading of the world, he has merely to give his impression. . . . If he sets out to prove that the world is good, that is probably just because he does not feel it so; and certainly he will be even less able to make us feel it so than those reasoned arguments designed to convert the pessimists.²¹

Religion and art are both characterized by conative elements. "Faith without works is dead," said St. James. The *karma marga* or way of works is another way of escape, says the Bhagavad Gita. From Kant forward western philosophy has placed a good deal of stress on the practical reason, as opposed to the theoretical reason. Ritschl, who was a student of Schleiermacher, added willing to his teacher's emphasis on feeling as opposed to the older intellectual view of religion. The pragmatic philosophy is decidedly voluntaristic, though it has suffered much from those who have not read past a superficial meaning in the title of William James' essay, *The Will to Believe*. It is not too much to say that if religion were denuded of the cult side, for the majority of people there would be little left. It is also fairly obvious that art minus the creations or expressions of art would be equal to zero for most people. From the logical point of view it has been said that "a science teaches us to know, and an art to do,"²² that "an art gives practical guidance and direction for some course of action."²³ In one sense

²¹ "Truth in Art and Religion," art. *The Hibbert Journal*, V, p. 367.

²² Jevons.

²³ J. E. Creighton: *An Introductory Logic*, p. 80.

the word is used to mean "any activity, or production involving intelligence and skill." ²⁴ Can we then say that art is work of a certain kind? R. S. Woodworth has answered the question for us by saying that "to the consumer art is play, but to the producer it is work, in the sense that it is directed toward definite ends, and has to stand criticism according as it does or does not reach those ends." ²⁵ But there is no unanimity among critics, and many hold that art is play rather than work. George Santayana in supporting that view holds that play is "whatever is done spontaneously and for its own sake, whether it have or not an ulterior utility." ²⁶ Those who differentiate between art and play do so on the ground that the art impulse requires for its satisfaction some expression in a rational and meaningful activity. Art, like religion, includes the element of expression, and sometimes the content to which it gives form is religious. Music, poetry, painting, sculpture, architecture and dancing have all been employed to express the love of God as well as the joy of living. We shall return to this matter later.

No exhaustive treatment of the matter is necessary. It is obvious that religion and art both involve the three primordial elements of the mental life, the cognitive, the affective and the conative. Neither of them is to be identified with any body of doctrines, group of emotions, or set of expressions. Each is expressive in its own way of the whole personality, an

²⁴ Baldwin: *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, art. "Art."

²⁵ *Psychology, A Study of Mental Life*, p. 517.

²⁶ *The Sense of Beauty*, p. 28.

outlook, a disposition, an attitude. Art arises when personality goes out towards the environment in the appreciation and creation of the beautiful. Religion arises when personality reaches out towards the cosmic environment in social relations, in intercourse, prayer and coöperation.

There is one other psychological element that calls for mention in analyzing the religious and æsthetic attitudes, viz., imagination. The two attitudes are closely akin to one another in that they both make abundant use of this process. In the psychological sense, imagination is the process of manipulating images in consciousness, and in the broader usage of the term it includes memory processes as well as imagination in the ordinary sense of the term. Some of the older psychologists classified images into sensory, memory and fantasy. By the sensory image they meant the actual impression made by a stimulating object, as e.g., the visual image or the auditory image. When we are conscious of an object that is not present to the senses, the details of which object correspond pretty much to those of the original presentation, we may speak of that as a memory image. But when consciousness selects here one element and there another and creatively combines images in a manner that has nothing corresponding to it in actual experience, the resultant image is described as a fantasy image. Modern psychology has established one fact with certainty, viz., that we cannot imagine anything, be it never so grotesque or never so sublime, but that the elements of the image had come to us in experience. Images

are the stuff of the thought processes, and we can no more carry on thinking without images than a mason can build a house without bricks and mortar or other building materials.

Imagination is sometimes reproductive, and at other times productive in its functioning. Both religion and art furnish us with examples of the two types of imagining. Reproductive imagination may be exemplified in the mimetic dance which, as we have seen, belongs to both. It operates also in the making of images which are intended to represent some historical scenes or events. The Roman Catholic's images of scenes from the life of Jesus, and the Buddhist's sculptures of scenes from the *jataka* tales are intended to be reproductive, though it must be admitted that even here creative imagination also plays an important part in furnishing the original contents. But religion and art are both particularly fertile fields for the work of creative imagination. Indeed some of the finest creations are to be found in religious art. Goethe said: "Men are creative in poetry and art only as long as they are religious; without religion they are merely imitative, lacking in originality." Whether it be literature, sculpture, painting, architecture or music, religion has been a source of inspiration unparalleled in the history of creative art. When art has been tuned to the service of religion, it has been felt that none but the greatest would be worthy. This is true of East and West alike, for the motives of great art and the creativity of it know no geographical limitations. Prof. J. Estlin Carpenter, writing concerning India, says:

The Brahmanical sacrifices needed no temples. It is generally believed that idolatry first found its way into Indian religion when Buddhism came into contact with Hellenic influence in South Afghanistan. The images of the Buddha in Gandhara are among the best and are also the earliest known. The impulse to employ this form of art in the service of religion thus sprang from Greece. It was Buddhism also which called sculpture and architecture to the service of religion, and added sculpture and painting to the decorations of the sanctuary. The rising terraces of the temple at Baro-Budur in Java (about 850 A.D.), crowded with statues and bas-reliefs which reach for three miles if placed side by side, rank among the architectural wonders of the world. The bronze statue of the Buddha at Nara in Japan, more than fifty feet in height, reared in the eighth century, was encompassed by a temple with a front two hundred and ninety feet in length and a height of one hundred and fifty-six feet. At Kamakura, the capital of East Japan eight hundred years ago, with a population of over a million, stood another forty-nine feet high; the process of casting began in 1252. Mundations twice destroyed its enclosing sanctuary, but the solemn figure still remains unharmed.

A statue solid set
And moulded in colossal calm.

No other, we are told, gives such an impression of majesty, or so truly symbolizes the central idea of Buddhism, the spiritual peace which comes of perfected knowledge and the subjugation of all passions."

The truth is that there is very little art worthy of the name in India that is not religious. Mogul art was the only type which separated art from religion, and

¹⁷ *Buddhism and Christianity*, pp. 14 f.

Mogul art did not possess the vitality and creativity of other Indian art. The Himalayas, home of Mount Kailasa, the traditional Paradise in Indian thought, were admired not simply for their majestic beauty, but chiefly because they contained the source of life and fertility. So the important place which they occupy in Indian art is due to their sacred character quite as much as to their beauty. The dance of *çiva*, which is also a familiar subject of Indian art, is not merely a representation of beauty, and grace of movement, but is important because of its religious significance. On the one hand it is representative of cosmic processes, and on the other of the subjective "spiritual processes whereby evil passions, evil thinking and wickedness are destroyed or transmuted in the alembic of the Divine Alchemist." ²² In Indian art a great many religious conceptions are portrayed symbolically, such symbols as the lotus, the bo tree, the wheel, the bull, the dance, and various weapons being very common. The function of the symbol is through sensuous imagery to suggest to the religious consciousness some conception which transcends the sensuous. Thus one of the most valuable instruments of the creative imagination is the symbol, because of its ability to awaken suggestions of ideals and values.

There is another sense in which imagination functions both in religion and art. Each of them presents an idealization of facts. In a sense morals does the same thing. It is the function of art, religion and morals to present a desirable world, a world as it ought to be rather than the one that exists in hard fact. The

²² E. B. Havell: *The Himalayas in Indian Art*, p. 65.

conception of God is one which raises to the *n*th power those values which men cherish the most. The Christian conceives of God as a person, and the Hindu refuses to accept the analogy from the same reason, viz., the desire to credit to God the supremest value that his experience has disclosed. The Christian believes the concept of personality transcends all known values, and the Hindu suspects personality is a limitation. In either case the aim is to portray the ideal, the *summum bonum*, ultimate reality. The work of art is also idealistic, the selection and adaptation of raw materials from the environment so that the ideal may be made real. The ideal in art as in religion means a heightened expression of character born of a faith that the external world contains elements of beauty and goodness which surpass what most men see and appreciate. The artistic consciousness like the religious consciousness is a discoverer, an explorer, finding new paths and more rapturous scenery than the ordinary man dreams of. As E. F. Carritt says: "Art shows to man's mind that which he would otherwise unconsciously be. . . . By putting him into a spiritual instead of a brutal relation with his feelings, it delivers him from their tyranny."²² In that sense it again resembles religion, offering a way of escape from banality to beauty, even as religion offers a way of escape to the kingdom of God. And who can say whether it may not be the same kingdom to which religion and art offer deliverance? The artist thinks of it in terms of beauty, and the saint in terms of love and holiness, but in each case it is an ideal kingdom, a kingdom not made with hands, eternal in

²² *The Theory of Beauty*, p. 70.

the heart of man. In the realm of the ideal, religion and art in imagination come together, each supplanting the other in portraying the possibilities of life, as yet unrealized. Santayana says:

Starting from some personification of nature or some memory of a good man, the popular and priestly tradition has refined and developed the ideal; it has made it an expression of men's aspiration and a counterpart of their need. The devotion of each tribe, shrine and psalmist has added some attribute to the god or some parable to his legend; and thus, around the kernel of some divine function, the imagination of a people has gathered every possible expression of it, creating a complete and beautiful personality, with its history, its character, and its gifts. No poet has ever equalled the perfection or significance of these religious creations. The greatest characters of fiction are uninteresting and unreal compared with the conceptions of the gods; so much so that men have believed that their gods have objective reality.²⁰ [And he adds:] The belief in the reality of an ideal personality brings about its further idealization.²¹

Goodness, beauty, and truth—these are the ideals which man has kept before him throughout the centuries. Goodness is the moral ideal, beauty the æsthetic ideal, and truth the scientific ideal. In all of them imagination goads, inspires and strengthens man for further striving. The moral ideal, no less than the æsthetic ideal, or the goal of the scientist, is never known, but must always be imagined. "A man to be greatly good must imagine intensely and comprehensively," said Shelley; "he must put himself in the place of another and of many others; the pains and

²⁰ *The Sense of Beauty*, p. 186.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

pleasures of his species become his own. The great instrument of moral good is the imagination." ** We may go even further than Shelley, and say that a man to be greatly religious "must imagine intensely and comprehensively." May we not think of the religious ideal as in a sense the combination and culmination of the three ideals, goodness, beauty, and truth? Surely the conceptions of God and of eternal life which the religious man portrays to himself imaginatively include all of these ideals. From the religious point of view we may think of the three realms—the true, the good, and the beautiful—as coördinating with one another, or perhaps as three aspects of the kingdom of God, to be worthy citizens of which is the goal of all striving. The artist, the moralist, and the scientist are all contributing to our understanding of that kingdom.

III

It is difficult to differentiate between religion and art because there are so many respects in which the attitudes resemble each other, and there are so many activities in which they are coördinated. Several points in common between them have been noted already, but it will be useful to summarize them, for differences will appear more significantly after we have noted resemblances.

(1) It need scarcely be pointed out that both the religious and the æsthetic attitudes are evaluatory attitudes. They are methods whereby man recognizes and expresses his appreciation of worth. In discussing

** Shelley: "The Defence of Poetry," quoted by Carritt: *The Theory of Beauty*, p. 57.

the relation between religion and science we observed something of the way in which the evaluatory attitude operates in religion. Religion very often reconciles us to the world, by putting us into communion with the more-than-human, and enabling us to see present events in their cosmic relationship. It helps us not only to find happiness in beauty and prosperity, but to read helpful meanings in pain and adversity. It enables us to understand this world as God's world, and sets us at work to realize in it a home for ourselves with all our spiritual aspirations. God is the greatest value of religion. In Him, as we have shown, are summed up the three great ultimate values of goodness, beauty and truth. Dr. Dearmer says:

True faith is to believe actively in the Ultimate Values, to have them is to possess reality, to see them is to enter the kingdom of Heaven, and to lay hold of eternal life. And, indeed, also these three are one, because they are emanations from the Godhead, and man has the desire for them because he is made in the image of God. They are one in their origin, and are made one again in the love which is God. Each indeed has always a scent of the other; goodness is true—to shun the truth is a moral evil, to do right is to find truth. Again, "Beauty is truth, truth beauty." Keats' words are almost an echo of Spenser's:

O how much more doth beauty beauteous seem
By that sweet ornament which truth doth give.

A life of high morality we call "a good life," but when a real saint dies we cannot but cry, "What a beautiful life!" and we cannot think of higher praise for a hero than to say he was true to the end.²²

²² *Art and Religion*, pp. 52 f.

Art, like religion, is both a discoverer and a creator of values. Probably Bishop William Temple is right in claiming that appreciation predominates over creation, because "much of the beauty of the world exists apart from our production of it."¹⁴ For that matter, the same criticism might also apply to the other great values, truth and goodness, though perhaps less to goodness than to beauty and truth. In any case beauty is a category of value. Art resembles religion in that it reconciles us to the world, in which we find ourselves, though it does so in a different way, i.e., by helping us to appreciate beauty in it, or to create beauty where it might not otherwise be. There is beauty in the world about for those who have sensitiveness to see it, and art is the response of man to that beauty. When art is really great, one can recognize in it a spiritual quality that exalts and inspires. For beauty is indeed a value of the spirit, and therefore a true æsthetic response is positively spiritual. "Art," says Mr. A. Clutton Brook, "is the expression of a certain attitude towards reality . . . the recognition of something greater than man, and when that recognition is not, art dies."¹⁵

When we say that beauty is a fundamental value, we do mean that sound or colour or taste is intrinsically more valuable than form or weight or other qualities. In a work of art we may remark on the colouring or the effect of sounds, but it is the total effect of the production which we hold as valuable. And we hold it to be valuable because it appeals to us individually,

¹⁴ *Christus Veritas*, p. 32.

¹⁵ *Essays on Art*, p. 6.

and helps to release us from elements in the environment and in experience from which we desire to escape. That is the subjective side of the æsthetic attitude. We are not able to appreciate the values of the beauties in the artistic creations of others unless we can enter into the motive and ideal of the artist. In other words there must be empathy.

The religious man and the artist may take up an attitude of evaluation towards the same phenomenon, each in his own way. The attitudes of different men towards a rainbow are typical. The scientist views it as an interesting phenomenon in the refraction of light. The artist sees it as a thing of beauty. But to the Hebrew it was the sign of a covenant between Yahweh and his people. So the value of a phenomenon or experience depends on the attitude and standpoint of the experiencing subject. That does not mean that religious and æsthetic attitudes are wholly subjective, though we should not dismiss them as trivial even if we found them to be so. But we must recognize that "there is no value apart from some appreciation of it." ²²

One other observation needs to be made in regard to our sense of values. If an experience be interpreted as worthwhile, then it must be morally right to pursue it. Carritt has observed that "if the experience of beauty be a thing of worth, it is one of the things which it is moral to cultivate, one of the good things without which morality would lack employment." ²³ What Carritt says about the experience of beauty is appli-

²² *The Sense of Beauty*, p. 18.

²³ *The Theory of Beauty*, p. 7.

cable also to the experience of truth or to such a religious experience as mystic communion with God. This is to reiterate the emphasis already urged concerning the essential unity of our experiences of values. Unless the universe be chaotic that is what we might expect, for if the kingdom of values were to be divided against itself, how would that kingdom stand?

(2) Reference has been made to the subjective side of our values. That leads to the further point that religion and art alike have both subjective and objective elements. They have a subjective side, for as Santayana said there can be no value apart from some appreciation of it. Values are human values or they are not values in any sense. St. Augustine in commenting on the first verse of Psalm xxii, "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken me," remarked, "if you take away the 'my' you might as well take away the 'God.'" It is not necessary to enter exhaustively into a discussion of this subjective element in religion, as it has already been discussed in the chapter concerning religion and science. Mysticism is a type of religious experience in which the subjective elements become exceedingly prominent. The mystic is very certain of the content of his experience because it is so much his own. His joy and ecstasy are transcendent. He emphasizes purgation, meditation and concentration, processes which belong to the individual consciousness. In some cases, as e.g., in the mysticism of the Upanishads, it seems as though the mind were turned in upon itself, so introspective is it. And the goal is an obliteration of the subject-object difference. *Tat tvam asi*, "That thou art," is the core of the mes-

sage which the Upanishads have to deliver. It must be obvious that if the person is to realize an identification of himself with the religious object, if the *atman* is to be absorbed in the *Brahman*, that realization must be attained subjectively. It is the individual *atman* that must realize its oneness with the cosmic spirit, if it is to be realized at all. At the same time no mystic would agree that the entire experience is subjective. He is persuaded that his knowledge of God is objective knowledge, that he is not merely communing with himself, not deluded, but that the ineffable One with whom he communes is real. He realizes a joy and an energy to live which he is sure comes to him from without. His spirit reaches out to the cosmic environment, and as he seeks to commune, he is conscious of an answer to his longing and his search. God draws nearer to him, as he draws nearer to God. Prayer is a religious experience which illustrates again the mingling of the subjective and objective. There are some who believe that the worth of prayer is entirely subjective. "Whoso rises from his knees a better man, his prayer is answered." There is not the slightest doubt that prayer reacts reflexively on the person who prays, but the person is rare who would continue to pray if he believed that was all there was to the experience. The critic may ask questions and make comments that suggest there is little or nothing of objective value in prayer, but the person who prays is certain that something objective is accomplished thereby which would not otherwise be realized. Prayer has auto-suggestive value, but the man who prays attains a knowledge of God and of God's king-

dom which could never come to him in any other way.

The brief summary of the psychological elements of art is sufficient to illustrate its subjective character. It is not an easy task to make a satisfactory psychological analysis, and psychological works will be found to discuss art under instincts, percepts, feelings, desires, imagination, social determinations and overt expressions. We have placed it in the sphere of the attitudes. Whatever may be said concerning the stimuli of these mental experiences, it is obvious that they are the experiences of individual subjects. It is common knowledge that people differ much not only in their ability to produce but even in their capacity for appreciating beauty. Furthermore what is beautiful to one person or group may be quite crude or grotesque to another. The writer once visited a fishing village on the Bay of Bengal, and was taken to the temple by these fishermen to see the idol there. It was a huge black image with the most inhuman features, all besmeared with oil, a thing of monstrous ugliness to one unused to such creations. But to the fishermen it was a thing of great beauty and a source of pride. Professor Gilbert Murray in his essay on "Literature as Revelation" relates one or two interesting cases of subjectivism. One is the story** of an essay written by a stern young Nonconformist at a certain university in which he was supposed to be discussing the poetry of Keats. His great criticism was that after all the important question to ask was whether Keats had ever saved a soul, a perfectly proper test, as Gilbert Mur-

** *Essays and Addresses*, p. 127.

ray agrees, but at fault in the narrow method of its application. He further illustrated subjectivism by saying that "A good Muslim believes in Muhammad far more passionately than any one believes in the multiplication table. That is just because in the case of the multiplication table he knows and is done with it; in the case of Muhammad he does not know, and makes up for his lack of knowledge by passionate feeling."³⁹

The Indian conception of beauty and art is decidedly subjectivistic. Mr. E. B. Havell describes it as follows: .

Beauty, says the Indian philosopher, is subjective, not objective. It is not inherent in form or matter; it belongs only to spirit, and can be apprehended only by spiritual vision. There is no beauty in a tree, or flower, or in man or woman as such. All perfectly fitted to fulfil their part in the cosmos; yet the beauty does not lie in the fitness itself, but in the divine idea which is impressed upon those human minds which are turned to receive it. . . . Beauty belongs to the human mind; there is neither ugliness nor beauty in matter alone. The true aim of the artist is not to extract beauty from nature, but to reveal the Life within life, the Noumenon within phenomenon, the Reality within unreality, and the Soul within matter. When that is revealed, beauty reveals itself. So all nature is beautiful for us, if we can only realize the Divine Idea within it.⁴⁰ [And again] In Indian art there is not a conscious striving after beauty, but an attempt to realize an idea.⁴¹

³⁹ Ibid., p. 136.

⁴⁰ *The Ideals of Indian Art*, pp. 23 f.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 32.

But art also has its objective side. When a great many different people agree as to the beauty of a sunset, there is unanimity among them that the stimulating object has something to do with their sense of beauty. A good deal of art partakes of the character of symbolism, that is, it points to an object other than the art itself. The real object of art is thus very often not expressed at all, but veiled behind symbols. Nevertheless we would be lacking in understanding if we mistook the symbols for the real object. They stand for the real object which is not explicitly stated at all. The æsthetic consciousness asserts that beauty is expressive, but expressive of what? The form and the content are not meant to be separated, except for purposes of critical analysis. In the æsthetic consciousness itself they are integrally united. This may be illustrated again from Indian art. In many of the products of Indian art, particularly in the sculptures which decorate the temples, there are scores of images of animals of various kinds, some real and some imaginary. If we look for the motive of the Indian artist, we discover that he is endeavouring to express in symbolism his belief in the unity of creation. The Indian artist, with his doctrinal background of *karma* and *samsara*, believed in a biological democracy, and expressed that in his sculptures. If we examine these sculptures merely as representations of animals, we miss their real meaning, their objective character. The symbolic character of Indian art is evident also in Buddhist creations. In many instances instead of making any representation of the Buddha at all, it was considered as sufficient to use one of the three

emblems—the tree, the stupa and the wheel—in order to evoke the Blessed One. The tree, the stupa and the wheel cannot in any sense be considered as the real objects of Buddhist art. They are rather symbols and expressions to remind those who see them of the Blessed One himself.

We have observed that in primitive culture it is impossible to draw any line of demarcation between art and magic. At that stage it is easy to appreciate the definitely objective character of art. It is regarded as objectively valuable for insuring a supply of food, victory over the enemy, or other desired ends, or sometimes in celebrating a victory or some other boon enjoyed. Concerning this aspect, Bernard Bosanquet says: "The festal or social view of art will help us here. Suppose a tribe or a nation has won a great victory; "they are feeling big, and they want to make something big," as I have heard an expert say. That, I take it, is the rough account of the beginning of the æsthetic attitude. And according to their capacity and their stage of culture, they may make a pile of their enemies' skulls, or they may build the Parthenon. The point of the æsthetic attitude lies in the adequate fusion of body and soul, where the soul is feeling, and the body its expression, without residue on either side." ⁴² The "adequate fusion of body and soul" which Bosanquet saw was necessary in the æsthetic attitude, we may put otherwise as "the adequate fusion" of subject and object. Bosanquet was quite right in criticizing the ultra subjectivism of Croce's æsthetic. "Though feeling is necessary to its (i.e.,

⁴² *Three Lectures on Æsthetic*, p. 75.

beauty's) embodiment, yet also the embodiment is necessary to feeling.⁴³

(3) Growing out of the fact that both art and religion are concerned with values, and that both have a subjective side, there is a further similarity. Both attitudes are attitudes of participation and appreciation. Hegel remarked that "in truth when we judge about beauty, the æsthetic experience is over, and we are critics." This is rather an extravagant way of expressing the matter, due to a defective psychology of the judging process. Appreciation itself may take the form of a judgment. That against which Hegel was inveighing was really the critical judgment, the judgment that rests on rational processes. But sometimes judgment is based very largely on feelings and emotions, and such are many of our judgments of appreciation, such as we make in art and religion. When religion gets into the hands of the professional critics, it ceases to be religion, and becomes theology of sorts. The priesthood was the creation of religious need, to be sure, but whenever in the history of religion it has turned professional, it has resulted in a devitalizing of religion. The Protestant Reformation in Europe and the Buddhist reformation in India were both protests against the devitalizing movement. Whenever religion has remained under the control of the participants, it has been vital and strong. It has related itself to felt needs and problems. So it is with art.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 87.

The more the people are participants the better it is for art [says Dr. Dearmer]. That is why our old parish churches, built and adorned by the village masons and carpenters, were of such exquisite and wholesome beauty. A church whose architecture, carving and painting is owned and shared by all, and where all help in the singing and take part in the ceremonial by joining in the processions and acting as singers, clerks, chanters, readers, servers, and assistant ministers (where, in fact, the service is coöperative and not a sacerdotal affair of the priest or pastor) is generally as healthy for art as it is for religion. Great art flourished between the twelfth and seventeenth centuries for this reason: on the one hand the churches were the home of the common people; . . . on the other, in the twelfth century the civic communes and the more democratic trade guilds spread from Constantinople over half Europe.**

What was true of Europe applies also to India. The art which has been produced in connection with the temples owes its greatness to the sense of participation which the craftsmen experienced. In the West we are familiar with art galleries, art schools, art societies and art books to teach the technique of art to would-be initiates. But everyone knows that real artists are born and not made. In India one does not meet with any of these so-called helps, yet skilled craftsmen are always to be found who are ready for a mere pittance in wages to devote their services to the construction or ornamentation of the temple. Moreover the best creations are those which have been produced in that spirit. The mosques and temples of India exhibit a much finer type of art than modern

** *Art and Religion*, pp. 9 f.

departmental buildings. Some of the old traditions are fortunately still kept alive such as the fresco painting in the temples of Rajputana.

We have pointed out in a previous connection that the critical attitude is scientific. No one will deny the usefulness of criticism in giving us a scientific validation of knowledge. But the critical attitude may become a fetish if it be presumed that it can do all for us that we need to have done. Neither beauty nor love nor God are the creations of critical processes. The artist may very well be right in claiming that his attitude of enjoyment and participation gives him truer knowledge of the nature of Reality than the critical but inartistic attitude of indifference or disapproval. And the religious man can likewise claim that prayer, sacrifice, communion, and all that makes up worship or the participator attitude towards cosmic processes give him a better understanding of the nature of those processes than he could ever get by cold intellectualism.

(4) Another aspect in which religion and art are alike is in their common use of symbolism. That implies a further likeness, viz., that they both have meanings which are implicit and which are made explicit only in the symbols. In the case of religion the truths expressed are clothed in symbols, and the distinction between the truth and their symbols is frequently difficult to discover. Since religion is a social attitude and is not concrete in any sense, it is inevitable that it should use symbols, if any of its experiences are to be expressed. It is futile to go on protesting against anthropomorphism in religion, as

if it could be avoided. We have no language and no symbolism other than those of our human experiences through which it is possible to express our religious ideas. The same thing applies to æsthetic ideas. It is a psychological fact that we are limited by our human experiences to symbols which convey 'with greater or less satisfaction the feelings and ideas that we experience æsthetically.

All religion conforms to this type [says Collingwood]. It is all, from top to bottom, a seed growing secretly, surrounded by an integument which is not itself the living germ but only its vehicle. It is thought growing up in the husk of language, and as yet unconscious that language and thought are different things. The distinction between what we say and what we mean, between a symbol or word and its meaning, is a distinction in the light of which alone it is possible to understand religion; but it is a distinction hidden from religion itself. It is implicit in religion, and becomes explicit only when we pass from religion to science. In science, language is transparent and we pierce through it, throw it on one side, in reaching the thought it conveys: in religion, language is opaque, fused with its own meaning into an undifferentiated unity which cannot be separated into two levels. Lose the symbol, and in religion you lose the meaning as well, whereas in science you merely take another symbol, which will serve your purpose equally well.⁴⁵

In Greece, Egypt, India and other countries one form which symbolism has taken has been the idol. Idols, of course, function differently for different peoples. Some regard them as the residence of a deity; some

⁴⁵ *Speculum Mentis*, p. 125.

as the very deity itself; while for others they stand as symbols to remind the worshipper of the real object of his worship. Idols, as employed in the Indian religions, may be classified into two groups, natural and artificial. The Sanskrit *svayambhu* is applied to the first type which are worshipped in their own right. Ordinarily they are rude stones, such as meteorites, regarded as having descended from heaven to earth, and consequently as pervaded by deity. Artificial idols, the second type, require a consecration rite after they have been fashioned by the craftsman. Having been brought from the workshop, the idol is first purified by the five products of the cow, after which it is placed in a copper jar containing water for twenty-four hours. At the expiration of this period the priest touches it ceremonially in all its limbs, and breathes upon its lips. Then the sacred fire is lit, and the image and its temple are purified and made ready for worship.

Difficulties arise when progress in education and culture brings about changed conditions amongst a people, so that the old deities become more and more shadowy. What is to become of the idols which represent the symbolism of another day and cease to bear the meanings that were originally attached to them? As Mr. Gardener says:

A statue or other work of art which needs explanation of its allusions, which does not express an ideal that appeals directly to the imagination of the people, has lost touch with religion, and cannot to any appreciable extent influence it or be influenced by it. The age of idolatry in the higher sense, of religious imag-

ination that enables the artist to bring the people nearer to their gods, or even the gods nearer to the heart of the people, has passed away, and in its place we find either a superstitious clinging to the magic power of the early objects of worship, or a mere acceptance as conventional symbols, of forms that bear no direct relation to anything that is believed in as real.⁴⁶

Religion and art have suffered many times at the hands of those who have mistaken the symbol for the truth symbolized. It is the mistake of confusing form with content, of failing to see the picture for the frame. The reason for the error is usually the persistence of the symbol as a form after it has lost its meaning. The remedy is what the artist would call empathy. When we are able to understand why certain symbols were used either in art or religion or in both, then we may appreciate their functional significance.

(5) Religion and art have this in common that they both deal with an ideal world. Perhaps this seems but another way of saying that both of them are concerned with values, but it is something more than that. The values with which they are concerned are only partially realized as yet, and both of them maintain the possibility of achieving something better than anything yet realized. This is possibly because each of them is concerned with the world of spirit. They are the expression of man's conviction of the supremacy of spiritual over material values in the cosmos. The religious man and the artist are both

⁴⁶ *Religion and Art in Ancient Greece*, pp. 118 f.

sure in their own way that it is possible to achieve something higher and better than has yet been done. It frequently happens that religion and art supplement one another in portraying this ideal world. The artist pictures a possible conformity of personality to the best in nature, and religion asserts its reality. This faith in the reality of the ideal heightens its ideal character, and leads to its further idealization. When one contrasts the ideal personalities of writers of fiction with those of religious legends, this becomes very apparent. The latter are transcendently finer and more real than the former. Evidently there is an operation of faith both in the working of the æsthetic consciousness and the religious consciousness, and where they operate together the result is a heightened expression of the ideal.

This is not equivalent to saying that religion and art are other-worldly. It is true that in religion we have posited the hope of a blessed hereafter which shall be better than anything we experience in this life. At the same time religious hope has reference to the present world, and most religious people are agreed that it has a mission in making the present life better. It offers the reënforcement which the moral life demands in declaring that the universe is of such a character and human nature is of such a character that moral ideals are realizable. In this respect art performs a similar function for life, because of its faith that the present order may be made more beautiful, may be harmonized more effectually with the cosmic order. It deals, as Wordsworth put it, with

the very world, which is the world
Of all of us, the place where in the end
We find our happiness, or not at all.*

It holds before us an ideal which transfigures present experiences from the ugly to the beautiful. It opens the eyes of the spirit to see beauty that would otherwise be missed, and thus it enables man to realize something of the world of cosmic values in the present. Neither religion nor art is satisfied with positing a better world outside of experience, or a better life beyond the present. Having done that, they serve the more immediate need of enabling us to make those ideals a part of present reality and present experience. The life of religion and the life of art are both the life of the spirit wherein dualism between present and future, natural and supernatural disappears. Art and religion both portray to us that life which we would like to live, and thus put us into right relations with one another and with the universe, delivering us from the lesser values.

We have referred in a preceding chapter to the fact that mysticism is a typical religious experience. The mystics of all time have been men with visions of the ideal. The goal of experience for them has been the unalloyed life of the spirit wherein the life of the individual fades away and melts into the life of God. They believe that they have been illumined by a great light "such as never was on sea or land," and have thereby come into possession of a knowledge of

* *Prelude*, xi, p. 142.

the ideal world that is immediate. Yet that ideal is tremendously real. "God is as real to me as myself," says one; "my recognition of Him is an indistinct but real presence." The life of art is not unlike religion in this respect. It is a life in which experience becomes significant as one lives through and appreciates what is beautiful and sublime. It is impossible to fit the ideals of either religion or art into a table of logical categories. Logic is a science applicable to ratiocinative processes, but not to mystical experience. As Collingwood says, we do not get "syllogisms in music," or "inductions in religion."⁴⁸

At the same time we must admit that the ideal of religion is a higher reach of consciousness than the æsthetic ideal. The æsthetic consciousness indeed portrays to itself an ideal worth striving for, the ideal of beauty, and it assumes that in so doing it has discovered the key that unlocks nature's finest secrets. Nevertheless art is able to go thus far and no farther in portraying the ideal. It is limited by the sensuous drapery without which it cannot present truth. And the higher value, "the unity of religious aspiration and human brotherhood, in faith, hope and charity, is a purely ideal one which cannot be content with any external sign, nor embodied in any natural form."⁴⁹ Hegel put it, "The Christian conception, and indeed all modern culture, exhibit a stage at which art can no longer be our highest mode of consciousness of the absolute. We cannot worship works of art."⁵⁰

⁴⁸ *Speculum Mentis*, p. 49.

⁴⁹ Carritt: *Theory of Beauty*, p. 154.

⁵⁰ Quoted by Carritt: *Ibid.*, p. 151.

IV

In considering the idealistic elements in the religious and æsthetic attitudes we have been led beyond the observation of similarity to that of a differentiation. Like other contrasts, that between religion and art is significant because of their points of resemblance. But we must go beyond the observance of their similarities, if our analysis is to be worth while.

(1) As already observed, the religious conception of the ideal transcends the æsthetic. The artist imagines and portrays his ideal, but he does not particularly care whether the object of his imagination is real or not. Hegel thought that art deals only with appearance whereas religion is concerned with reality. Croce, too, taught that art is inferior to religion, assuming that religion is a form of speculative truth standing between thought and imagination. "Art is governed entirely by imagination; its only riches are images. Art does not classify objects, nor pronounce them real or imaginary, nor qualify them, nor define them. Art feels and represents them. Nothing more."⁸¹ In another passage he says, "Art, in fact, is in contact with palpitating reality, but does not know that it is in contact, and therefore is not truly in contact. Art does not allow itself to be troubled with the abstractions of the intellect, and therefore does not make mistakes. If art, then, be the first and most ingenuous form of knowledge, it cannot give complete satisfaction to man's need to know, and therefore cannot be the ultimate end of the theoretic spirit."⁸²

⁸¹ *Æsthetic*, p. 385.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 401.

It is possible to exaggerate this difference between religion and art. Collingwood thinks that "the æsthetic experience cares nothing for the reality or unreality of its object," that "there is no such thing as the artistic illusion, for illusion means believing in the reality of that which is unreal, and art does not believe in the reality of anything at all."⁵³ Now we have already observed that the artist is, sometimes at least, persuaded that his attitude enables him to understand the truth about the universe, better than it can be apprehended in any other way. Browning expressed that conviction:

But God has a few of us whom He whispers in the ear;
The rest may reason and welcome; 'tis we musicians
know.⁵⁴

And Wordsworth expressed his faith that he was

Well pleased to recognize
In nature and the language of the sense,
The anchor of my purest thoughts, the nurse,
The guide, the guardian of my heart, and soul
Of all my moral being.

Perhaps it may be said that these men in expressing such convictions were really transcending æsthetic experience, that in asserting its reality they were really religious. Be that as it may, it remains true that religious experience usually transcends æsthetic in its assertiveness of the reality of its ideal. The flow of images in the æsthetic consciousness is unregulated and often unrestrained, but in the religious conscious-

⁵³ *Speculum Mentis*, p. 60.

⁵⁴ *Abt Vogler*.

ness there is always the restraining influence born of the necessity of harmonizing them with reality. The æsthetic ideal calls forth our admiration and appreciation, but never our worship unless that ideal be identified with the great cosmic Artist in what Tennyson would have called a "higher pantheism."

What is the basis of the Puritan and Muslim objection to art or at least to certain types of art? It is grounded in a peculiar suspicion that the æsthetic ideal may be too self-contained, too much satisfied with itself. Now the *raison d'être* of art, religion or any other human institution is its capability of meeting the human need to establish right relations with the environment. And if art be tempted to stop short of that ideal, and claim our interests for its own sake, it is hiding from us a more fundamental human interest. The Puritan and Muslim are right in suspecting any attempt to represent our supremest values in sensuous drapery. As Malcolm Spenser has said: "Though art may express, it may also hide the truth; it can belittle and distort the idea it would embody; it may even kill the soul of truth. Indeed for the unworldly, religious art must always do one or other of these things." ** That is the danger that always lies in the use of images in worship. The worshipper may begin with a perfectly good intention to use the image as a symbol or a means of concentration, but he may end by allowing it to become an object of worship in its own right. When the creation of art occupies the place of worship, then it has left its proper function and usurped that of religion. It has

** In *The Necessity of Art*, by A. Clutton Brock and Others, p. 107.

veiled the truth instead of furnishing a figure for its clearer understanding. It is doubtless the very nearness of art to religion, historically and functionally, that has led the Puritan and the Muslim to draw such hard and fast lines, and warn their people against the danger of art's encroaching on religion.

(2) The religious attitude is social in a more profound sense than is the æsthetic attitude. This is saying a good deal for there is a large element of the social in art. It has been shown that the origin of art, as well as its function, has close associations with collective life. Many modern writers on the æsthetic make reference to the significance of the social element. As already observed, Bosanquet quotes "an expert" who said, "Suppose a tribe or a nation has won a great victory; 'they are feeling big, and they want to make something big.'" He continues, "That I take it is the rough account of the beginning of the æsthetic attitude. And according to their capacity and their stage of culture, they may make a pile of the enemies' skulls, or they may build the Pantheon."⁸⁸ It is not necessary to deal at length with this matter, important as it is. It has already been illustrated from the brief accounts given of palæolithic art, and of the separation of the drama from the *dromenon* in ancient Greece.

The matter of origin is probably less important than that of function. The æsthetic attitude is one of the characteristic forms through which the social consciousness of any people or any age finds expression. "Without a public in the largest sense of the

⁸⁸ *Three Lectures on Æsthetic*, p. 75.

word, no art would ever have appeared." " That is inevitable because the artist perforce uses the imagery of the age and group to which he belongs and in which he shares. In a sense his mission is prophetic for he beckons and urges his contemporaries forward towards more complete and satisfying forms of their own ideal. He serves the group by making its ideal more articulate. At the same time social criticism offers an effectual check upon the artist, and if his imaginings run too far afield from recognized ideals, he is liable to censure or rejection.

The difference between eastern and western art has often been remarked. It may be true, as a Japanese writer has said, that really great art "knows neither east nor west," and that "the best art of any country stands aloof from time and space, and leads people of all countries to the one kingdom where emotion, not intellect, should alone be a passport." " Nevertheless there are differences that can be perceived by even ordinary people, even though the greatness of the work in both cases be acknowledged. The key to these differences is explicable in terms of the social consciousness whose ideals they express. Indian art is characteristically the expression of ideals of the Indian social mind. One of those ideas is that of the unity of all creation. Indian philosophy has taught and Indian art has, for at least twenty-five centuries, endeavoured to express this conception to which modern biology is now offering fresh confirmation. But Indian thought with its doctrine of reincarnation has

" Y. Hirn: *The Origins of Art*, p. 25.

" Yone Noguchi: *Some Japanese Artists*, pp. 97, 98.

gone further, and art reflects it in the myriad representations of animal life. Again, one of the outstanding Indian conceptions is that of the immanence of cosmic personality. This is a type of mystical pantheism which preserves the thought of the transcendence of the world-souls or *Brahman* over the individual souls in which it is immanent. There is no conception which appears more frequently in the creations of Indian art than this. Though the Upanishadic conception of God is that He so transcends human thought and imagination that any attempt at a description is a limitation of Him, still there is recognition that for practical purposes of worship He must be given some form. In practice, ordinary people go to the opposite extreme and declare that it is not possible to approach Him or concentrate attention on Him in worship without the aid of images. How then is this apparent opposition between philosophy and practice resolved? It is by regarding images and paintings as external manifestations of the all-pervading *Brahman*.

Different figures in Indian art are made to portray different aspects of divinity in its multiplicity of manifestations. The metaphysical conception of the evolving universe is frequently symbolized by *Isvara* as *Narayana* reposing in the waters of chaos on the serpent *Sesha*, while *Brahma* the creator appears enthroned on the lotus, emblematic of purity, which is made to spring from the navel of *Narayana*. In one temple in South India the Inexpressible and Unconditioned is represented by an empty cell, that is by space. The cosmic conflict between good and

evil as depicted in the Vishnu Purana is a favourite subject in Indian art. The destructive forces of Nature are portrayed in the dancing Çiva, he who is at once destroyer and regenerator. The comparative helplessness of the purely intellectual without spiritual enlightenment is symbolized by Ganesa—the head of an elephant on the body of a human infant. The male figure is emblematic of divinity whereas the female figures represent the saktis or generative powers of the Hindu triad. Brahma the creator has for his spouse Saraswati, who presides over learning, wisdom and the fine arts. The sakti of Vishnu the Preserver is Lakshmi, guardian of earthly prosperity and good fortune. The consorts of Çiva the Destroyer of demons are Uma and Parvati, who preside over purity and spirituality. Thus Indian art is shot through with a symbolism that betokens the dominant ideals of the social consciousness, frequently in its religious attitudes. And the reason that it appears as curious and fantastic in some respects to westerners is precisely this difference in the social consciousness which determines the limits within which the artist must draw his imagery and execute his work. In a similar way the art of other peoples may be associated with the group mind to which it gives expression.

But there is still another sense in which art exhibits a social character, and that is in the æsthetic attitude itself. Quite a number of writers have dwelt on the mystical element in art. Yone Noguchi, the Japanese, says: "I believe that any real decorative art is mystical, and that, in general, there always resides a certain

mysticism in every material expression." ⁸⁹ Percy Brown in characterizing Rajput and Buddhist painting says, "The dominant note of both was religion, and the chief feature was mysticism."⁹⁰ Dr. James Cousins dwells at some length on the mystical character of Indian art, and describes it as practising "the western mystical doctrine of the Perpetual Presence."⁹¹ Santayana describes the influence of the sublime as leading to the mystical confession, "Lord, though thou slay me, yet will I trust thee."⁹² The great artists are unanimous in asserting that their greatest work is done in a sense of inspiration, that is to say a consciousness of being at one with a power outside of themselves through which they are able to accomplish what would otherwise be impossible. They believe that they have been in intimate contact with cosmic reality and that their art is an expression of that extra-human power with which they have been *en rapport*. Tolstoi was of the opinion that religious art has a sacramental effect on man, touching him with an exalted emotion. Miss E. D. Puffer in analyzing what she terms "the aesthetic repose" ⁹³ has established a very strong case for the mystical element in art. First of all she deals with mysticism as the typical enthusiasm of religion, and shows that the characteristic mystical experience is that in which religious exaltation results in a loss of the sense of personal identity, so completely is consciousness

⁸⁹ *Some Japanese Artists.*

⁹⁰ *Indian Painting*, p. 7.

⁹¹ *The Philosophy of Beauty*, p. 71.

⁹² *The Sense of Beauty*, p. 245.

⁹³ *The Psychology of Beauty*, pp. 60-87.

dominated by the sense of God. The object of all mystical contemplation is the achievement of this sense of a merging and melting of personal consciousness in the One, that which the Indian mystic knows as absorption. She then goes on to show that devotion to beauty produces the same kind of mental attitude as religious enthusiasm. The subject of æsthetic rapture like the subject of religious ecstasy dwells on his delights, gives himself over to emotional contemplation, and merges his consciousness in the One extra-human reality. The æsthetic attitude resembles the mystical attitude in the loss of consciousness of personal identity, and a sense of unity with the object *to which it is devoted. In art as in religion, one must lose oneself to gain the world.*

It is possible in some such manner as indicated to make out a case for an element of the social in the æsthetic attitude. Yet it needs modification by saying that the social element here is secondary rather than primary. The æsthetic attitude is fundamentally one of enjoyment. Its aim is not explanation, nor communication of information, but appreciation. Call it critical appreciation, if you will, but it is appreciation. Even its creative aspect is subsidiary to that. Now the appreciatory or enjoyment attitude is neither necessarily nor primarily social, though it may be augmented by sharing it with others. A social attitude can be only the attitude of one person towards another or towards an object which has been personified. The object of the æsthetic attitude is not a person, and if it be personified it is an indication that the æsthetic attitude has been transcended, conceivably by the

religious. The æsthetic consciousness glories in the realization of the attractiveness, beauty or sublimity which creations of art possess, and one of the ways in which it finds expression is the endeavour to communicate or interpret this experience to other people. The particular arts and works of art, music, painting, sculpture, literature, etc., are the channels through which creative imagination attempts to communicate and interpret the beauty or sublimity which is enjoyed. It will be obvious at once that communication and interpretation are processes which serve social ends. But it ought not to be less obvious that the purpose of these processes has grown out of an appreciation which involves perception and imagination in a more narrowly personal sense. This must not be so construed as to neglect the fact that personality is inherently social. Personality however is as really individual as it is social, and the fact that each consciousness is an identity having its own mental processes is perfectly clear. These same mental processes are affected by certain social determinations and issue in other social consequences. The æsthetic attitude of enjoyment is personal in the individual sense. It is social in so far as the collective consciousness largely determines the limits within which the individual may find his enjoyment, and in the sense that he seeks for opportunities to communicate and interpret to other members of society his own æsthetic experience.

The claim has already been stated for the religious attitude that it is more profoundly social than the æsthetic. In dealing with the relation between religion and science, this characteristic of the religious

attitude has already been unfolded. Here it may be reiterated that the religious attitude is through and through social. It matters not what the external manifestations of the religious consciousness may be, what overt expression may be utilized, the attitude in every case is social. If man did not believe that the extra-human environment were amenable to social relationships, he would cease to be religious. But in every impulse to religious feeling and in every conation to religious expression, this attitude is present. It is not maintained that man is always conscious of the social character of his attitude when religious. Probably the Hinayana Buddhist for instance, in his endeavour to solve the riddle of suffering by the overcoming of desire, is very often unconscious that his attitude to the environing cosmos is social. And the Vedantist who seeks for the absorption of his own soul in the world-soul may think he is denying or transcending social relations. Yet have we not in these examples types of mysticism the very soul of which is social?

It has been shown that religion like art finds its genesis in the social life. Further the religious consciousness like the æsthetic is limited in its field of expression by the operations of the social consciousness of which each forms a part. It is also true that the religious life is largely social in the functional human sense, that the celebration of religious rituals is largely done by the group and the articulation of religious beliefs is largely the accomplishment of the group. The æsthetic consciousness may profit by sharing its experiences with others, but is much less

dependent on such coöperation for its very existence than is the religious consciousness. Indeed there is much to be said for the position that religion has contributed to art no small share of the social character which it exhibits, for no art is more socially determined and appreciated than religious art. Religion is in less danger than art of being satisfied with itself, for it involves the sense of dependence and the reaching out to the One on whom dependence is felt. Religion involves worship, a commerce between man and the object of his worship more social than anything between the artist and the object of his contemplation. The work of art is enjoyed. God is worshipped.

(3) Another distinction is sometimes given, that religion is more intimately connected with morality than is art. Once again our position is difficult because we are not dealing with a distinction between a positive and negative but rather with one between greater and lesser degrees of intimacy in the same relationship. Professor Carritt has pointed out that "What is distinctly beautiful need not by any means be distinctly useful, comfortable or morally good."⁴ But he makes it very clear that he does not imply by that a cleavage between the beautiful and the good, for he says in the same discussion that "If the experience of beauty be a thing of worth, it is one of the things which it is moral to cultivate, one of the good things without which morality would lack employment."⁵ And in another connection, already quoted, he says

⁴ *The Theory of Beauty*, p. 5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

that regarding the world as beautiful is equivalent to regarding it as worth our while, if only we regard it disinterestedly, free from the will to live in it.⁸⁸ This is certainly a point to be remembered. We do not live in a universe in which moral and æsthetic values exist in isolation. It is even conceivable that sometimes we extract both types of value simultaneously from the same experience. We frequently regard the good as also beautiful and the beautiful as good at the same time.

The consideration of the relation between moral and æsthetic values must be with reference to the total worth process. This has been analyzed with much penetration by Professor W. M. Urban in his book on *Valuation, Its Nature and Laws*.

The worth attitude [he says] may acquire the attribute of obligation or of æsthetic repose in the object. These acquired feelings then become the basis of importation of new worth to the object. Genetically viewed, the more primitive ethical and æsthetic values arise in the very processes of consumption and acquisition. The obligation to cleanliness and thrift, the æsthetic values of taste and refinement in living, are acquired almost imperceptibly, and from the analytical point of view also, it is impossible to say that obligation is something fundamentally different from desire or that the æsthetic is desireless appreciation. They are merely appreciative distinctions within the total worth process, modifications of attitude by which meaning is acquired. . . . An act or an attitude acquires ethical worth or meaning when it becomes obligatory, and for an act to be felt as obligatory, means that it

⁸⁸ "Truth in Art and Religion," art. *The Hibbert Journal*, VIII, pp. 370 f.

has become the object of a new kind of worth feeling. An object acquires æsthetic worth or meaning when it becomes, as we say, beautiful, the term being used in its larger sense to include all the modifications of the æsthetic. And for an object to be felt as beautiful means that it has become the object of a new kind of worth feeling. In each case the oughtness or the beauty of act or object is a funded meaning or worth acquired in some process and imputed to the object or act."⁷

It is possible that this worth attitude towards any object may involve both elements being present synchronously. Yet it is not necessary that they should exist side by side. Feeling an object to be beautiful does not necessitate any obligation towards it. The feeling of obligation arises in a social situation, and if the object of the æsthetic attitude be a person, it may involve a feeling of obligation. When an object appeals to the æsthetic consciousness it acquires the "capacity of holding us, of confining the energy of conation and feeling to an expansion of feeling, to repose in the object."⁸ On the other hand, if the object evokes the moral attitude, it inspires an impulse to apprehend its meaning and value in terms of our human relationships, especially as they culminate in judgments of right and wrong. So we may say that the relation of art to morality is in a sense a part of the broader problem, already discussed, as to the extent to which the æsthetic attitude is social. Since it is fundamentally an attitude of enjoyment, a repose, it does not require to evoke a feeling of obligation,

⁷⁷ *Valuation, Its Nature and Laws*, p. 205.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

though at times the object to which it is directed may do so.

The relation between religion and morality is to be the subject of the next chapter, but in this connection one or two observations are necessary. In the first place, both the religious and moral attitudes are thoroughly social, the difference being in regard to their environmental reference. The religious attitude arises within the sphere of our social attitude towards the extra-human environment, and the moral attitude within that of our social attitude towards the human environment. This division into the human and the extra-human is an analysis of our environment which we make for theoretical purposes, but they belong to our one universe of experience, and in practical affairs the division is frequently difficult to demark. We have had occasion to observe that the scientific view of the world has made it increasingly difficult to separate the natural from the supernatural. The more we learn about the supernatural the more natural it seems to be, and the wider our knowledge of the natural the more it seems to be shot through with the supernatural. That means that the line between the human and the non-human moves up and down much like the white-black line in a colour pyramid with its indefinite shades of gray in between. This is one palpable reason why it is sometimes impossible to draw a hard and fast line between religion and morality. In the higher religions there is an insistence that religious ideas should be squared with moral ideas, that a God who is not at least equal to our highest standards of morality is no God at all. On the other hand those who are engaged in the

moral struggle are always conscious of the need for more-than-human power to realize their ideals. They are conscious of the cosmic significance of the moral struggle. So the spheres of these two attitudes are constantly overlapping and interpenetrating. The conclusion is valid. The religious attitude stands in closer kinship to the moral attitude than does the æsthetic. Art might sometimes escape from being moral, but religion cannot.

(4) From the differentiations that have been observed it would appear that much of the difference between religion and art is a difference in degree rather than content. The religious attitude transcends the æsthetic attitude towards the ideal in its assertiveness and its logical insistence on the coherence of that ideal with the rest of reality. The religious attitude partakes more thoroughly in the social element than does the æsthetic. And the religious attitude has more in common with the moral than has the æsthetic. But the difference is more than simply one of degree. It has already been pointed out that each in its own way represents the human search for the truth about reality. But what is the significance of that phrase "each in its own way"? It means that the methods whereby truth is sought are different, and that the aspects of truth attained are distinctive.

How is truth attained by the artist? It is mainly through the æsthetic repose. The æsthetic attitude is one of enjoyment, and consequently a good deal of emphasis is put upon its emotional value. The repose, as we have had occasion to observe, is very like that of the mystic. There are some scholars who

place so much emphasis on this element as to rather obscure its conative or creative phase. Earl Balfour, in his Romanes Lecture, said, "You enjoy a picture, you enjoy a poem, you enjoy a symphony, but your enjoyment does not go beyond this; it never prompts any policy, any course of action; it does not drive you into the practical world at all." " And Bishop William Temple agrees with him in the view that "the æsthetic attitude is quite non-practical in the sense that while it, and it alone, possesses us, the will and every kind of desire are quiescent. The perception of beauty may indeed stir up all manner of impulses; but in itself it is merely contemplative. . . . Whether or not mysticism is, as Mr. Balfour fears, the only philosophy of art, it is beyond all question that the æsthetic experience is a purely mystical experience." " Temple seems to imply a distinction between the æsthetic attitude which is one of contemplation and the artistic expression which calls forth the æsthetic attitude. Croce described the work of the artist as giving the "expression of impressions," " but surely he does not mean that expression is art while impression is the æsthetic attitude. That would be making a theoretical distinction to which there is nothing corresponding in human experience. Indeed Croce himself criticizes that position. "It is customary," he says, "to distinguish the internal from the external work of art; the terminology seems here to be infelicitous, for the work of art (the æsthetic

⁸⁸ *Questioning on Criticism and Beauty*, p. 21.

⁸⁹ *Mens Creatrix*, p. 97.

⁹¹ *Æsthetic*, p. 21.

work) is always *internal*; and that which is called *external* is no longer a work of art. Others distinguished between *æsthetic* fact and *artistic* fact, meaning by the second the external or practical stage, which may and generally does follow the first. But in this case, it is simply a case of linguistic usage, doubtless permissible, although perhaps not opportune."⁷² The distinction between the emotional experience as *æsthetic* attitude, and its conative tendency as *artistic* expression appears to be a survival of the faculty psychology, but the understanding of consciousness as a functional unity should be a corrective of such views. The emotional enjoyment frequently finds expression in the artistic expression. As far as the *æsthetic* attitude is concerned it is true that enjoyment is the dominant feature, and the artistic expression is the conation resulting from such an emotional attitude.

The kind of truth which is obtained by means of the *æsthetic* consciousness is emotional truth in the guise of beauty. It is neither logical truth, scientific truth, nor moral truth. It is doubtless true that works of art give interpretive expression to scientific and moral truths at times, but that is subsidiary to the purpose of exhibiting emotional values. There is an important point which has been brought out by Croce and further elaborated by Temple, viz., that we ought to find the meaning of a work of art in the work itself and not as something which can be detached or abstracted from it. Poetry, painting and music convey meanings no doubt, but are not created that we

⁷² Ibid., p. 83.

should abstract some meaning away from them. As A. C. Bradley said about certain poems which are artistic gems, if we inquire as to the meaning of such a poem, the only answer possible is, "It means itself."⁷³ The function of the work of art is not to be the sensuous representation of some intellectual truth for which men ought to strive behind the form. The form is the content also. The meaning of the artist is not something apart from the expression of his art. Temple says, "Art is expression; what then does it express? Itself. There is no other expression."⁷⁴ There is an exception to be made, however, which Mr. Bradley pointed out. An extended work of art, like a long poem or an oratorio, cannot be taken as the expression of a passing mood, and our larger consciousness demands that it exhibit certain moral or religious phases. Consciousness cannot be only æsthetic for a long time, and a work of art which calls for prolonged attention must also appeal to other attitudes like the moral or religious.

In contrast with the æsthetic consciousness, it must be reiterated that the religious consciousness is social both as to method of functioning, and content of experience. Prayer, sacrifice, votive offering, the typical expressions of the religious consciousness are all social. One of the bases on which it rests is the sense of dependence on the cosmic environment which has grown out of the critical experiences of life. Man has discovered through great experiences that his environing universe is amenable to social manipula-

⁷³ *Poetry for Poetry's Sake*, p. 29.

⁷⁴ *Mens Creatrix*, p. 105.

tion, that the supermundane power he needs is accessible to him by social means. The religious man does not merely *enjoy* God. He invokes Him, offers gifts to Him, *worships* Him. In his worship man often employs artistic creations, for all acts of worship, whether dancing, singing, erecting temples and adorning them, dramatic enactments or speech, are in one sense æsthetic expressions. Worship is an activity in which both the æsthetic and the religious consciousness find expression. There is something to be said for the argument that the religious consciousness includes the æsthetic. Certainly it does so at times, though there are also æsthetic expressions that are not religious. But when the work of art is employed in religion it is employed as an instrument for social approach, a symbol or a representation of value. The mystical element in art falls short of satisfying its underlying need unless it carries consciousness beyond the æsthetic to the religious. The goal of Art is not attained by art itself, however mystical it may be, for the human heart cannot find satisfaction for its deepest needs in mere enjoyment. It requires the assertiveness of the religious consciousness which springs out of the conviction and experience that there is in reality a guarantee for its values. That guarantee is obtainable only as we assume the social attitude towards the environing universe, and first as an adventure of faith, and then with the certainty of experience, realize the consciousness of God.

The truth content which the religious consciousness attains is also of a social character. In some form or other it expresses the belief that the universe

responds to man's quest for a power with which he can commune and from which he can obtain spiritual reinforcement. Primitive man believes that his deity is able to protect him against sickness and misfortune, and that such protection is given in response to his faithfulness in observing the prescribed ritual. The logic of *do ut des* is social, even if it does not satisfy reflective morality. In the higher religions prayer is interpreted as spiritual converse between the human and the divine, and usually those who regard it as a pious exercise of purely subjective significance finish by ceasing to pray. Probably as high a conception as any yet attained is that of love as the means to and love as the content of the knowledge of God. An early Christian mystic wrote: "Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God; and everyone that loveth is born of God and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love."⁷⁵ Love is the religious consciousness in its highest expression. It expresses the worshipful attitude towards God in its purest form. He who loves the most knows God the best, because love is most characteristic of God. Horace Bushnell once said that "Loving God is but letting God love us, giving welcome, that is, to God's love." Surely here is a reciprocity that transcends the æsthetic repose, and that is the distinguishing characteristic of religion. Collingwood thinks that "holiness is to religion what beauty is to art."⁷⁶ It would be more correct to say that love is to religion what beauty is to art, for love expresses more ade-

⁷⁵ I John iv. 7, 8.

⁷⁶ *Spaculum Mentis*, p. 119.

quately the permanent character of religion, its social essence and its social value.

V

Religion and art have been of immense significance and service to one another in social experience. Happily they have much oftener worked in coöperation than in competition. Religion has been a perennial source of inspiration to art, and art has had a refining influence on religion. Religion has sometimes furnished the content and art the form. Religion has provided the material and art the symbolism. Religion has created a body; art has clothed it in beautiful drapery. Religion has given birth to spiritual conceptions; art has devised the means for interpreting and communicating them. Religion has found God; art has paid Him a glorious tribute.

It has been the function of art to furnish various vehicles through which the religious consciousness might find expression. Dancing, processions, gardens, painting, architecture, sculpture, music, poetry and prose have all been employed for the overt expression of the religious attitude. Some of the Hebrew psalms, which are themselves outbursts of religious emotion, indicate the various forms of art used for religious purposes by that people.

Praise God in His sanctuary: praise Him the firmament of His power.

Praise Him with the sound of the trumpet: praise him with the psaltery and harp.

Praise Him with the timbrel and dance."

"Ps. cl. 1, 3, 4.

The debt of religion to music is everywhere apparent. The Chinese have their "ear-shattering processions" which are provided by the philanthropically minded in token of their piety. In India music and religion have been interwoven from time immemorial. In Christian Europe the greatest music has been produced in and dedicated to the service of religion. Painting, architecture and poetry have been the most richly creative when inspired by religion. Whenever the religious motive has declined, art has declined. In India many beautiful gardens are maintained in connection with temples, and certain flowers are considered to be the favourites of the deities.

Not God! in gardens! when the eve is cool!
Nay, but I have a sign:
'Tis very sure God walks in mine."^a

May we not say that it is the mission of religion to discover spiritual value, and the mission of art to reveal it? Since God is the consummation of all our highest spiritual values, we include in our idea of Him the element of beauty, so that it is signally appropriate that art should supply beautiful vehicles to convey religious truth and feeling.

Sometimes works of art have been offered to the deity in the nature of a propitiation where there was fear of a loss of favour. Temples have been built and dedicated, and sculpture has been employed from that motive. Art has sometimes been substituted for the ritual and such arts as music have been enlisted for the ritual itself. The service of art to religion

^a Quoted by Dearmer in *Art and Religion*, p. 13.

includes the furnishing of symbols to represent religious objects. Symbolism constitutes both a service and a danger to religion. A beautiful statue may conceivably be just as much an aid to worship as a beautiful liturgy, if it be the expression of an ideal that is cherished by the religious consciousness. For a certain type of mind it would seem that statues appeal to the religious imagination and stand as the symbols of an ideal, bringing it into more intimate association with practical experience. But if the ideal does not speak for itself but needs to be interpreted, if the æsthetic device ceases to be articulate with divine feeling and power, then it not only fails, but actually hinders religion.

If art has sometimes been the handmaid of religion, religion has also served as a handmaid of art at other times. Religion has been throughout the ages the chief source of inspiration to art, and art has never flourished apart from religion. The mythologies of religion, such as the Buddhist *jataka* tales, have furnished the artist with subjects for his creative imagination. The association of worship with particular places and objects has at other times afforded a basis for art. Religious emotions and ideas have formed a part of the social consciousness in which the artist has shared and in which he has found his ideals.

Probably the greatest service of religion to art is that of setting æsthetic values in their proper relationship in human life. Höffding pointed out that religion rests on the faith that all real values are

conserved. We may add that vital religion also believes that we men have the privilege of coöperating with God in the task of conserving them. But we must also believe that in some manner the great and imperishable values hang together, that they participate in reality. Beauty, truth and goodness do not exist in separation to be conserved, for none of them has any power of self-conservation. It is the splendid mission of religion to bring this trinity of values together into the unity of God. None of these three values is reducible to either of the other two, yet all of them are brought together in the conception of God. It is the only conceivable way of securing coherence in the realm of values. Religion is necessary to secure unity among the values, but also for the completion of the values themselves. Art is the expression of the beautiful in the universe, but beauty is not a perennial source of satisfaction in itself. We are more completely satisfied only in the One who unites in Himself beauty, goodness and truth in perfect proportions, and confers upon them a stability which they have not power in themselves to guarantee. The religious consciousness thus confirms the hope of the philosopher that there must be an eternal home of our values in which they reciprocate one another.

Ye know why the forms are fair, ye hear how the tale
is told;

It is all triumphant art, but art in obedience to law,
Painter and poet are proud in the artist-list enrolled:
But here is the finger of God, a flash of the will that can,

Existent behind all laws, that made them and, lo they
are!

And I know not if, save in this, such gift be allowed to
man,

That out of three sounds he frame, not a fourth sound,
but a star.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Robert Browning: *Abl Vogler*.

CHAPTER V

THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND MORALITY

EVERY conceivable kind of relation has been thought to subsist between religion and morality. Some have believed them to be two different names for the same facts. Others have said that morality was born in the matrix of religion, while others have reversed the relationship, claiming morality to be the mother and religion the child. Still others have proposed to separate them completely, as if no relationship whatever subsisted between them. The problem is one of significance to the whole of philosophy, and the historico-psychological approach is one which gives promise of fertile suggestion. It has the advantage of taking the facts of experience as they are disclosed in the historical process and interpreting them in the light of our achieved knowledge concerning the mental life. The method has its limitations and they are nowhere more apparent than in the problem before us. Nevertheless it starts us on the right road in compelling us first of all to face the facts. Whatever metaphysical interpretations we may desire to add will be all the more sure for beginning with the findings of history and psychology.

It has been observed that a logic of religion is exceedingly difficult to obtain because of the multi-

tudinous variety of religious expressions. It is equally difficult to undertake to formulate a concrete universal which can cover the facts of moral experience. Yet the appreciation of the meaning of the problem before us depends in no small measure on a clear understanding of the spheres of each. Now a definition is expected to serve two functions: first, it ought to afford a criterion of the functional identity among the various particulars which fall within the scope of the universal; and second, it ought to be so expressed as to exclude any other thing from which it is to be differentiated. In the problem of the relation between religion and morality, the acuteness of the situation is due to the fact that the definitions accepted have failed sometimes in the one requirement and sometimes in the other. If the definitions of religion and morals be sufficiently narrow, they will not appear to be in any way concerned with one another. If they be broad enough, they will seem to cover the same territory.

It is generally accepted that both religion and morals have developed within the sphere of the social attitudes. Both of them are particularly vital to life, and are the outcomes of human reactions to an environment that is considered to be amenable to social relationships. In the midst of the great variety of concrete expressions and forms which we call religious and moral, the one outstanding element which they have in common is this social attitude towards the environment. How then are they to be differentiated? The differentiation is to be found in the environments that are socialized, in the case of

religion the reference being to the extra-human in distinction from the moral with its reference to the human. In religion man is conscious of a sense of social solidarity with his environing universe; in morality he is conscious of social solidarity with his fellow men. Whenever there are concepts of common interest to the two, such as judgments, duties, values, etc., the difference of their signification is to be found in their reference, in the one case that being extra-human, and in the other human.

I

The question as to whether or not there is any relationship between religion and morality is easily answered because of the fact that we find them inter-related in several historical situations. We are not dealing with a purely speculative question, but with one that is factual. Over and over again we find individuals and groups assuming religious and moral attitudes simultaneously. The same situation may evoke both attitudes. The same stimulus may call forth a response that is at once moral and religious. An examination of the historical situations in which the two attitudes are found in association affords the data requisite for an inductive approach to the problem. Whatever analysis we may be able to make depends primarily on the accurate observation of the facts. As action precedes reflection, so historical observation comes before psychological analysis.

(1) We have amply observed that human life in the stage of primitivity was an undifferentiated continuum. These two attitudes towards the environ-

ment are not localizable in the precultural stage of human history. The explicit articulation of the attitudes and disciplines—magic, science, art, morality and religion—is an achievement of the reflective processes. In examining the behaviour of primitive peoples, what we find is the stuff out of which morals and religion were produced rather than the products themselves. The undifferentiated social consciousness was the matrix out of which both the moral consciousness and the religious consciousness developed.

In early group life the sense of solidarity was preserved very largely through the predominating influence of custom. The over-mastering influence of which primitive man was conscious was the recognized folk-way, the sanctioned custom. The welfare of the group was regarded as bound up with approved habits, and whatever authority was developed functioned as the guardian and preserver of the folkway. Nothing more binding had been conceived, and yet the bond was neither specifically moral nor specifically religious. It may appear paradoxical to say that it was at the same time both and neither. Custom was interpreted as possessing at once the sanction of a moral standard and the sacredness of a religious sanction, and yet it was not differentially either.

The reign of custom in group life is largely due to the fact that the corporate feeling is so strong. All the way along from primitive society to our more complex civilizations, we find man determined largely in his individual actions by the group's way of doing things, by what McDougall calls "The Group Mind." It is clearly observable in India with its tyranny of

mammul, dominating the whole social life, in caste, in religion and in economic relations. Professor John Dewey is of opinion that what Dr. McDougall calls "The Group Mind" is nothing more than "a custom brought at some point to explicit emphatic consciousness, emotional or intellectual".¹ The bonds which unite a group together for the enforcement of custom are psychological. A corporate awareness or a corporate feeling culminates in corporately approved activity. Man's techniques are never in advance of his felt needs, and in the early stage his felt needs were those which he shared with the other members of the group in which his life was integrated. The welfare of the group was the main determiner of the welfare of the individual. Its approved habits were his practised habits. Its judgments were his judgments. Its values were his values. The significance of this was that conduct was praised or blamed, property was administered, industry was conducted, and wars were waged in the interests of the group and by the group. It was the duty of the individual to love what the group loved, and hate what the group hated.

The members of the group ate together, feasted together, fasted together, worked together, played together, hunted together, danced together, sang together, sacrificed together and prayed together. Individualism was a subsequent development, belonging to the period of reflective action. The truth is we are frequently tempted to exaggerate the individual's significance even in more advanced culture. Pure and simple individualism is a fiction of the imagination.

¹ *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 60.

Even Robinson Crusoe had the society of his man Friday, and the individual with whom we have to deal in our psychological analysis is one whom we have attempted to abstract from his group or environment for theoretical purposes. The first sign of individualism in primitive times was looked upon as endangering the life of the group. So there was developed a technique for the enforcement of custom. Sometimes this was in the form of something decorative such as feathers, tattoos or costumes which expressed the notion of approval, and we have primitive art and morality in juxtaposition. At other times disapproval was expressed in the form of ridicule. Tabu played an exceedingly important part in the enforcement of custom. Its original meaning as something "marked off" grew to include the conception of the dangerous, and consequently the sacred. A tabu expresses the resentment of the group against an infringement of its customs, and hence is intensely emotionally toned. "The significance of the tabu lies, however, not in the prohibition, which is social and secondary, but in the nature of the sanction, the inevitable, automatic, and incommensurate consequence of violation."² In the beginning tabu was not specifically either moral or religious, but simply an articulation of social usage and authority. As time went on the word came to have added significance in the preservation of group customs as they were differentiated into those of purely human reference and those associated with the group's conceptions of the superhuman.

Primitive man had no scientific apparatus for build-

² George Foote Moore: *The Birth and Growth of Religion*, p. 71.

ing up an explanation of successes and failures. He conceived of a certain mysterious force called luck which he frequently associated with unseen powers that produced good or ill. The Greeks had a goddess who was a deification of luck—Tyche. Since the good or bad luck may befall the entire group, and not simply the actor, the group was interested in controlling the conduct of the individual for the sake of insuring its own welfare. Hence there arose such notions as lucky times, lucky objects, lucky persons, lucky places, lucky words, lucky customs, etc., and conversely there were unlucky times, objects, persons, places, words and customs. These conceptions were inevitably associated with magic, positive and negative, and unlucky objects became objects of tabu. It is one phase in the enforcement of group sanctions for its own welfare.

The ceremonial is a great guardian of custom among primitive peoples. The occasions of the ceremonial were the critical experiences of life, notably birth, initiation into the group, marriage, death, the seasons, unusual natural phenomena, war and the treatment of strangers. The social habits of the group had enabled it to build up a body of custom which represented the group's accumulated wisdom as to the best means for meeting the various crises of life. In the ceremonial the additional elements of mystery, music, dancing, singing, etc., added an emotional tone to the custom that made its binding power greater. Some of the ceremonials are symbolical in character, such as fire ceremonies to impart courage, initiation ceremonies in which the group's mythology is portrayed,

war-dances to insure success in an impending battle, fertility dances to insure good crops, and so on. Such ceremonies help in the preservation of the unity and continuity of the group life, and appear very real since the unsophisticated mind makes very little distinction between the symbol and that which is symbolized. The ceremonies not only reënforce the received customs, but are themselves an important element in the body of customs.

The important point to be observed is that both the moral and the religious attitudes were begotten in a common matrix—the social life of primitive man. Psychologically considered, they owe their beginnings to the process of differentiation begun within the realm of the social activities. As the consciousness of a line of demarcation between the human and the extra-human arose within the socially environing forces, the need for attitudes and techniques answering to these divisions became gradually evident, and morals and religion are the outcomes of that experienced need. It is not the case of either of them arising out of the other, but of both of them being related to a common source. The relationship is that of sister disciplines rather than that of mother and child.

(2) The beginnings of religion and morality as separable phases of life, distinguishable attitudes towards the environment, do not mean that thereafter they stand in isolation from one another. The conception of a more-than-human force in the environment does not involve a complete dissociation from the human. In the earlier forms of religion there

are many indications that man regarded the two elements of the social life as forming a functional unity. The life of the deity was inextricably bound up with the life of the group, and vice versa. At the same time the passage from customary behaviour to reflective determination was a slow and gradual process with constant evidences of survival of the older way of doing things. Inevitably the social consciousness under such circumstances exhibited a close affinity between religion and morality. This may be illustrated by reference to different phenomena in the history of culture.

The most elementary form of social organization was the family. Next came the tribe. The tribe is an ethnological division of society in which consanguinity and affinity are the bonds of a close-knit unity. The tribe sometimes looks to a common progenitor as the origin of its existence. Sometimes this is conceived in the form of a totem animal with which the welfare of the tribe continues to be associated, and which is a bond of its continued solidarity. One of the beliefs peculiar to the tribal organization of society is the belief in a patron deity who is protector of the tribe and responsible for its welfare. Totemism is, of course, one form of that belief. In the pre-prophetic period of the history of Israel, tribal religion prevailed among many of the peoples of the Mediterranean World. Yahweh was the God of the Israelites as Marduk was of the Babylonians. The people owed obedience and worship in return for which the deity was expected to guard the interests of the worshippers. The implication was that conduct was judged in accord-

ance with the standards of the group of which the deity was an integral part, and that breaches of the standard were offensive to the deity and consequently were punished by a withdrawal of his protecting care. The ceremonial was designed very largely to impress upon the mind of the youth the sense of responsibility and the dangers involved in failing to live up to the demands of his group. Morality had a divine sanction.

One of the most powerful instruments in the control of the tribe for enforcing its standards on the individual member was the tabu. Some scholars believe that the origin of tabu can be traced to the fear associated with the totem animal. But the tabu of animals very soon spread over to human beings, and it was found especially effective because it combined the power of a police regulation with that of a religious sanction. One field in which the operation of tabu has persisted particularly long is in the matter of marriage. In totemistic tribes the rules prescribed were exogamous. Exogamy was the custom of prohibiting a man from marrying a woman of his own tribe. This kinship relation, which was also connected with the sacred animal ancestor, thus became basic to the social organization. The significance is that conduct was blamed or praised with reference to the welfare of the group of which the sacred animal was an integral part.

Another phase of religious development that illustrates the same inter-relationship is ancestor religion. It is a development within the old patriarchal system of kinship groups. Kinship was reckoned through the male line, and those who had died were regarded as invisible members of the family. Ancestor worship

has been very widespread among various ethnological groups, having its adherents among the Semites, Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, Hindus, Teutons, Japanese and Chinese. The Greek Hestia and the Roman Vesta were symbols of the sacred character of the family. The Dasara is the festival in which the Hindu does honour to the spirits of his ancestors. The *graddha* is an annual ceremony performed for deceased ancestors the object of which is to assist the departed to enter the ancestral heaven (*pitra loka*), though it has the added value of accumulating merit for him who performs it. In most instances where we have a cult of the dead it signifies that the people regard the spirits of the departed as powerful to influence the living for weal or for woe. Hence the code of conduct is designed to guide the person so to act as to retain the good will of the dead. In this way the group believes in a bond of indissoluble union with the unseen that gives to its customs and demands a sacredness and an authority which would otherwise be impossible. If the departed ancestors live on, then they must be capable of infusing into the living who please them those higher qualities of wisdom, courage and strength for which they had been reputed, and they must also be able to help the living to guard against the enemies of the past and present. The elevation of heroic ancestors to the rank of deities is not an uncommon practice, and where that takes place, the religious bond becomes all the more powerful in the enforcement of the group standards.

The history of religions affords another illustration of a similar relationship in what are known as depart-

mental deities. These are gods who are regarded as presiding over specific departments or subdivisions of human activity. Thus agriculture, navigation, education, war, the muse, the dance, the hunt, wine, wealth and various other human interests are severally considered as having their own patron deities. In each case, prosperity and success depend on securing the favour and coöperation of the particular deity whose domain is concerned. The religions of Egypt, India, Greece and Rome in particular offer examples of this type of theocracy. It follows that in whatever respects conduct is related to any of these departments of human affairs, it is vitally related to the presiding deity who operates in that sphere. In India Sarasvati is the benign 'goddess who presides over learning; Lakshmi is the goddess who bestows wealth and prosperity; Agni is the god of fire; Soma is the god of the intoxicating juice of the soma-plant. Assistance in any department over which a particular deity presides depends on the maintenance of satisfactory relations between the person and his god. In some instances even immoral activities are associated with particular deities. Mohini, the goddess of lust, is thought to wander about after night-fall to trap the unwary. A religion which departmentalizes the god-world to correspond to its view of human life works out a great minutiae of rules and regulations for the governing of conduct, since every portion of it comes under the superintendence of some deity. Thus morality gains by the additional sanction of the superhuman.

In the phenomenon of a covenant god we have another example of the deity being considered as an

integral part of the human group, and as thus giving a reinforcement to its moral demands. A covenant is a bond or agreement believed to have been consummated between the group and its deities. Such agreement is memorialized by means of a symbol. The basal notion is that God promises certain bounties, such as salvation or a blessed immortality, in return for man's obedience and cult ministrations. The more common forms of symbolizing the covenant were the sacrifice or sacramental meal in which the community of interest between the group and its god is given pictorial expression. Sometimes meteorological phenomena, such as the rainbow among the Hebrews, were regarded as signs and seals of a covenant relationship. Totemism also is essentially a covenant relationship into which both parties have entered for mutual help and protection. In other instances, though the bond made is between human groups, the deity is expressly called upon as a witness to the contract. The practical implications of such bonds between the human and the divine were in the sphere of conduct. Their binding force was moral, and the condition for their realization on the divine side was the fulfillment of moral obligation on the human. The classical expression of it is in the prophecy of Jeremiah where the covenant relationship becomes distinctly ethical.

Behold the days come, saith Jehovah, that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah: not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers in the day that I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt; which my covenant they brake, although I

was a husband unto them, saith Jehovah: But this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after these days, saith Jehovah: I will put my law in their inward parts, and in their heart will I write it; and I will be their god, and they shall be my people. And they shall teach no more every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know Jehovah; for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them, saith Jehovah: for I will forgive their iniquity, and their sin will I remember no more.^a

In earlier Hebrew history, the covenant was regarded as much more an affair of the cult, but Jeremiah lifted it to a plane that is decidedly moral. We are reminded of it again in the Hegelian conception of heart-legality as the basis of the moral life.

Whenever the life of the deity is conceived as functionally integrated with the human group, the outcome is that divine sanction and divine protection are accorded to the body of social customs which are interpreted as acts at once of morality and religion. This idea does not emerge in the primitive stage, for the conception of obligation was first associated with the *mores* or *mammul*. But religious conceptions enabled the savage to give to his custom an extra-human sanction. This added to group custom, the consciousness of guilt and divine retribution, concepts that were most important in making possible an advance that was really ethical. Gradually there came to be substituted a divine sanction for the sanction of the original folkway, and the substitution gave greater strength to the authority of the custom. The custom was now

^a Jer. xxxi. 31-34.

regarded as divine in origin as well as sanction, and consequently it passed into the category of law.

When it came to be believed that the gods were not merely the guardians and vindicators of the customary law of the community, but the authors of all law, social, civil and religious, every transgression or neglect is an offence against God in the quality of law-giver as well as ruler, and if wilful is a constructive defiance of His authority which He doubly resents. It is through this immediate reference to God that wrongdoing becomes sin. . . . Religion was not made ethical, but morality religious; and religion thus often interposed a formidable obstacle to moral progress.*

The ideas of defilement and purification illustrate this extra-human sanction that was given to customary morality. To begin with, the infringement of approved customs associated with the critical occasions of human life, both individual and social, was regarded as entailing ceremonial defilement. In particular there arose about birth, initiation, puberty, marriage and death, a body of rites and ceremonies, calculated to remove the defilement that was supposed to be the natural accompaniment of such occasions. Consequently the function of the ceremonial was purificatory. Now purification, like defilement, is a word with a double meaning. It involves fitness to approach the deity as well as to mix freely with the other members of the community, just as defilement means unfitness in the same double sense. The unfortunate thing is that pollution is regarded usually as contagious whereas

* George Foote Moore: *The Birth and Growth of Religion*, pp. 75, 76.

purification is seldom so. Contact with a tabued person or with a person suffering from any other form of impurity results in the spread of the contagion. A man's impurity may be communicated to others in a great many cases, but the process of purification on the account of the one is not thereby necessarily efficacious for the other. In some cases however the entire affair is considered socially, and the defilement and purificatory rites alike are regarded as affecting the entire community. The important point to be observed is the wide-spread character of the belief in the religico-moral nature of social behaviour. Defilement and lustration are conceived not simply socially but also ceremonially. From this point of view judgments of conduct are at the same time both religious and moral.

(3) The concept of revelation is common to many historical religions. The meaning is that the sacred scriptures are believed to be of divine origin, and man's by donation. Wherever such ideas prevail, human behaviour is judged morally by such religious standards. The outcome has had its advantages and its disadvantages from the ethical point of view. The limitations which men have experienced everywhere as they have stood face to face with crises, which normal knowledge processes did not fit them to solve, have driven them to search along the more-than-human pathways for the truth the need of which they have felt. On the other hand, when the canon of revelation is once closed, admitting neither addition, subtraction nor change, it tends to give a stamp of infallibility to moral ideals and practices that precludes

the possibility of any further creative morality. In practice, we are familiar with the variety of attempts that have been made either to attain a process whereby superhumanly authenticated knowledge might be obtained, or to attain definite truth content. The history of religions records phenomena of great variety, including divinations, dreams, oracles, ecstasies, signs, portents, prognostications, trances, revelations, etc. At the primitive end of the process we have the shamanistic trance, induced by dance or intoxicant, but the instructions and advice given at such a time are regarded as of divine origin. At the upper end we have such revelations as sacred scriptures or mystic rapture, but still the same assurance of divine origin. Sacred books are regarded either as originating from or as sealed by the deity. The functional significance is that in the sacred text we have a sure and safe guide, indeed a divinely authenticated and therefore infallible guide to conduct. Whether it be the Law of the Hebrew, the Gospel of the Christian, the Quran of the Muslim, the Avesta of the Zoroastrian, or the Veda of the Hindu, the functional conception is the same, namely a body of truth superhuman in origin, man's by revelation, and therefore authoritative in the sphere of conduct.

The place of revelation owes its importance in some degree to the functional significance of language. Inward thought and overt expression are the necessary correlates of communication and progress. Language is a system of indirect social types of reaction whereby ideational processes that are associated find expression. Language is a technique whereby imagery is suggested

and attitudes invoked. The social life deepens to an appreciable extent by the use of such "vocal gestures." Among primitive peoples there is a tendency under certain circumstances to regard certain words or sentences as possessed of magical potency. Hence the origin of the use of spells, mantras, charms, curses, blessings, etc. Sometimes this power is believed to operate negatively, and certain words or forms of expression are tabued because they are considered to be possessed of power to do harm. Now the essential element in the belief in the power of the word is in the sphere of human conduct as that is related to the god-world. Professor Brinton refers to the three forms in which the sacred character of language operates. These are, first, the word to the gods or prayer; second, the word from the gods or revelation; and third, the word about the gods or the myth. Obviously it is the word from the gods which is of greatest significance in the sphere of morals.

The place given to the Veda in Hindu thought is illustrative of the matter. In all of the orthodox systems of Hindu philosophy the Veda is accepted as authoritative, because its origin is regarded as super-human. In the later philosophy the schools were divided into orthodox and heterodox according as they accepted or repudiated the authority of the Veda. The Sanskrit word is *ṛuti* which means "hearing," and refers to the revelation as though it were the hearing of a divine voice. At the same time the Vedic revelation is spoken of also as something seen by intuitive insight. It is *dṛiti* as well as *ṛuti*. It is an expression of the familiar truth that religion—in this instance

Vedic knowledge—is not an affair of logical demonstration, but of mystic inspiration. In the beginning *ṛuti* referred to the Rig-Veda, but a little later came to include the other three Vedas as well. When the Brahmanas with their appendices, the Aranyakas and the Upanishads were composed, the designation *ṛuti* came to be applied to them in precisely the same way as it was to the Vedas. Even the word Veda (knowledge) came to be used in that all-inclusive sense, to include the prose literature as well as the poetic. It was believed that no hymn or Brahmana had a human origin, but that they were eternal, and had been seen or heard, i.e., discovered by the rishis or seers. This divine knowledge was also associated with language or sound (*śabda*) which was conceived as eternal, and sometimes also interpreted as an eternal voice or word (*vac*) heard by the rishis. The Karma Mimamsa school, for example, posits the eternity of the word, and argues that among the criteria of knowledge the most important is *śabda*. The Tantric position in regard to sound resembles that of the Mimamsa, namely that it is eternal. As Surendranath Das Gupta has pointed out, "The denotativeness of words is absolutely independent of human agency and belongs to the words by their very nature. . . . Again the denotative potency of a word has no beginning in time and is therefore as eternal as the word itself. The word itself has no beginning for the simple reason that the thing it denotes has also no beginning, for the word itself with them had no beginning. All men have been applying the same things from time immemorial. So the denotations of common words must be eternal and

not conventional.”* The word alone is sufficient to reveal the power of the unseen, and to reveal the course which human conduct should take. Duty must not be left on so precarious a foundation as human determinations, but must have that divine foundation which the Veda affords. This is exceedingly important for morality, because the essential character of the word is taken to be in the sphere of injunction rather than formal denotation. We thus have a doctrine not only of the supernatural origin of the Veda, but even of sound. And thereby we have an infallible criterion of the duties of men as related to one another and to the unseen world.

The experienced need for a revelation was the desire to be certain beyond a peradventure in regard to the will of God and in regard to the requirements essential to the securing of His favour. When we come to deal with the content of the body of revealed knowledge, we find that it includes much that is directly concerned with human conduct. God does not belong to a sphere separate from that in which man dwells, but is integral to the human world. So the knowledge of God is not granted to man in a merely formal way, independently of conduct and character. In the history of the Hebrew religion, for example, it was the mission of the great prophets to impress upon the nation the moral conditionality of revelation. The nation had been deluding itself with the supposition that God was going to make Himself known to them

* *General Introduction to Tantra Philosophy*, Surendranath Das Gupta: Vol. III, in the Silver Jubilee Volumes, ed. by Sir Ashtosh Mookerjee, pp. 261 ff.

in love and care if they punctiliously observed the requirements of the ceremonial law. But the prophets uttered the divine word that righteousness, justice, mercy, love and humility, these virtues of the heart, would accomplish much more in making God accessible to them than all their sacrifices and offerings. The prophet Micah represents Israel as plaintively inquiring as to how the favour of God may be restored. "Wherewith shall I come before Jehovah, and bow myself before the high God? Shall I come before Him with burnt offerings, with calves a year old? Will Jehovah be pleased with thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?"

It is the old question as to whether the ceremonial is possessed of a magical potency which makes it equal in efficacy to moral purity. The reply to the question comes as from the lips of the Lord Himself, a reply that betokens that ceremonial purity will never suffice to win the favour of a God who delights as much to dwell in the hearts of men as to pervade the infinite reaches of time and space. "He hath showed thee, O man, what is good, and what doth Jehovah require of thee, but to do justly, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with thy God?" *

We find a parallel struggle taking place in India. There is on the one hand the attempt to use the authority of revelation to equate the divine requirements with ceremonial formalism. Yet there is heard, ever and anon, a voice of protest that nothing can take the place of pure living in winning the favour

* Micah vi. 6-8.

of the gods. In the Mahabharata the law of righteousness (*dharma*) is identified with the supreme spirit, and it is argued that righteousness is an eternal principle of equal authority with the Veda. Buddhism was a further protest against the tendency to reduce the divine demands to external forms. One trouble was, as E. W. Hopkins points out, that "in general the jurists, whose law-manuals were gradually evolved out of books on liturgical and social rules, were too much under the influence of the caste system to ignore the greater turpitude of a low-caste man as compared with that of a high-caste man in the case of the same offence." Another difficulty was that the earlier conceptions of moral delinquency were conceived too much as breaches of custom or departures from the ritual. Buddhism introduced the heightened conception that sin grieves the divine spirits, and therefore is wrong. Further it endeavoured to free morality from the control of religious formalism and to introduce the principle of causality. Ethical behaviour came to occupy the first place in Buddhist demands. The Dhammapada or "Path of Virtue" is a fine expression of the Buddhist demand for ethical conduct as the best form of religious devotion. Pure living fits a man for divine approval much more than ascetic practices, caste or any other outward distinction. "Not by matted locks, nor by lineage, nor by caste is one a Brahman; he is the Brahman in whom are truth and righteousness and purity. What boots your tangled hair, O fool, what avails your garment of skins? You have adorned the outward parts, within you are full

¹ *The Ethics of India*, p. 87.

of uncleanness. . . . He is the Brahman who does not give way to anger, who is careful of religious duties, who is upright, pure, and controlled." *

The significance of revelations such as these is two-fold. In the first place they give us a portrait of God or the cosmic order that is ethical, and secondly they unfold the ethical demands of religion on humanity. An ethicizing of religion, such as we find proclaimed by Micah and in the Dhammapada, always tends towards a spiritualizing and universalizing of it. It results in the redemption of religion from the paralyzing influence of particularism and formalism. This has been one of the most salutary effects on religion, resulting from the impact of higher ethical views of life. Ceremonialism in religion always tends towards mental and moral sterility, whereas moral ideals have helped towards a rational view of the universe, as well as a more practical and socially serviceable conception of personal duty.

(4) The greatest moral forces of any community are always personal. This is inevitable because the moral relation itself is a relation between persons. Whenever such forces are personalized in the religious leadership of a community, there is an inevitable association between the moral and the religious. The development and enrichment of personality depends in no small measure on the social situation. At the same time its greatness is partially due to the fact that it transcends social limitations. Leadership rests on the ability to assimilate the best that the environmental situation can give and to express that ideal forcefully,

* Dhammapada, xxvi, §§ 393, 394, 400.

but also on a measure of creative intelligence. The community is always ready to honour and to follow one who is a personal embodiment of its own ideal. Hence when a leader is once acknowledged, his word in matters of duty is likely to find pretty ready acceptance. Of course there are times when the leader is a genius and so far in advance of his own time that it is only after a considerable lapse of time that his leadership gains acknowledgement. A prophet is very often without honour in his own day as well as in his own country. Nevertheless a gradually developed appreciation is frequently more profound in the end than one of mushroom origin.

The most primitive type of religious leadership was the shaman or witch doctor. These men were chosen for their work because there appeared to be something supernatural about them. Coe points out that in reality their leadership was due to three factors: (1) the impressiveness of trance phenomena, (2) the success they attained through doing what the people desired, and (3) wisdom gained through habitually dealing with public interests. The shaman really belongs to the period of customary morality, so that under the influence of the trance, the suggestions he makes are for the most part based on the traditions of the group. Successful guesses as to guilty persons in the case of crime, and successes in problem-solving and predictions go far to establish the confidence of the people. He is deemed to be possessed of an occult power, so that whatever he does or says carries powerful suggestibility to the minds of the people. His suggestions, as has been said, are usually in line with

tribal traditions, but his mysterious power gives to them a reënforcement of great power. With the development of culture the shaman receded on the one hand before the prophet and on the other before the priest. The prophet was the successor of the seer who apprehended the divine will through visions and dreams. He spoke the deity's will and acted as the spokesman of the deity to the people. The burden of prophetic messages was social righteousness as related to existing circumstances, the element of prediction being quite subsidiary to that end. The conviction that the prophet spoke God's message gave strength to his ethical admonitions. While the prophet's business was more especially with matters of moral and spiritual significance, the priest took care of the ceremonial and all matters connected with the group's business with the gods. Yet the priestly duties were inclusive of a broad variety of functions, including teaching, purifying, recording traditions and history, foretelling the future, and various matters of moral significance. Both the priest and the prophet were regarded as possessing superior knowledge in regard to the will of the gods, and consequently their significance for group morality was very great.

Professor Galloway applies the term "prophetism" to that type of religious figure such as we find in the Hebrew prophets no matter what people or religion he may have been associated with. In that sense the word may be taken to include such great leaders of the moral and religious life as Buddha, Confucius and Zoroaster. It is of no small significance that such prophetic voices have seldom emanated from the priestly

or official religious classes, but rather from men who have had direct personal experience of God, and have made articulate their convictions in inspired messages for their day. The prophet, as the etymology of the word indicates, was one who spoke on behalf of God. Yet he was in a very real sense a child of his time. He spoke indeed with the voice of God, but that voice was raised in vital relationship to specific needs. The prophet knew full well the social and political currents of his day. He realized the wrongs that cried out to be righted and the evils that demanded redress. He spoke with a profound sympathy, and yet with a moral fervour that was incomparable. He made vocal the deeper social conscience and became the spokesman of the outraged social justice. He called upon the people to repent of evil and accept the rule of righteousness because God required it. He was a social reformer, because he believed such reforms to be demanded in the interests of conformity to the will of God.

The great founders of religion have been men with messages at once moral and religious. Muhammad is typical. The situation in the Arabia in which he was born was appalling both ethically and religiously. Drunkenness, gambling, infanticide, murder, robbery, bad marriage laws, slavery, and kindred evils were rampant. Judged by the prevailing standards, the prophet accomplished very notable reforms in the moral conditions, not to mention his condemnation of idolatry and the whole pagan cultus, and his substitution of a life of prayer and devotion on the type of the Jewish and Christian conceptions. Muhammad

was convinced that the religion which he preached was his by revelation, so that the moral character of his message was doubly reënforced by the fact of its revelatory claims and the force of his own personality.

Buddha put so much emphasis on morality that some critics of Buddhism have gone the length of saying that it is not a religion but merely an ethical philosophy. Though it is true that Buddha himself seems to have been silent in regard to theology, yet the Nirvana that he preached was distinctly a religious concept, and could be attained only by means of religion. Furthermore the extra-human reference, which we may characterize as implicit in early Buddhism, very soon become explicit in the Mahayana period. The human tendency to seek for help along the more-than-human channels resulted in his followers converting Buddha himself into a deity, the one basis and authority for the *dhamma*, or moral law. As Hopkins says, "Within a few centuries of Buddha's death his followers had practically become almost as religious in their outlook on ethics as were their Brahmanized countrymen, who held that this was a divine institution, that moral laws had been directly inspired, and that the god still watches men to see whether their behaviour was straight or crooked." *

The subject of the teachings of Jesus was the kingdom of God. Like the Hebrew prophets who preceded him, he held up to scorn the hypocrisy of the ceremonial religion of that day, and told the people that unless their morality was something better than that of the religious officialdom of the day, they would

* *The Ethics of India*, p. 170.

have no place in that kingdom. There never could be any substitute for purity of heart and uprightness of life. Selfishness was the most horrid sin of all, the most debasing to human character and the most dishonouring to the God of love. Jesus did not interest himself in trying to upset the established forms of religion, but was more concerned with pointing out the moral and spiritual significance of these forms. Ceremonial ablutions and tithing of one's income were all right in their place, but it was a mistake to be so preoccupied with these ceremonial matters as to forget that justice, righteousness and love were infinitely more important in God's sight. It was a mistake to think that "God was a celestial bookkeeper, forever noting down and balancing up men's debit and credit accounts"¹⁰ in terms of forms and rituals. The current legalism of Jesus' day laid down meticulous regulations for the guidance of conduct. In the place of this, Jesus substituted a few simple and meaningful principles. For the scribes morality was a system; for Jesus it was an attitude. So the emphasis in the teachings of Jesus was on a life of moral purity as the *sine qua non* of securing and retaining the favour of God. But more than that, he taught that faith in his Father would bring with it moral power. So that the requisite for divine favour and fellowship, and the power to fulfill that requisite were cor-relatives. Jesus was not only a great teacher of morality, but an exemplar. The type of life which he proclaimed as absolutely essential for participation in God's kingdom was the life that he lived. Morality

¹⁰ C. W. Gilkey: *Jesus and Life To-day*, p. 18.

and religion were not only in integral association in his teaching, but they were in holy alliance in his life.

II

Psychologically considered, the rôles of religion and morality in human experience are to be found in the sphere of personal attitudes and dispositions as well as in the relationships which grow out of those attitudes. The tendency to find the function of these important human interests within the sphere of the attitudes is part and parcel of the more dynamic approach to human problems which characterizes modern thought. The time is past when religion, morality or any of the other spheres of thought and activity can be viewed as finished products and examined from the purely structural point of view. Life itself is a dynamic ongoing process, and the mental attitudes are the dispositions of living organisms towards constantly changing situations. The contents of morals and religion, both on their cognitive and conative sides, exhibit such a wide variety that one would be bewildered if he attempted an analysis. Yet there is, as we have observed, the possibility of finding a concrete universal in the mental attitudes out of which their characteristic activities arise. It is within the sphere of the attitudes that the common characteristics are disclosed, as well as their differences.

(1) In the first place, be it observed that both religion and morals have taken their rise within the sphere of the social attitudes. Attitudes are the attitudes of conscious persons, and the concept of person-

ality carries a fundamentally social meaning. A study of the psycho-neural dispositions makes it obvious that the distinctions between altruism and egoism which we popularly make are only relatively significant. Indeed the consciousness of the self gradually emerges from the consciousness of others as personality unfolds. In religion and morality alike we assume that there exist in the environment "others" with whom we have social relationships. This has been abundantly illustrated in the case of religion. And it is equally clear in the case of morality.

The history of morals is fundamentally a social history. The first stage is that of customary morality in which the ethical judgment is determined by the individual's conformity or non-conformity to the group's approved customs. In the next stage we find these social sanctions gradually assuming more stable form in codes of laws to which social authority was attached. As time went on, philosophical reflection attempted to construct a complete system of life, making the moral life part of that whole, and viewing it with reference to its cosmic significance. This more rational view of the moral life reacted again on the content of ethics, and it was seen that the true basis of the moral life is in connection with the development of man in society, so that the claims of the individual and the group may harmonize, and that the entire moral development may be conceived in its cosmic bearings. The development of reflection with regard to the moral life is approximately coördinate with the development of social ideas and usages.

The history of ethics is in a sense the story of the development of society.

The claim that morality is essentially social does not imply a denial of the personal element. The moral judgment is a personal judgment on an action or an actor, and sometimes it is pronounced on one's own actions or on oneself, the actor. It may be questioned how such a judgment can be interpreted as social. The answer is that the basis for judgment, the major premise of the syllogism, is socially given. The individual, as a member of society, gets his conceptions of approval and disapproval from the group to which he belongs. Moral standards and ideals are always socially initiated and socially operative. The individual's ideal may deviate up or down from that of the social group, but the deviation is seldom great. It is the social atmosphere in which one breathes that must furnish the oxygen for moral vitality. Consequently even the judgments of the individual on his own conduct or character are social in nature. This fact has been stated by moralists in different ways. One or two of the more pictorial presentations are those of Adam Smith and W. K. Clifford. Adam Smith described the moral judgment in terms of the approval or disapproval of "the impartial spectator." Approval or disapproval finds its origin in the emotion of sympathy. When one passes judgment on his own conduct, he has to divide himself into two persons, "the man within" who passes judgment, and "the man without" on whom it is passed. Clifford's description is in terms of "the tribal self," approval being interpreted by the feeling that the act is helpful to

the community. When a man does something harmful to the community, remorse is due to the tribal self waking up and saying, "In the name of the tribe, I do not like this thing that I, as an individual, have done." These two interpretations present in a graphic way the social foundation of conscience. The function of conscience is the formation of moral judgment on actions proposed or performed, and judgments involve major premises which are socially given.

The entire vocabulary of ethics is charged with social meaning. The conception of obligation or duty can arise only in a social position where the individual has to consider a course of action with reference to a socially established association between himself and others. The idea of rights such as life, freedom, property and contracts is closely correlated with the sense of duty. Ethics cannot seriously consider rights apart from duties, for the precise reason that they are so frequently the obverse and reverse sides of the same social situation. Again virtue is a social category that is relative to social ideas and usages, and that derives its meaning from its association with social functions. Value is fundamentally an economic term having reference to the ratio in which commodities are exchanged against one another in the open market, and consequently it is a judgment of social significance. The three principal values that we recognize are goodness, truth and beauty, the first mentioned being, of course, the particular concern of morality. The good has been defined simply as that which ought to be, and it is obvious that the moral endeavour to bring about what ought to be must be a coöperative effort, coöperative

not only in the sense of man with man but of man with the universe in which goodness must be realized, if at all. It is not necessary to illustrate the matter further. If duty, right, virtue, value and goodness are concepts of social significance, so is all the language of ethics. Any interpretation of morality which fails to take account of its social character will be unable to do justice to the facts that it undertakes to interpret.

It is the thesis of this essay that a social attitude towards the cosmic environment is the fundamental character of the religious consciousness. A great variety of attempts to define religion in terms of an abstract universal or some other concrete universal has been made, but none of them is so well able to account for all of the facts of religious experience. For whatever phase of religious experience we may investigate, from the crudest primitive beginnings to the most reflective, aesthetic and moral expressions, we do not encounter any facts that cannot be explained in terms of man's socializing of his extra-human environment in the interests of a more abundant life.

One of the most noteworthy of modern attempts to analyze the genius of religion is that of Professor Rudolph Otto which has been translated into English under the title *The Idea of the Holy*. After exploring the possibilities of description, he concludes that there is no term which exactly meets his need, and he therefore invents the word "*numinous*" from the Latin *numen*. His idea is that holiness is a category of interpretation and evaluation peculiar to religion, but that it cannot be used to describe the character of religion

because it has developed a definite ethical content which is too restricted to do justice to its religious connotation. In present usage holiness refers to the morally good, but this is a derivative meaning. In addition to that idea it carries "a clear overplus of meaning" the content of which was largely feeling or non-rational. It is to get a word that will denote the overplus in the meaning of holiness that he coins the term "numinous." When he comes to describe the content that he would put into this term, he analyzes it as including a "creature-feeling" and sense of dependence. The only appropriate term to describe the object of this emotional experience is *mysterium tremendum*, and this is described as containing (1) the element of awefulness, (2) the element of overpoweringness or majesty, (3) the element of energy or urgency, (4) the "wholly other," and (5) the element of fascination. It is, then, the idea of the holy, before it came to acquire its ethical meaning as equivalent to "the completely good" which Otto takes to be the essence of religion. The first observation which we have to make is that the author does not take adequate account of the history of the concept "holy." One of the best treatments of that subject is to be found in the late Professor Robertson Smith's *The Religion of the Semites*. Robertson Smith is in agreement with Otto that the original meaning of the word "holy" was not ethical. The antithesis of *holy* was not *evil* but *common*. The origin of the word takes us back to the treatment of the sanctuary as a holy place which must not be treated as common. People associated with the sanctuary, even though they were

moral reprobates, were holy. The gods of the sanctuary, the utensils used therein, and the special times for cult performances were also called holy. The regulations which governed the conduct of the people towards holy objects were mainly negative. The best word which differentiates the idea of the holy in its original setting from its more modern ethical meaning, is the Polynesian *tabu*. It has been shown that a tabued object was frequently regarded as possessed with that mysterious power called *mana*. The evidence from philology is adduced to confirm the analogy. "In Hebrew," we are told, "this root is mainly applied to such consecration as implies absolute separation from human use and association,"¹¹ and as such runs throughout the field of Semitic languages. It thus means something "separated" or "withdrawn," and carries the essential notion of a prohibition or restriction of license, which is precisely the meaning of the Polynesian word. "The fact that all the Semites have rules of uncleanness as well as rules of holiness; that the boundary between the two is often vague, and that the former as well as the latter present the most startling agreement in point of detail with savage tabus, leaves no reasonable doubt as to the origin and ultimate relations of the idea of holiness."¹² In the discussion of tabu in an earlier chapter, it was shown that tabu is best understood as negative magic. Whereas the principle of magic is doing something that something else may happen, the principle of tabu

¹¹ W. Robertson Smith: *The Religion of the Semites*, p. 150 n.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 152. See also *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*: art. "Holiness" by N. Söderblom, in which the same explanation is offered.

is the avoidance of something lest something else may happen. Though magic and tabu are frequently in association with some occult power, such as *mana*, both of them make use of a thoroughly mechanical technique. The governing notion in both cases is coercion, the operation being negative in the case of tabu. Magic and tabu represent the positive and negative aspects of the primitive form of the causal category, and as such are rather pre-scientific than pre-religious categories. If Robertson Smith's contention as to the original meaning of holiness be correct, we thus see that it operated primitively and mechanically rather than positively and socially. It is our contention that the essential element in religion, the only concrete universal that appears in all the multitudinous expressions of religion, is a mental attitude, specifically the social attitude which man takes towards his extra-human environment. Man longs for support, security, companionship and help from his cosmic environment, and religion is the endeavour on his part to obtain the satisfaction of this felt need. The essential element of religion cannot be found in the character of the object of man's search, whether that object be conceived in terms of *mana*,¹³ *orenda*,¹⁴ *manitou*,¹⁵ *wakan*,¹⁶ *hasina*,¹⁷ *baraka*,¹⁸ *manngur*,¹⁹ *sakti*,²⁰ tabu, the "numinous," the holy, the ineffable, the inexorable, the unknowable, the ideal, the unmoved

¹³ Polynesian (see *E. R. E.* *sv.* *mana*).

¹⁴ Iroquoian (*ibid.*).

¹⁵ Algonquin (*ibid.*).

¹⁶ Siouan (*ibid.*).

¹⁷ Madagascarian (*ibid.*).

¹⁸ Moroccan (*ibid.*).

¹⁹ Kabi of Queensland (*ibid.*).

²⁰ Sanskrit (*ibid.*).

mover, the uncaused cause, the totality of life, cosmic energy, vital impulse, life force, the infinite, or the All. The attempts to depict the "other" of man's social relationship with the extra-human are so many and varied that it precludes any possibility of achieving a definition of religion in such terms. Besides that, it would shut early Buddhism out of the category of religion entirely, for there we have no reference to the deity at all.

In describing the characteristics of the *mysterium tremendum*, which he says is the object of the emotional element in the experience of "the numinous," there is one phrase that Otto uses that is particularly significant—the "wholly other." This "other" need not necessarily be a "spirit," a "dæmon" or a "deva." "Nor does it make any difference in this respect whether, to interpret and preserve their apprehension of this "other," men coin original imagery of their own or adopt imaginations drawn from the world of legend, the fabrications of fancy apart from and prior to any stirrings of dæmonic dread. This feeling or consciousness of the "wholly other" will attach itself to, or sometimes be indirectly aroused by means of, objects which are already puzzling upon the "natural plane," or are of a surprising or astounding character."²¹ It would have seemed less strange to us if Otto had selected this element as the essential element of religion instead of a quality attached to it. It may be maintained that those elements which he selects along with the "wholly other"—awefulness,

²¹ *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 29.

majesty, urgency, and fascination—in his analysis of the *mysterium tremendum*, are in point of fact qualities ascribed at various times to the “other” of the religious relationships. The main thing is that in religion man seeks to enter into helpful social relationship with the “other,” whether he conceives of the “other” in monotheistic, pantheistic or pantheonic concepts. The terms in which he depicts the character of the “other” of the relationship is not the fundamental thing; the socializing attitude which he assumes towards it is the primary matter. Perhaps Otto might reply that it is the “numinous” character of the object which makes man seek to enter into the social relationship. But it might as well be contended that this “numinous” character of the object had inspired the æsthetic, the scientific, and the moral attitudes. If the “numinous” be of the same stuff as *mana*, magic and tabu, it belongs to that undifferentiated continuum of primitive life out of which all the attitudes have sprung. One response to the “numinous” is what has developed into art. Another is the effort to gain mechanical control of it such as we see in magic and science. And the fact that the idea of the holy has come to have such a decidedly ethical content is evidence that the moral attitude has genetical relationship with the “numinous.” It therefore fails as a principle of differentiation. It is attached qualitatively to the “other” of the religious relationship, and is one of various descriptions which have been used, but the distinctive element is the effort to get into such a relationship. Amid the tremendous variety of religious expressions, cult activi-

ties, and ideas of the power or powers with which the religious man is seeking to socialize, the only possible common factor is psychological—the social attitude towards that environing power.

The religious and moral attitudes bear this affinity to one another that both are tendencies to treat the environment socially. The differentiation is to be found within the environment, the moral attitude being towards the human element and the religious towards the cosmic element therein. To be sure, man is part and parcel of the cosmos. As Principal L. P. Jacks put it, "We belong to the universe, bone of its bone, and flesh of its flesh."²² That is why religion and morals are in such intimate and vital relationship. Nevertheless it is possible to assume a moral attitude towards one's fellow men without explicitly introducing the religious element, and some men have at times assumed religious attitudes which others would call immoral. The reason that such situations can and occasionally do arise is that we imply such a differentiation in the elements of our environment when assuming the attitudes. It may not be conducive to the best types of religion and morals to assume such a line of demarcation, and, while we make it for theoretical ends, we recognize that in practice we do not desire to keep them apart.

(2) The second observation is that the religious and moral attitudes are alike evaluatory attitudes. Some attention has been given in the previous discussions to the nature of the value-judgment, particularly as

²² "Morals and Religion," art. *The Hibbert Journal*, July 1921, p. 619.

it is concerned with religion, so that it will not be necessary to deal with it at length in this connection. There is however no subject with which modern philosophy concerns itself more than this question of values. The value judgment, though it cannot be viewed in isolation from the common-sense judgment of existence, is nevertheless something added to it, a modification of the raw material furnished by sense-perception. These evaluational modifications include the logical, scientific or intellectual which is interested in truth values, the æsthetic which is concerned with beauty values, and the moral which aims at goodness. Since these judgments are the judgments of conscious, feeling persons they have their subjective side. But since the reference of the judgment is to some object lying beyond the individual consciousness, they have also an objective side. Professor W. R. Sorley²² has the merit of showing conclusively that value is not merely a subjective category, but that such a judgment would never be made without some objective reference. He argues in Kantian style that nothing is of ultimate worth for its own sake except persons or some personal state or quality. He robs the subjectivists of their ammunition when he claims that the very fact that value is an affair of the personal life is an argument for its objectivity. The truth, beauty and goodness which a man appreciates are not mere qualities of the process of experiencing values or of the experiencing subject. They are found as belonging to personal life, whether his own or that of others. Philosophy must take cognizance of the reality of con-

²² *Moral Values and the Idea of God* (1918, 2d. ed., 1921).

scious individuals, for persons surely constitute parts, indeed exceedingly important parts of the objective order, the order of reality. "Natural law and ethical principles are equally objective," says Sorley, "but they differ in the objective orders to which they apply and in their modes of application. The laws of nature apply to the realm of existing things in space and time, and their validity consists in the accuracy of their description of events. Values apply to personal life, and their validity consists not in describing how persons comport themselves, but in expressing an ideal which they should realize." ²⁴ The second argument advanced for the objectivity of the value-judgement is that it is a factor in or an aspect of the system of reality which philosophy seeks to understand. No view of reality can be complete which fails to accord adequate recognition to the realm of values.

Other philosophers have endeavoured to prove that a harmony underlying the three fundamental values must be assumed. Sometimes the terms representing these values are interchanged, and we speak of the beauty of a life when we mean beauty, or of goodness in a description when we mean truth. Furthermore, as we have already observed, these values are not mutually independent but are constantly interpenetrating, so that Keats could say, "Beauty is truth, truth beauty." Various attempts have been made to give a philosophical account of values so as to set them forth in harmonious relations. Plato's idea of the good, e.g., included joy in the beautiful, pleasure

²⁴ *Contemporary British Philosophy*, II, p. 256.

in the sensuous imitation of the idea, and the intelligent understanding of the relations existing among things. Kant conceived of the "highest good" as a union of virtue and happiness, grounded in the principle of reason, and he related God, freedom and immortality to the sphere of personal values. Hegel also attempted to find a spiritual synthesis, and believed that the one absolute spirit was apprehended variously as pure perception in art, as imaginative representation in religion and as conception in philosophy, whereas the objective spirit is manifested in morality, politics and history. The importance accorded to values in modern thought is due in no small measure to Lotze who posited a teleological idealism in which he thought that even the phenomenal world is a realm of values in which the good is progressively being realized. Among recent writers Professor James Ward's doctrine of a realm of ends is noteworthy as emphasizing the principle of continuity along with values. The appreciation of worth for him involves a sense of the promise and potency of further good that it may enfold . . . a yearning to realize this, and . . . the active endeavour that such feeling prompts. . . . More life and a fuller one, achieved by much toil and struggle, an ascent to higher levels, not movement along the line of least resistance—this is the one increasing purpose that we can so far discern, when we regard the world historically as a "realm of ends."¹⁶

The value with which the moral life is concerned is goodness. But we cannot dismiss the matter with

¹⁶ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 449.

the observation that there is unanimity among all moralists on that point. For goodness is a word that has not always been defined in the same way. There are several meanings in popular usage, but even within the sphere of ethics the signification shifts, being now equivalent to benevolence or kindness, again to moral excellence, and yet again to the object of desire, *that which is valued as being conducive to happiness or to the satisfaction of felt needs.* With Socrates goodness was understood conceptually, moral ideas being the highest. Plato thought the idea of the good was equivalent to ultimate reality and included all the values. Aristotle's view was that the good is the realization of the powers of the human soul. The Aristotelian and Platonic ideas dominated the Middle Ages, and we find no significant change in the meaning of goodness until we come to Immanuel Kant. It was his primary thesis that "nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will." ** This gave a personal aspect to the concept of the good which it has never lost. Another element in the concept is its teleological character. Of course all values are in some sense teleological, though sometimes that factor is slurred over. Whatever is good is good with some end in view or as related to some purpose. As William James put it, whenever he heard the adjective applied he felt like asking the question, "good for what?" or "good for whom?" The good has been contrasted with evil by Josiah Royce in these striking words:

** *Metaphysic of Morals* (Abbott's trans.), p. 9.

By good, as we mortals experience it, we mean something that, when it comes, or is expected, we actively welcome, try to attain or keep and regard with content. By evil in general, as it is in our experience, we mean whatever we find in any sense repugnant and intolerable. . . . We mean (by evil) precisely whatever we regard as something to be gotten rid of, shrunk from, put out of sight, of hearing, of memory, eschewed, expelled, assailed, or otherwise directly or indirectly resisted. By good we mean whatever we regard as something to be welcomed, pursued, won, grasped, held, persisted in, preserved. And we show all this in our acts in the presence of any grade of good or evil, sensuous, æsthetic, ideal or moral . . . whether you regard us as animals or moralists, whether it is a sweet taste, a poem, a virtue, or God that we look to as good; or whether it is a burn or a temptation, an outward physical foe, or a stealthy inward ideal enemy that we regard as evil.²⁷

Naville has put the contrast much more briefly in defining the good as in a general sense "what ought to be" and evil as "what ought not to be."²⁸

Our judgment of good as "what ought to be" is important as indicating not only the realm to which our moral values belong, but the fact of their cosmic significance. "That which ought to be" is a concern of more than passing human endeavour. In itself the moral life has the power to bring about what ought to be only within limitations. Faith in the achievability of moral values involves faith in an enabling power greater than is inherent in the moral

²⁷ *Studies of Good and Evil*, p. 18.

²⁸ *The Problem of Evil*, Chap. I.

life itself, a power that transcends human limitations and yet preserves all of the elements of value. Such is the faith at the basis of the belief that the full fruitage of morality is religion. If religion is to complement and fulfill the aims of morality, it means that it must be in some manner a guarantor of moral values. Religious faith is indeed an insistence that all the real values of experience—truth and beauty as well as goodness—persist and are synthesized in the life and character of God.

Science, art, and morality are all concerned with values, science with truth, art with beauty, morality with goodness. Religion also is greatly concerned with values, but with what values in particular? The great value category of religion is God. The idea of God is comprehensive and inclusive in the realm of values. In fact it arose in experience in association with the human effort to achieve values and to make sure that no values perish. Not only does the God-concept include the idea of a guarantee that no values shall perish, but it is itself a great value category. It is psychologically obvious that man can attribute no higher values to God than those which he has experienced. At best he can take his human values, pile them together, and suggest that these are the values which are represented in God, only that He possesses them to the *n*th degree. So the Deity stands for the kind of spiritual values which man has understood and appreciated.

Suggestions have sometimes been made which, if accepted, would narrow the sphere of religious values.

Collingwood says: "Holiness is to religion what beauty is to art."²⁰ Thus he finds the core of religion in the same region as Otto, with this difference that Collingwood seems to be using the word more in its modern ethical sense. Taken at its best, the idea of the holy means no more than high moral and spiritual excellency or perfect goodness. To say that God is absolutely holy is to attribute to Him in perfect form our highest moral value, but nothing more. Some have attempted to substitute love for holiness as best depicting the character of God and the essence of religion. In the teachings of great religious leaders, particularly of Jesus, the place of love is paramount. It is presented as the best description of the character of God, as well as the fundamental attribute of a life pleasing to Him. There is no need to raise the old problem of the relative importance of holiness and love in the character of God. There could be no rivalry in a harmonious personality such as God's. But this much may be admitted, that love is a moral quality of more distinctive social significance than holiness, and in that sense it is a better expression of the genius of religion. Since our conception of God is the summation of values in reference to the object of our social attitude, love probably expresses the essence of God's character more satisfactorily than holiness. Love is the acme of virtue. It is goodness plus unselfishness which makes it much more beautiful. Love desires the good of others as well as fellowship with them. "The good which love seeks," says Sorley, "is not merely happiness, but the realiza-

²⁰ *Speculum Mentis*, p. 119.

tion in each person of the values of which he is capable. And the communism which love seeks will be facilitated by agreement as to the values most cherished." **

But the primary value of religion is neither love nor holiness, important though these may be. For the religious consciousness conceives of God as embracing within Himself truth and beauty, holiness and love, and any other values which are cherished, all of them in complete measure. Men have with remarkable unanimity identified the higher values of beauty, truth and goodness with God. Poets and other artists have felt confident that "if you get simple beauty and nought else" you will find yourself very close to the heart of God. Philosophers and scientists have been persuaded that if they are successful in the quest for truth, they will find not only truth but God. And moralists have had a similar confidence that goodness is in God and God in goodness. The feeling of dependence which characterizes the religious consciousness is due among other things to the sense of inability to achieve the values that are desired and the sense of insecurity in regard to what has been achieved. Faith in God is one evidence of the human insistence that values are real and shall be continuous. Höffding says: "Religion presupposes that men have discovered by experience that there is something valuable. . . . Before a man can attribute certain excellent qualities to his God, he must have learnt to know both the qualities and their value in his own experience. . . . Religion presupposes the special experience

** *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 489.

that the fate of values is at stake in the battle of existence."²¹ It is in their conception of God that we learn the nature of the values that the adherents of any religion desire to conserve. Whether the conception be as driver of swift horses across the pathless sky, warm breath of all that lives, lord of the upper air whose eye flashes lightning and whose voice is thunder, life-giving force, destructive and devastating power in nature, maker of human destiny, omnipotent ruler of the universe, ineffable goal of the mystic's striving, or loving Father, we may see in that thought-form an expression of the values which men desire to be conserved. Social experience furnishes man with his mental machinery and concepts as well as with the language through which he expresses and communicates his ideas. Whatever be the values that such experience leads him to posit and to cherish, it is in religion that he finds their home, in God that he finds their guarantee.

Value-judgements are concerned with meanings, and interpretations, interpretation being the transmission of a meaning by means of symbols or intelligible terms from mind to mind. Science, art, morality and religion are all engaged in the employment of meanings. The fact is, as Dewey has pointed out, that "all the affairs of life which need regulation—all values of all types—depend on the utilization of meanings."²² The chief type of meanings with which the scientist is concerned are those which can be related to truth. The artist, on the other hand, finds meanings in sunsets,

²¹ *The Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 217, 219.

²² *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, p. 109.

storms and various other phenomena, meanings translatable in terms of beauty. The meanings in which the moralist is interested have to do with goodness, virtue and duty, meanings which can be executed in actions. The religious man discovers meaning in the world about him, or at least he ventures to resolve that it shall have meaning in terms of the will of God, the kingdom of God or some such ideal. The evaluatory process is thus one in which the subject attempts to appreciate the significance or extract the meaning from events or phenomena in the interests of human welfare. The evaluational attitude is one which is marked by the disposition to attend to the environment or react to it in such a manner as to recognize certain elements as meaningful and worthful. It is concerned with a plan or purpose, and is mediated to the individual or group in a social environment. Value thus expresses a relationship. It is a social concept, and involves a judging process in which the external factor is interpreted as of worth to the self. Religion and morality may be described as specific phases of this general process and attitude. In morality the meaning or value arises by virtue of the fact that the attitude stimulated is serviceable to the individual or the group in the task of establishing helpful social relationships with one's fellow men in accordance with the acknowledged sanctions. In religion, on the other hand, the meaning or worth is excited by the realization that the attitude assumed is instrumental in promoting the welfare of the individual or the group in relation to the cosmic environment. The technique of morality is to assist us to promote what-

ever we believe to be right and good and to obstruct whatever we find to be wrong and evil in man's relations with man. The technique of religion is to help us to obtain spiritual reënforcement through our social relations with the extra-human. The former deals with values on the basis of a human reference; the latter is concerned with those values which grow out of our dealings with God.

(3) Religion and morality are akin to one another for the further reason that both of them view life in its totality, though, of course, from differing points of view. The necessary corollary of such an observation is that they must interpenetrate a great deal. Religion interprets the world to us as a whole and through the medium of social relationship. It furnishes us with a technique whereby we may live in the world in such a way as to secure a maximum amount of spiritual satisfaction. In religion, whether in worship, in prayer or in meditation, man regards the object of his devotion as of cosmic significance and relates himself thereto as to a coherent whole. The interpretation which morality gives is also one of the world and life as an aggregate. The moral standard is concerned with life in the totality of its relations and functions. The standard is an articulation of the group's ideal of life, and the individual accepts it as a principle and a guide of conduct that may determine the direction of the conative life. Character is the sum of one's moral dispositions to act and one's attitudes towards other objects of action and is to a considerable degree determined by what is accepted as the ideal. Where the moral end is conceived in

some such terms as "the beloved community" (of Royce) the response in character is relatively high. The meaning of goodness and virtue also involves an outlook on life and the world as a coherent whole. Unless our ethical meanings be characterized by coherency and consistency, it would be exceedingly difficult to understand one another when we are discussing moral problems.

(i) Monistic philosophy interprets the world as characterized by an ethical unity, an ethical unity which is on the way to attainment perhaps, but such is its ultimate character. In such a universe goodness cannot have one meaning for God and a totally different one for us men. The meanings of goodness and evil, virtue and vice must be relatively the same. Yet the fact that evil and vice exist signifies that the ethical unity is not fully achieved. Empirical philosophy may not go so far as to assert that the universe is characterized by ethical unity, but it would agree that ethical unity is a goal towards which we may strive. It is a worthy aim for the coöperation of God and man, a venture that is worth risking our lives to attain. In either case we believe that moral values are realizable, that goodness can be achieved. The world in which we live is not mechanically predetermined, but there is real freedom for us to coöperate with God for the ultimate domination of goodness. In so far as men strive for the good, they are working together with God to achieve the ethical unity of the universe.

The significance of the inclusiveness of these attitudes and techniques is, as we have observed, an

inevitable interpenetration of each by the other. If religion be so comprehensive as to be cosmic in its scope, then one's relations with his fellow men must be part of the sum total of its interests, for surely one's fellow men are an actual and vital part of the universe in which one lives. So the idea of being religious without being moral is illogical and the reverse is just as true. For surely one cannot think long and seriously about goodness and the ideal without realizing that these are concepts that defy the limits of the purely human, and take one into the sphere of the cosmic. Ever since the days of Plato men have identified the Highest Good or the Ideal with God. Which means that the fullest, most harmonious development of the moral life is possible of realization only as life is also developed Godwards.

(ii) The human attitude towards life in its totality has resulted in two opposing interpretations, the teleological and the mechanistic. The teleological view holds that the phenomenal universe gives evidence of purposes or designs which are being gradually fulfilled, whereas the mechanistic world view is that the universe is controlled by immutable natural laws which operate with mathematically observable and predictable precision. Mechanism includes the hypothesis that the world is self-contained and self-directing and so is devoid of purpose. The general laws of matter and motion are regarded as sufficient to account for all the phenomena of the universe. "Give me matter, and I shall construct the world," exclaimed Descartes. When Napoleon commented on the absence of any reference to deity in La Place's thesis on the nebular

hypothesis, the astronomer replied, "Sire, I have no need of that hypothesis." The extreme mechanist evidently conceives of the laws of matter and motion as rigid, immutable and devoid of purpose. The laws of mathematics and physics are taken as typical. In biology, too, the theory has its advocates in opposition to vitalism, the mechanistic theory being that all morphological changes are due to the simple operations of the principle of cause and effect, and that eventually all of the complicated activities of organic life will be explained without the necessity of assuming any mysterious directing force. In contrast with this the teleologist holds that the universe as a whole is purposeful, that reality is characterized by development and purpose, tending in the direction of harmony and coherency. The teleologist believes that organisms are composed of interrelated parts that coöperate with one another in the interests of the welfare of the whole.

A. E. Taylor has pointed out that those who attempt to explain the universe on the analogy of a machine utilize a conception which differs from the characteristic of the machines we know in experience in that

every real machine is to begin with the incarnation of the internal purpose of a sentient being. It is something that has been fashioned for the express object of attaining a certain result, and the more perfect its structure the greater is the impossibility of understanding the principle of construction without comprehension of the result it is devised to effect. Why the various parts have precisely the shape, size, strength and other qualities they have, you can only tell when you know what is the work the maker of the machine intended it

to do. . . . In a perfect machine the character and behaviour of every part would be absolutely determined by the demands made on that part by the purpose to be fulfilled by the working of the whole. . . . Thus a true machine, so far from being purposeless, is a typical embodiment of conscious purpose. . . . The machine has in itself no power of fresh purposive adaptability by which to modify the purpose it reflects, or to remedy an initial defect in its execution. . . . Not only are all machines in the end the product of designing intelligence, but all machines are dependent upon external purposive intelligence for control. They require intelligence to set them going, and they require it equally, in one form or another, to regulate and supervise their working."³

Thus a critical examination of the mechanistic analogy discloses much less of a dilemma than is superficially supposed. To call the world a mechanism is not to explain it apart from a designer, any more than to call a clock a mechanism would account for it without a clock-maker.

Supposing one were to grant to the mechanist the freedom to carry his position as far as logically possible, could he interpret all the facts of the universe? Can a mechanistic biologist, for example, achieve a satisfactory philosophy of life that will account for moral and religious experiences as well as for biological processes? The problem has been examined with considerable care by Professor Joseph Needham,³⁴ and his conclusion is noteworthy. The biophysicist and

³³ *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 236 f.

³⁴ "Mechanistic Biology and the Religious Consciousness," in *Science, Religion and Reality*, edited by Joseph Needham, pp. 220-257.

the biochemist, he believes, can be thorough-going mechanists within the fields over which their sciences exercise jurisdiction. The vitalistic hypothesis is insofar unnecessary to account for observable facts. "There can be no doubt that mechanistic biology is quite capable of describing physical life, as far as anything can be described by a scientific method."⁸⁵ Nevertheless, when it comes to a mechanistic conception of the universe, we have to acknowledge the evidence of its mental origin. No theory of interpretation is given to us from without, but it is the achievement of the mental processes. But no mental process, nor yet consciousness itself can be described or explained in physico-chemical terms, "for that would amount to explaining something by an instrument itself the product of the thing explained."⁸⁶ The conclusion that Needham regards as the most justifiable, taking all available facts into consideration, is that "life in all its forms is the phenomenal disturbance created in the field of matter and energy when mind comes into it."⁸⁷ Those who have attempted to analyze consciousness, from Hume onwards, need to be reminded that they must not neglect the fact that consciousness must first be there to be analyzed. It is fairly obvious that the religious and moral attitudes both fall within the scope of the mental and spiritual life in which the physico-chemical explanation is inoperative.

The teleological hypothesis implies the notion of

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 253.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 250.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 251.

world purposer, a being who plans and carries into effect the purposes of the cosmos. The teleologist points out that even in the case of those sciences which are supposed to operate by the most rigid type of mechanical laws, there is no purpose in the original scientific interest which seeks to be gratified by the so-called mechanical treatment of the subject. In one sense, all science as all religion, morals, and art, are charged with a biological purpose. They are by life and for life. Even scientific laws, conceived as thoroughly mechanical, and tools designed with mechanistic skill are but instruments to serve the ends of life.

(iii) The form of this dilemma that is especially significant for morality is that of determinism and free will. Determinism is the application of the mechanistic theory to the sphere of conduct. It would make ethics a mere science of social behaviour, delete the elements of choice and responsibility from conduct, and rob both morals and religion of objectivity. The strength of the deterministic position is, of course, its abhorrence of the idea of chance. The determinist tells us that once you deny determinism, you open the way for utter confusion and topsy-turvydom. Against that the indeterminist counters with the suggestion that if you posit determinism you reduce choice to an illusion. If the world, our lives included, is pre-determined by fate, then our expressions of repentance are hollow, our hopes are futile, and our ideals chimerical. In actual experience, we have all perhaps longed like Omar Khayyám:

"Ah, Love! could thou and I with Fate conspire
To mend the sorry Scheme of things entire,
Would we not shatter it to bits—and then
Re-mould it nearer to the Heart's Desire!"

If our longings and aspirations, our regrets and our resolutions have any meaning, it can be only in a world with real choices, real opportunities, real responsibilities and real risks. The erection of ethical standards, the fulfilling of ethical duties and the struggle to attain the moral ideal could not persist long or significantly in a mechanistically determined universe. The doctrine of free will, while it recognizes the social and physical limitations under which we exercise our choices, is the outcome of our belief that we are of such a character and that the universe is of such a character that moral ideals are capable of realization.

The forms which this problem assumes vary in different situations, yet in one form or another it is probably the most insistent problem of moral philosophy. In India the traditional solution is found in the doctrine of *karma* and *samsara*. Karma is a rigorous application of the causal principle to the sphere of conduct in the belief that every act sets in operation certain forces. The karma of an individual is the force resulting from the totality of his acts which determines his future, for the doctrine is allied to belief in metempsychosis (*samsara*). It is a belief in the retributive reward of character.

"According unto his deeds the embodied one successively assumes forms in various conditions. Coarse and fine, many in number, the embodied one chooses forms according to his own qualities. (Each) subse-

quent cause of his union with them is seen to be because of the quality of his acts and of himself." "

Professor E. W. Hopkins summarizes the ethical value of the karma doctrine in a sympathetic treatment:

It teaches that there is no such thing as a cruel fate or an unjust God, that it is foolish to rail at misfortune as if it were undeserved, or to expect a better fate hereafter if one is not morally prepared for it. Karma takes, as it were, the place of a just, logical, irresistible, divine Power. It rewards virtue and punishes vice (mental and bodily) with the unerring "fruit of the deed." It is apparently a blind mechanical force, yet it is intrinsically ethical. All its rewards are for the good, all its punishments are for the wicked. It represents a cosmic power of righteousness forever working through encouragement of virtue towards a high ethical goal. Logically, suffering is caused by sin, and sin by ignorance, as the Nyaya philosophy says, and that wisdom which brings salvation entails the elimination of sin as well as of suffering."

The strength of the *karma-samsara* doctrine is its emphasis on cosmic justice. "As a man soweth, so shall he also reap," and that unerringly, irrevocably. In human society justice may sometimes miscarry, but not so in the world of ultimate realities. The wicked man may seem to flourish in the temporal order, and the virtuous may seem to be poorly rewarded, but in the eternal order karma can only bear its appropriate fruit. It is an old conception that virtue ought to be rewarded, and evil ought to be punished, and

" Cvetagvatara Upanishad, 11-12 (Hume's trans.).

" *The Ethics of India*, p. 105 f.

one that no one would dare to dismiss lightly. The question which must be faced is as to whether the karma doctrine is as consistently just as it claims. Since a man's present status is the fruit of his karma in a previous life, its ethical working would seem to demand some memory of that life. But the reward of unremembered virtue and the expiration of unremembered vice does not enable the individual to associate rewards and punishments with conduct in any practical way. The moral value of the doctrine, as Dr. A. G. Hogg has convincingly shown, has thus been exchanged for a significance that is mainly judicial. "Judgment instead of being a presupposition of the moral order, has become its primary business. . . . It leaves no room for any real union between the individual purposes of men and the universal purpose or meaning of existence." ⁴⁰ Of course there is no scientific evidence in support of the doctrine, though primarily the doctrine is an application of the scientific principle of causality to conduct. Its supposition is a supposition of faith, but it is faith in what sort of universe? It is a faith in a universe that operates by rigidly mechanical causation and not one that is alive with purpose. The only way in which karma is capable of teleological interpretation is in juridical terms. It is difficult to see how it can be interpreted other than mechanistically and deterministically. There can be no real freedom of the will, nor any forgiveness of sins, and these doctrines are essential to ethics and religion. Morality and religion both involve social attitudes for which there is no real place

⁴⁰ *Karma and Redemption*, pp. 52, 53.

in a *karma-samsara* scheme of things. The truth is that practical morality and religion in India have attempted to make good the deficiencies of the karma philosophy, and have assumed that the moral life involves real choices and that the gods can and do forgive sin.

It is related that Plato once put a question to Socrates: "Do you think that the gods can forgive sin, Socrates?" To which the teacher replied, "I do not know, Plato, but I do not think it would be safe." But we believe that forgiveness is about the divinest thing we know, and that

•Earthly power doth then show likest God's
When mercy seasons justice.

The moral order is not shattered when God forgives sins, for religion and morals are both relations between persons, and personality is not bound by rigid determinism, but is characterized by the ability creatively to meet situations and solve problems of human and cosmic significance. The forgiveness of sins is one of the greatest evidences that the cosmic order is moral and not a heartless machine grinding out destinies.

(iv) One way in which this attitude which views the universe and life in its entirety has expressed itself in India is in the doctrine of *dharma*. Dharma is a word that signifies duty, virtue and law of righteousness. It is of interest to observe that this very word with its rich ethical content is utilized to depict the character of God. The *Çvetagvatara Upanishad* describes the One God, Creator and Lord of all, as

"the bringer of *dharma* and the remover of sin." ⁴¹ And in the Mahabharata the supreme spirit as Vishnu is described as "Brahma and supreme Dharma, Being and Non-being." ⁴² Buddhism in the second stage of its development transformed the law (*dhamma*) and the order into external manifestations of the absolute which was incarnated in Buddha. One of the results has been the tendency to make the concept of dharma stand now for religion and now for morality. The one divine-human law of righteousness operates now in religion and now in morals. Thus we have such an intimate association between the two attitudes that many Indians identify them. Religion and morality are blended in dharma. They are part and parcel of one another. This identification dates back to the Dharma Sutras in which differentiations between religious duty, customary morality, ritualistic form, virtue and law were not made, and the one concept *dharma* stood for all. It was the entire body of sanctioned usages, religious and moral. But there is yet another reason for the identification, viz., the immanent monism of the Upanishads. The world-soul (*Brahman*) was identified on the one hand with the personal God, and on the other hand with dharma or morality. Thus the philosophical basis for morality was found in the very nature of God Himself.

(v) Goodness is the value for which morality seeks, and God as the home of our values includes within Himself the idea of goodness. The meaning of goodness, since its culmination is in the character of God,

⁴¹ vi. 6.

⁴² xii. 261, colxxx. 26.

is of cosmic significance. "That which ought to be" is an ideal to be realized in personal experience, but one which demands a friendly environment for its fulfillment. Evil as well as good is a problem of cosmic meaning, and our conception is due in considerable measure to the inclusiveness of our attitude. Primitive man's conceptions of good and evil were concrete and pluralistic. The notion of goods and evils was earlier than that of good and evil, the latter being due to our concept-making tendencies and processes. Philosophical reflection also made it evident that these experiences must have more than individualistic significance, if they have any at all. The problem is the most difficult of all those which concern the relationship between religion and morality. We can scarcely present it more plainly than Epicurus did two thousand two hundred years ago. "Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then is He impotent. Is He able, but not willing? Then is He malevolent. Is He both able and willing? Whence then is evil?"⁴⁸

How can the existence of evil in the universe be explained in consonance with the character of God? Our practical religious needs demand a God who will actually help us in life. We feel that God must be "good" in the sense of taking sides with us in the struggle to overcome evils. On the other hand the philosopher is in search for an ultimate principle of explanation that will include within its scope all the divergent aspects of experience in a higher synthesis, and there are evil aspects as well as "good." So that

⁴⁸ Hume: *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, p. 134.

any solution of the moral problem that may be postulated is faced with the acute necessity of being tested from both of these points of view. The fact that so many hypotheses have been put forward is evidence of the perplexity involved, as well as of the persistent faith that there must be a solution somewhere that can satisfy human needs. It is fair to say that the problem of evil could rise only in association with a belief in God. If one's philosophy of life were naturalism or mechanism, then there could be no power that could be held accountable for the existence of evil, and hence no problem. But if there be a God who in any sense transcends the universe of objects and relations, then there is a chance for criticism in regard to the existence of evil. Professor E. S. Brightman has clearly shown that "Moral evil must become a problem for religion, because it is hostility to the values with the conservation of which religion is concerned." " He also reminds us that "religion has never undertaken to blink the fact of evil," " but from the very first has endeavoured to offer some solution to the problem.

One attempt to solve the dilemma has been to posit a dualism, an eternal warfare between two powers, the one good and the other evil, but however much this may satisfy the religious consciousness in regard to the experience of struggle, it is philosophically unsatisfactory to think that God is not the one and only ultimate. Pantheism offers another solution by merging good and evil alike in the divine totality of things, but

" *Religious Values*, p. 94.

" *Ibid.*, p. 133.

this suffers from the defect of a tendency towards an indifferent acquiescence in the presence of evils as elements of an inevitable order instead of enemies to be fought and subdued. A still less satisfactory hypothesis is that of the pessimist who teaches that the world is a bungle and that, if there be a God, He must be stupid if not bad—a hypothesis that grows out of a shallow interpretation of the divine will as something enigmatical and capricious. Another attempted solution is that of explaining away evil as due to our finite way of looking at things, and as something which would disappear with the fuller knowledge which God possesses. This view is built on the sublime optimism that “whatever is is right,” and makes our errors of perception the ground for blotting out the distinction between good and evil. But if we do that, there seems to be no sufficient reason for still calling God “good.” Others have attempted to resolve the dilemma by saying that God is good, but is not omnipotent; that He is a fellow struggler with us in the warfares against evils; that as He helps us overcome evils in our own souls, so we must help Him conquer them in the universe. This view is a powerful moral challenge and a great religious inspiration, but to the majority the pluralistic view of the world with which it is associated is unsatisfying. All of the solutions proposed, except perhaps pessimism, have their advantages, and none is devoid of defects. There are certain facts on which we feel that, either for religious or moral reasons or both, we must insist: (1) that God is good, otherwise theism must go; (2) that the moral struggle entails a genuine conflict against real evils, and that only

through such a struggle are moral development and moral character possibilities; (3) that the real struggle between good and evil is personal and spiritual rather than physical or metaphysical; (4) that human personality is possessed of genuine freedom to choose between the good and the evil, the higher and the lower, in other words that moral values are real values; (5) that human personalities have an actual part to play in coöperation with the divine personality in the banishment of evils from the world; (6) that, though our moral distinctions may be less clear than those of God, yet they are qualitatively the same, that is, God feels about good and evil as we feel about them, only more intensely so; and, (7) that as we become more like God our moral distinctions approximate to His, that is to say the moral consciousness develops with the religious life. Whatever conclusions we may reach on the basis of these data must be largely the conclusions of faith, and in the long run there is no power as well able as faith to merge the moral life in the religious life, and to sustain the good man in his struggle towards more goodness.

There is another phase to the problem that has been created by the association of morality and religion with one another in human experience. It is the assumption of the moral consciousness that the universe is one in which improvement is possible, which of course means that in its present condition it is imperfect. But the religious consciousness, as it functions in a great many people, assumes that the universe is the creation of a perfect and omnipotent

Being. If it were made as good as such a Creator could make it, how could it offer an atmosphere in which moral improvement is possible? It is really the problem of the validity of the moral consciousness. However it is not as staggering as it might appear at first blush, for it rests on an *a priori* hypothesis that need not be assumed, viz., that a perfectly good God must of necessity create a perfect universe. Morality and religion may find common ground in the faith and hope that it is possible, in comradeship with God, to achieve a perfectly ordered universe.

III

The relation between religion and morality is apparent in their mutual influence over one another. It was inevitable that two attitudes which have so much in common should lead to certain modifications in one another. We need only remind ourselves again that both are the attitudes of conscious persons, and there is nothing to prevent a person from assuming both attitudes at the same time, or in close association with one another. The mental life is an integral unity, and it is impossible to keep religion and morals in water-tight compartments. Religion has been vitally influenced by morality, and morality has been profoundly influenced by religion. In the long run it seems pretty clear that this mutuality of influence has been for the good of both parties. It is nothing short of disastrous when either one attempts to get along without the other. Neither unreligious morality nor unmoral religion are satisfying, either philosophically or in practical experience. Their alliance is

not simply a matter of mutual benefit, but a necessity for the unfolding spiritual life of man.

Let us observe in brief the influence of morality on religion in the first instance. There are two respects in which that influence is particularly apparent, first in bringing about modifications in the idea of God, and second in moralizing prevailing ideas in regard to the future life.

The idea of God of any people is in a measure a product of social experience. And social experience includes the whole body of moral ideas and usages. The conception of God which prevails at any time is clothed in the imagery current in the time. Imagery is the stuff of the thought processes, and inasmuch as it is reinstated sensorial experience, it reflects the background of experience, individual and social. Whatever concepts men have are the constructs of the image-combining processes under the influence of the associated tendencies. This is nowhere more evidenced than in the thought of God. It is quite true in the psychological sense that man makes God in his own image. Xenophanes said, "If oxen and lions had hands and could paint with their hands, and fashion images, as men do, they would make the pictures and images of their gods in their own likeness." ⁴⁶ And Spinoza wrote in the same strain, "I believe that a triangle, if it could speak, would in like manner say that God is eminently triangular, and a circle that the divine nature is eminently circular; and thus would everyone ascribe his own attitude to God." ⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Quoted by Bakewell in *Source-Book in Ancient Philosophy*, p. 8.

⁴⁷ Epistle ix.

It is psychologically impossible for the conceptions of men to rise above the level of their experiences. The best they can do is to seize upon the elements of greatest worth in experience, and, raising them to the n th dimension, posit them to God. That is the reason that man's conceptions of God exhibit so much anthropomorphism.

From the earliest times of which we have any data concerning beliefs in superhuman beings, the gods reflect the morality of their devotees inasmuch as they are considered to be the guardians of morals, rewarding the good and punishing the evil. Where morality is identified with custom and custom includes weird and savage practices, the result was a crude and particularistic conception of good. The gods were expected to participate in petty human jealousies and quarrels, in their barter and other business, as well as in their rites and ceremonies. Sometimes they were pictured as bloodthirsty and cruel, or erotic and suspicious, after the analogy of human beings. Primitive mythologies contain accounts of the doings of the gods that are anything but edifying. The gradual change from customary morality to reflective morality involved a corresponding moralizing of the idea of God. The older myths came to be looked upon as the superstitions of primitive culture, or in other cases came to be interpreted symbolically. The myths and legends are the products of the childhood of the race, and if they persist into the period of reflective culture, it is only as they arouse æsthetic interest, or are transfigured into symbols.

The shift from customary to reflective morality was

gradual, almost imperceptible. At first there appear only here and there individual thinkers who begin to doubt the truth of the myths or the value of customs. Inconsistencies and exceptions are observed, and the validity of sanctions and usages called into question. When doubts arise as to the morality of certain ideas and usages, it is but one more step to the conclusion that the gods would scarcely descend to such levels of conduct. Gradually the voices of protest increase in volume until eventually the myth is discarded as demonstrably unbelievable for those who have had richer experiences of God. The history of any theology—Hellenic, Hindu, Hebrew or Christian—discloses the tendency to abandon cruder conceptions of God as moral ideas are purified. To attribute to God a morality in any wise inferior to the best that has been conceived in human experience would be fatal to religion. At each stage of reflective life, God must be conceived as the embodiment of the highest social values.

Wundt has attempted to trace the origin of the ideas of God to a fusion of human conceptions of the demonic and the heroic. He says: "The God is at once hero and demon; since, however, the demoniacal element in him magnifies his heroic attributes into the superhuman, and since the personal character which he borrows from the hero supersedes the indefinite and impersonal nature of the demon, he is exalted at once above both, in an ideally magnified form."⁴⁸ Though this is an unsatisfactory account because it does not account for all the factors, it has the merit

⁴⁸ *Folk Psychology*, p. 369.

of pointing one way in which modification takes place in the thought of God in accordance with developing moral ideas. The ideas of God as magnified hero, demon, fetish or tribal deity are all of them particularistic and inadequate as they are associated with moral concepts of inferior types. But the thought of God is made richer and fuller as moral experience takes on deeper meanings and achieves greater values.

The other respect in which the pressure of influence from morality on religion is apparent is in moralizing the conceptions of the future life. Among animistic peoples the belief in survival after death is that the disembodied soul has a sort of ghostly existence. Moreover there is a common belief that the soul after death has desires and needs pretty much the same as those in life, including weapons, utensils and gaudy ornaments. So we find the practice of placing money and various articles into the tomb of the departed for his use in the other world. Sometimes servants have been buried with the wealthy to continue their services in the other world. Bloody ceremonies in which human beings or animals were the victims were not at all uncommon. As a step towards moralization, the practice of putting effigies instead of wives and servants into tombs was begun. The realization that the departed have no need for our human offerings of food and clothing gradually dawned on men as the process of moralizing the hereafter proceeded.

One form in which morals affect the ideas of the hereafter is in regard to social distinctions. Many people believe that such distinctions are perpetuated in the other world. Thus the extra-human world came

to be divided into two realms on moral grounds: heaven was a place where the good are rewarded and worthy aspirations fulfilled, and hell a place in which the results of tabu are raised to cosmic significance and guilty men receive the just fruit of their sins. In the earlier usages, however, goodness and sinfulness were conceived as ceremonially religious rather than moral. The good man was he who had been meticulously careful to observe all the requirements of ceremonial custom, and the evil those who disregarded that obligation. Among the Hindus such rewards and punishments are believed to be temporary, and it is believed that the souls return to the world later to inhabit other bodies.

The Egyptian religion affords an example of the moralizing of the future life. In an ancient song on *Retribution* in praise of the god Ptah, the poet says:

Beware of Ptah, the Lord of Justice,
Behold he doth not overlook the wrong deed of any
man.
Abstain from pronouncing Ptah's name wrongly,
Lo, he who pronounceth it wrongly,
Behold, he goeth to destruction.⁴⁰

But in the time when *The Book of the Dead* was written the future was determined by moral elements rather than such details as the pronounciation of a god's name. Osiris is portrayed as the dispenser of justice. The hearts of men are weighed in balances against the feather of an ostrich, symbol of Truth,

⁴⁰ In *Anthology of Ancient Egyptian Poems* compiled by C. E. Sharpley, Wisdom of the East Series, p. 85.

while Thoth records the verdict. There is still left some of the tendency to determine the future on a ceremonial and formal basis, but the moralizing influence is decidedly at work.

In the higher religions the belief in immortality is associated with the doctrine of redemption. The desire for salvation from all those hindrances which prevent man from realizing his best self and enjoying communion with God, moved men to understand that such desires would not be fulfilled in the present. They were associated with the belief in the future. The type of salvation that is promised varies in accordance with the character of the evils from which it is desired to escape, and the character of the values it is hoped to realize. In India the desire is to escape from the inexorable working of karma, to so live that that karma may be destroyed. Salvation is thus release from the fruit of action and from the endless round of existences, when at last the individual soul (*atman*) realizes its oneness with the world-soul (*Brahman*). In Christianity the longing is for escape from sin, moral evil being the one insurmountable barrier to perfect communion with God. The heart of the Christian view of the future is summed up in Jesus' words: "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God."

IV

The service of religion to morality is preëminently that of completing and fulfilling the demands and ideals that morality posits. Although morality has developed within the sphere of man's attitudes towards

his fellow men, its implications carry him beyond that sphere. If he believes that the cosmic order is a moral order, then God is necessary. Kant expressed this truth by saying: "Unless there is to be a dualism in the universe, I must believe in a power adequate to bridge the gap between the moral ideal and fact." We may not find it necessary to assume with Kant a diremption between the realm of nature and the moral realm, the phenomenal world and the noumenal world, and therefore to assume that God is the bridge for the metaphysical gap. Apparently Kant's convictions carried him further than his theory. He believed that the moral order was objectively valid, belonged to the world of reality, and that ultimately reality must be considered as one. And his great service was in demonstrating that the moral life is incomplete unless we recognize it as belonging to a realm of ends.

If we postulate the validity of the moral ideal (and any other supposition would lead to pessimism), then we must make demands on the universe. We must assume that we are of such a character and that the universe is of such a character that moral ends are possible of achievement. We must believe that the moral man has a right to feel at home in the world, that in it he can find opportunity and even inspiration as he seeks to achieve goodness. D. Hume said: "In many views of the universe, and of its parts, particularly the latter, the beauty and fitness of final causes strike us with such irresistible force, that all objections appear (what I believe they really are) mere cavils and sophisms, nor can we imagine

how it was even possible for us to repose any weight on them." ⁸⁰ Progress in the direction of the chosen ideal depends on more than mere subjective processes. There are environing forces that are beyond the control of the human will, and if man were to feel that these forces, the natural and cosmic forces, were set against the individual who is struggling morally, it would take the heart out of his endeavours. The very core of morality depends on faith in the improvability and salvability of human nature, a faith that demands a friendly universe.

The function of religion for morals is to provide an ideal and inspire faith in that ideal which beckons the moral man on and on. Höffding has a most striking paragraph on the services of religion to morality.

There can be no doubt, then [he says], that faith in the conservation of values itself possesses value when it appears as a practical belief which, through the attempt to verify itself, incites to action. It also contains an element of consolation, for it raises our minds above the limited and finite. But the fact that religion is becoming increasingly significant as a means of consolation and that this point of view is so strongly emphasized are signs of its altered position in the spiritual life. Religion was once the pillar of fire which went before the human race in its great march through history, showing it the way. Now it is fast assuming the rôle of the ambulance which follows in the rear and picks up the exhausted and the wounded. But this, too, is a great work. It is, however, not sufficient; and when religion has disburdened herself of all her dead values, she will once more, in intimate association with ethics, rise to be a power which leads men forward.⁸¹

⁸⁰ *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, p. 141.

⁸¹ *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 346.

The link that connects religion with morality is forged by faith. We cannot prove with mathematical exactitude or logical precision that the envioning universe is our friend as we struggle to attain our ideals. We cannot satisfy the Cartesian demand for certainty. Nevertheless such faith furnishes us with a much more reasonable interpretation of the universe than we could obtain in any other way. To suppose that the universe is a vast machine grinding out destinies, as we have seen, is benumbing to ethics and religion alike. To find the meaning of the world in a fairy tale would be to believe in a make-believe world from which experience would soon extricate us with a rude shock. But the hypothesis that the universe is grounded in goodness, and that it provides a real sphere for moral struggle and heroic effort and lends its support to the moral man, is a view of the universe that is more meaningful and more serviceable. The hypothesis that the universe is unfriendly to moral struggle encounters greater difficulties because it has to overlook some of the most significant facts of experience, at the same time that it fails to satisfy the main test of a good hypothesis—the ability to make deductions from it that would serve the ends of the moral life. William James was right in delineating the logic of determinism which attempts to veto the rights of faith as a “pretended logic.”

Ethics itself is unable to give us positive assurance that the moral struggle is sure to issue in the victory of the right and the defeat of the wrong. To be sure there are a few brave souls who say that man ought to be willing to maintain the struggle for its own

sake, and let it be its own reward, even though there is no assurance of a friendly universe. But the majority of men feel that without such an assurance the moral struggle would be destitute of meaning. Whence then is to come the assurance that the moral man needs? It is only religious faith that can furnish the reënforcement that the ethical consciousness needs a faith that maintains that the ultimate destiny of the universe is in the control of a good God. The religious consciousness asserts explicitly what the moral consciousness assumes implicitly. Moral faith proceeds on the assumption that there is a *summum bonum*, an ultimate ideal, a goal of all striving. The religious consciousness finds that ideal and goal in God. God is the supreme and personal Will, the Guarantor of the validity of moral values and of the reality of the moral ideal. Belief in a moral order is founded on a faith in one who is the author and guarantor of its values. From such a point of view the moral life may be considered as a temporal aspect of the religious, and as achieving its own ends only in and through religion. Moral values merge inevitably into the religious. The crown of morality is religion.

Morality as such is not concerned directly with the supermundane order of things. It is an attitude towards the human factor in the environment. Yet the validity of its ideals and values rests on a basis that is more than human. The adequacy of morality depends partially on the recognition of its own inadequacy apart from religion. As Principal Jacks says:

Morality must have a cosmic motive or, philosophically, it has none. We belong to the universe, bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh; and it cannot be our duty to make the interests of mankind the supreme object of endeavour if the universe of which we are parts sets us the example of indifference to those interests or of hostility to them. The moral agent needs to know that Reality, or the Universe, is on his side in this matter: on his side not merely in the sense that it gives him a blind and unconscious support, in the course of evolution or otherwise, but that it regards him with sympathy and approval, that it responds to his loyalty, and is as truly determined not to betray him as he to be faithful to it. For goodness is essentially a coöperative enterprise between man and the world in which he lives, and could never be sustained for long in an environment whose innermost nature was devoid of the spirit and the motives which sustain the good man in his work. The Universe must needs be moral towards us in the same sense that we are moral towards it. Without this assurance of spiritual reciprocity the underlying motive of our moral interests is lacking. So far as Religion can give this assurance it has a vital connection with Ethic.⁵²

The question of the relation between morals and religion involves not only the matter of rationalizing the meaning of the moral life, but the acquisition of moral power. The conviction that the moral ideal, if it be more than chimerical, depends ultimately on a religious foundation is not merely a matter of speculative interest, but is one of profound practical concern. Human experience drives home the sense of uncertainty and delinquency. Like St. Paul, we fail

⁵² "Morals and Religion," art. *The Hibbert Journal*, July 1921, p. 619.

to do the good that we want to do, and we commit the very wrongs we do not want to do. We experience, with Kant, a gap between the moral ideal and fact. The practical search is for a power that will enable us to achieve our own ideals, to overcome evil with good. Since the ideal is cosmic in its reference, the power by which it can be attained must also be cosmic in its scope. There is thus an inescapable pragmatic reason for bringing morality and religion into association.

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For my part [says Principal Jacks], I have no hesitation in confessing that my search for moral *truth* is coincident with my search for moral *power*. Here we are finding truth to whatever extent we are finding power, and vice versa. Equally we are in error so far as any conclusions we may reach leave the Right less urgent or the Good less attractive. My interest in the present inquiry lies in the hope that by connecting Religion with Ethics a new motive may be liberated, or an old motive strengthened, which may cause somebody, conceivably myself, to embark with increased energy on the moral life. . . . Religion creates motives which are strong enough to overcome the enormous difficulties involved in living the good life, even in its simpler forms, and adequate to maintain that continuous improvement of the Moral Ideal which is the alternative to its deterioration."¹

The consciousness of embarking on an enterprise that is nothing short of cosmic in its significance, and of being in coöperation with God in His work of redeeming the world from moral evil, and of growing increasingly into Godlike characters assuredly gives an impulse to moral struggle that would be in

¹ Ibid., pp. 616, 617.

any other case impossible. It gives the supreme motive for the social tasks of bettering the world. It reënforces the will to be good on the part of the individual. It supplies a criterion for moral judgment which cannot be ignored. It keeps religion in intimate contact with the facts of life and the problems of life. It cements the alliance between God and man in a community of purpose.

CHAPTER VI

RELIGION DIFFERENTIATED

THE available evidence seems to show that religion is ineradicably grounded in human nature. We find the religious attitude emerging among all peoples and in all stages of culture. The inveterateness of religious phenomena would seem to establish beyond a peradventure the universal experience of its serviceableness to human life. Once in a while some one comes forward with the announcement that he has discovered a group of people destitute of religion. But always on closer investigation it has been ascertained that there were some crude cult practices, some meager beginnings of a religion with which the observer had failed to reckon. The mistake is usually made because the observer is tempted to approach his task with *a priori* notions of the nature of religion which preclude the observed phenomena. In its most primitive forms the religious attitude forms one element in an undifferentiated continuum, and if one is looking for the completely differentiated attitude at a stage too primitive for the reflective process to have attained such discrimination, he is likely to be disappointed. History does not record a time, be it never so remote, when men lived without experiencing the need, and achieving some expression answering to their felt need

of a religion. Even prehistoric human remains can only be interpreted satisfactorily on the hypothesis that pre-cultural man was religious. Doubtless the religious attitude was less defined and more inclusive among the ancients than it is for most modern people. The lines of demarcation between religious phenomena and other social facts were more vague among peoples of lower culture. Even that is evidence of the fact that the religious experience is practically coextensive with the human race.

The inclusiveness or exclusiveness with which social phenomena are treated is determined by the scope of one's definitions. It is possible to define religion so broadly that it will include all the facts of social experience, morality, politics, business, recreation, and indeed everything whereby the group is attempting to achieve or to conserve some value.¹ For such a definition the political mass meeting, harangued to excitement by an agitator, and the football match with its surging, cheering crowds have the same flavour as a religious gathering. Certainly these are also attempts of the group to give expression to an experienced need and to conserve something of worth. Yet there are surely clear enough distinctions in the ways through which such attempts have been made to enable us to differentiate more sharply between religious facts and other social facts. However, religion has suffered more frequently and more deplorably at the hands of those

¹ E. S. Ames in *The Psychology of Religious Experience* says, "The religious consciousness is identified with the consciousness of the greatest values of life" (p. 168). "Religion is identified with the fullest and most intense social consciousness" (p. 197).

whose definitions were too exclusive. It has too often been the practice to define religion in terms of one's own experience, and the breadth of the individual's experience is exceedingly variable. The inevitable result of narrowing the content of religion is that one frequently comes into contact with phenomena that are inexplicable on any other basis. Early Buddhism has been the great stumbling block in the way of definitions of religion, and some have tried to escape by declaring it to be a philosophy but not a religion. But surely the history of Buddhism is a history of religious development. If there be little or nothing said about the gods in the Hinayana period, the omission is more than made good in the Mahayana and Tantrayana periods. The student of Buddhism may discern the presence of a real religious yearning, a yearning for inner peace through right relations with the cosmic environment in a purer form, with less of an admixture of psychological and theological speculation, in the earlier than in the later stages of Buddhistic development. So that a definition of religion that precludes Buddhism is inadequate.

The facts of religious experience are so multiform that the formulation of a definition of religion is exceedingly difficult. When an examination is made of the variety of definitions that have been attempted, it becomes apparent at once that there is very little unanimity among investigators. Sometimes the individual aspect is made predominant and sometimes the social; now the intellectual or doctrinal element bulks large, now the emotional and again the active or cult side; the interest with some is psychological and valu-

ational, and with others it is metaphysical and ontological. This much is obvious, that if any concrete universal is achieved, it will not be through emphasizing either doctrine or cult, for it is in these spheres that we encounter the most bewildering variety of manifestations. The problem of finding the common element in the crude magico-religious rites of primitive culture, the highly liturgical services of Catholic Christianity, the revivalist campaigns of evangelical Christianity, the philosophical speculations of Brahmanism, the rigorous demands of Islam, and the ethical doctrines of Buddhism or Confucianism is the problem that confronts the person who would define religion.² Even within the individual religions the variety of phenomena is sometimes perplexing. Popular Hinduism with its medley of survivals, animistic and magical, and philosophical Hinduism, so far as externals are concerned, have very little in common. A few years ago *The Leader* of Allahabad conducted a symposium to which many eminent Hindus contributed their views on *The Essentials of Hinduism*.³ There were several who voiced their difficulty in the matter owing to the broad range of beliefs and practices within Hinduism. The one item on which there was con-

² Principal John Oman trenchantly remarks: "In religion, as in all else, we ought to try to distinguish what belongs to it as such from what is merely imported into it by imperfect human nature. . . . In a general study of the subject we have to conceive religion widely enough to include both St. Francis and the Grand Inquisitor as religious men, just as, in a general study of politics, we have to include Abraham Lincoln and Boss Croker as politicians." "*The Sphere of Religion*," in *Science, Religion and Reality*, edited by Joseph Needham, p. 267.

³ *The Essentials of Hinduism* (collected and published by G. A. Natesan and Co., Madras).

siderable unanimity was that one must be born a Hindu. The same difficulty would undoubtedly be felt if one were to conduct a symposium on the essentials of any other religion. Now the task of the logic of religion is to identify the essentials not of a particular religion, but of religion, a task of still greater difficulty. Certainly the essential element is not to be found in an external practice or belief, for as soon as an attempt is made to define on that basis, one is confronted with a residue of unexplained facts. The only evidence of a common element is in the attitude of consciousness that induces men under varying circumstances to develop such widely different beliefs and rites. The logic of religion must be psychological because the material which it has to interpret is mental and spiritual.

To identify the essence of religion in the sphere of the attitudes is not equivalent to reducing religious experience to mere subjectivism or positivism. The religious attitude, like the scientific and the moral, has its external reference. "The knowledge of our own attitudes and of the operation of the nervous system," says John Dewey, "is no more a substitute for the direct operation of the things than metabolic processes are a substitute for food materials. In the one case as in the other we have become acquainted with an added *object*; and by means of this added object further active relationships with the extra-personal world are instituted." ⁴ Although we have all along been emphasizing the psychological and social aspects of religious experience, we do not mean with

⁴ *Experience and Nature*, p. 24.

Berkeley that "all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth . . . have not any subsistence without a mind, that their being is to be perceived as known." ^a The historic religions all have their sacred places, persons, times, seasons and ceremonials, and the study of their development indicates that the cult side is primordial, the emotional and doctrinal being later. In acknowledging the presence of a subjective element, we do not thereby confess that religious experience is any the less valuable. The differentiation of religion as an attitude of a particular type, similar to the manner of distinguishing the marks of science, art, and morality, is part of a general tendency to shift from a static and structural view of life to one that is dynamic and functional. Experience is not content but process, not something experienced but experiencing. The attitudes and the dispositions are organically and functionally significant, having an objective reference towards something beyond or external to themselves. Worship, prayer, faith, belief, mystical communion, reverence and love are not mere states of consciousness, but active expressions of a religious attitude towards extra-human objects of reference.

Professor Lloyd Morgan in the second series of his Gifford Lectures ^a lays stress on the differentiation of religion within the sphere of the attitudes. It is his ambition to work out a monistic interpretation of the universe, and he makes use of the concept of evolution for that purpose. The world at large exhibits various arrays of facts, "(1) an array of physico-

^a *Principles of Human Knowledge*, art. vi.

^a *Life, Mind and Spirit* (1926).

chemical events, (2) an array of vital events which occur only in organisms, (3) an array of mental events which occur only in some organisms—those which we commonly speak of as conscious.”⁷ His contention is that in vital events there emerges a new kind of relatedness not obtainable at the lower level of physico-chemical events. Similarly in mental events there is a kind of relatedness which is supervenient to that appearing in either physico-chemical or vital events. In the same way that vitality is supervenient to physico-chemical action and mentality is supervenient to vitality, he suggests that the religious attitude is a still more highly emergent attitude. As mentality is higher than mere vitality, so spirituality is higher than mere mentality. This interpretation has the merit of making the religious attitude appear naturally. What is usually called the supernatural is but a supervenient phase in a naturalistic scheme. Spiritual value is a higher order, emanating from a newly emergent attitude of mind, but it does not belong to another world. What then is this religious attitude? Lloyd Morgan describes it as the attitude in which Divine Purpose is recognized in the ascending hierarchy of stages of progress, each stage being in turn supervenient or supernatural to that which precedes it. The religious person sees the entire process as the working of God, the religious attitude being supervenient to all, though there be no antagonism among the stages. Religious value is not antagonistic to utility, truth, beauty or goodness, yet it supersedes them all. This

⁷ C. Lloyd Morgan, “A Philosophy of Evolution,” in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, edited by J. H. Muirhead, I, p. 298.

is Lloyd Morgan's interpretation of the religious attitude.

The validity of the religious attitude may be tested by determining to what extent it brings us into contact with and gives us knowledge of reality. It would be a strange and confusing world indeed if we were required to think of truth, goodness, beauty, love, piety and God as less real than syllogisms, children, landscapes and temples. But, as Dr. Dewey says, "whether the loved and the devotional objects have all the qualities which the lover and the devout worshipper attribute to them is a matter to be settled by evidence, and evidence is always extrinsic." ^a Now the concrete experiences of humanity throughout the course of history have furnished cumulative evidence in support of the belief that the religious attitude brings us into contact with reality. There are in the main two possible attitudes which man can assume towards his environing cosmos, the one mechanistic and the other social. When he treats it as a machine, manipulating, experimenting, analyzing, classifying and explaining, he finds that such treatment rewards him with a body of truth which he calls science and which enables him to control it better for certain of his ends. On the other hand he can learn to what extent the universe is capable and willing to respond to his socializing attitude only by worship and prayer. The fact that he gains reënforcement for his spiritual ambitions and strength for his moral endeavours is the best possible evidence that the religious attitude has put him in touch with reality, and with a phase

^a *Experience and Nature*, pp. 17 f.

of reality that he could never come to know by any other means. The experiences of divine grace, forgiveness of sins, and mystic communion are really the responses of God to the religious attitude as the experience of conjugal felicity is the outcome of mutual attitudes of love in the husband and wife. The religious attitude by making possible the achievement of certain knowledge about reality otherwise unattainable has amply justified the claim of validity which we make on its behalf.

The outstanding feature of the religious attitude is its social character. All people when they are religious in some manner or other assume a social attitude. To be sure, the business of socializing finds expression in a variety of ways, but the one element in common is the social. Now, a social attitude is possible only between persons, or in a person who personifies something outside of him so that he can socialize with it. In religion, the world with which man enters into social relations is bigger, more comprehensive than the sphere of the merely human. He may not always reason, as the Hebrew or the Christian, that there is a personal power behind the phenomenal world with which it is possible to have social dealings. But rites and ceremonies, prayer and worship and mystic communion are evidence that man treats his environing universe as though it were amenable to social advances, whether or not he be conscious of the significance of his conduct.

The ceremonials of primitive peoples furnish a fair illustration. These are customs and rites, as has been shown, which the group practises under the authority

of its head men with the aim of reënforcing the life and activities of the group, and controlling forces extraneous to it. There is a bewildering variety of rites, some mimetic, some sympathetic, but all of them dramatic and symbolic. Many of them are meticulously performed because of the fear of some dire calamity overtaking the group. Life is teeming with hazards and perils. The religion of primitive man is one of his attempts to overcome the sense of precariousness and uncertainty, and the means employed are expiation and propitiation. Many rites are designed to function privately, i.e., to prevent some evil or danger that threatens the group. Others are sympathetic in the belief that like begets like, so that desirable results can be secured by preparing the kind of atmosphere or environment in which such things can happen. Others are mimetic on the supposition that a dramatic enactment, imitative of the rain that is needed or the victorious battle that is wanted, will induce the desired end. In some instances deities are invoked who are thought to preside over the particular departments of collective life, at times the idol representing the deity being brought from its accustomed place and given a place of importance in the enacted ceremonial. A sense of dependence and a desire to effect helpful social relationship with the extra-human power is always present, even when the object of dependence is not consciously defined. It is unreasonable to suppose that the group would go through the enactment of its mimetic rites and symbolic ceremonials with such precision and care solely because of the entertainment offered through the

drama. If it were only an undertaking for pleasure, the elements of fear and caution as to details would scarcely be so persistent and prominent. The performance of the ceremonial is obviously a project which the group regards as of ampler significance than that of the drama for its own sake. It is regarded as of present value in ensuring helpful relationships with the god-world, as well as influential in helping to determine the course of future events. It has the marks of a recognition, even though it be not articulate, of an external power or powers the assistance of which may be made available by the correct enactment of the ceremonial. In a great many cases this power is consciously recognized, is personified, and an effort is made by expiation and propitiation to gain the coöperation of the personified power. In any case, the ceremonial is the consequent of an attitude that is essentially social towards the larger, the more-than-human environment.

The social character of the religious attitude continues to claim recognition in the more developed ethnic faiths. In the case of such religions as those of Greece, Rome, Egypt, and Babylonia, in popular Hinduism and popular Buddhism we have a mass of more or less complex polytheistic and idolatrous rites. In such cases the situation is fairly clear. The personification and deification of nature powers, animals, the dead, abstract characteristics, and even of humanly wrought utensils and images are evidence of the social attitude that expresses itself otherwise in the ceremonial. Sacrificial offerings, votive offerings, sacred meals, collective dances, and songs, and ascetic con-

temptation are further manifestations of the group's desire to enter into desirable social relationships with the world that transcends the human.

The mystery religions of the Græco-Roman world furnish us with another fascinating chapter in the story of religion. These religions purported to offer to men as individuals a way of escape from the perils of the present and the dangers of the future, and the blessed redemption which they promised to men was through union with a particular deity which their mythology portrayed as having achieved a glorious victory, enabling it to assist men to a triumphant conclusion. "A mystery religion," says Dr. S. Angus, "was a religion of redemption which professed to remove estrangement between man and God, to procure forgiveness of sins, to furnish mediation. Means of purification and formulæ of access to God, and acclamations of confidence and victory were part of the apparatus of every mystery."⁹ The mystery religions were characterized by acts of a sacramental, dramatic nature, as for example the initiation ceremony. This rite was designed to bring into existence a spirit of unity between the person being initiated and the triumphant deity. In most instances the deity, with whom union was thus sought, was regarded as having experienced death and resurrection, and hence able to insure for his devotees a triumphal issue over the powers of the nether world. This was without doubt symbolic of the change of the seasons, the passing from the winter to the spring, a matter of first concern to agricultural peoples. The mystery cults

⁹ *The Mystery Religions and Christianity*, p. 50.

through their impressive symbolism appealed to the imagination, aroused the emotions, and promoted spiritual aspiration. But the gods of the mysteries were regarded as of cosmic significance, so that we have here another of the concrete attempts of man to get into helpful social relationships with powers believed to be able to provide the satisfaction for felt needs.

The goal of mysticism is union with God. All of the mystics describe the final stage of the mystic experience as unitive. It matters not in what terms the mystic describes the ineffable with whom he is entering into union, the culmination of the process is always union, and the entire experience is intensely social. Sometimes mysticism is conceived philosophically and theoretically, and at other times religiously and practically. In some instances the thought is of an overmastering power, immanent in the universe, with whom the mystic communes as soul with soul. Other mystics interpret the power with which they seek to commune as identical with the universe, i.e., pantheistically, and aim at ultimate absorption in that all-pervading life. The Persian Sufi may be taken as a typical mystic. The goal of his endeavour is to realize his essential oneness with God, which is the loveliest experience possible to man, transforming his character into one like that of God. "As the rain-drop absorbed in the ocean is not annihilated but ceases to exist individually, so the disembodied soul becomes indistinguishable from the universal Deity.

. . . To be united, here and now, with the World-soul is the utmost imaginable bliss for souls that love

each other on earth." ¹⁰ The mystic yearns for the knowledge and enjoyment of God through union with him, whether he be conceived as transcendent or as corresponding to the world. Yet even in the case of those who, like Christians and Muslims, think of God as transcendent, the language through which they depict the mystic experience is very like the language of pantheistic absorption.

The sustaining elements of the great theistic religions are of a social nature. Whether we think of the propitiatory sacrifice, the votive offering, the hymn of praise, or the suppliant prayer, the end of worship as its beginning is to impart to the worshipper a sense of union and communion with God, or so to prepare the way that he may be the recipient of such blessings as the Deity may be disposed to grant. This "business with the gods" calls forth an extensive range of manifestations including gratitude, homage, submission, supplication, expiation, propitiation, etc., but behind the ritual, the liturgy and the ceremonial is the motive of gaining the approbation of the deity so as to enjoy his fellowship and his blessing. So the Hebrew prized the favour of Yahweh above all else. The Muhammadan religion is known as *Islam* which means complete surrender to the will of God, and the devotee is called a *Muslim* or one who has thus surrendered himself. In modern Hinduism nothing is more significant than *bhakti* or devotion which is invariably connected with a particular deity, such as Krishna-bhakti. In modern Buddhism one of the most striking features is faith in the Buddha Amit-

¹⁰ R. A. Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam*, p. 167.

abha, the bestower of boundless light and life. The Zoroastrian believes in a great cosmic conflict between the kingdom of goodness and light ruled by Ormazd and the domain of evil and darkness over which Ahriman presides, and further that it is the chief end of man to ally himself with the cause of Ormazd, an alliance made possible by a life of faith and purity. The religion of Jesus Christ is concerned before all else with establishing a condition of fellowship and harmony between God the Father and man his wayward son. That was what Jesus meant by "the kingdom of God." And that is what Christians conceive to be the *raison d'être* of the church.

There is an increasing number of people in all religions who agree that the highest manifestation of the religious life is love and the noblest conception of God is love. According to the late Professor Ward the realm of ends is a kingdom of love. He says, "So God is love. And what must that world be that is worthy of such love? The only worthy object of love is just love: it must then be a world that can love God. But love is free: in a ready-made world it could have no place. Only as we learn to know God do we learn to love him."¹¹

The evidence is not all in by any means. But the evidence adduced may be said to be representative of the main types of religious phenomena. No significant form of religious activity has been neglected. Look where we may, the same fact confronts us, the fact of the socializing character of the religious attitude. It has led Professor C. H. Toy to define

¹¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 153.

religion as "man's attitude towards the universe regarded as a social and ethical force; it is the sense of social solidarity with objects regarded as powers, and the institution of social relations with them."¹² The world of religion is not limited by the confines of the human, and with that more-than-human world its business is to help men in establishing helpful relationships.

The second significant characteristic of the religious attitude is that it is evaluational. It is essentially an attitude of appreciation and appraisal. This is the normal outcome of what has already been observed in regard to the social character of the attitude. As the environment comes to be related socially to the group or to the individual, there is a persistent endeavour to appreciate the significance of or to extract the meaning from events in such a way as to make them instrumental in the furtherance of human welfare. As Dr. Irving King expressed it, "Certain elements in the life of a people come to consciousness as having peculiar value, and therefore the religious attitude is a special case of the larger sense of value."¹³ And again, "The religious attitude is one in which appreciative and valuational elements predominate, particularly such as are determined by social intercourse and by a social atmosphere generally. If religion is the distinctive product of such conditions, it is not strange that the conceptions of worth, the valuational attitudes thus socially determined should be associated in some way with persons. In other words, social values could

¹² *Introduction to the History of Religions*, p. 1.

¹³ *The Development of Religion*, p. 215.

scarcely be perpetuated except in some sort of social terms."¹⁴ "The religious consciousness is an attitude built up about the larger meaning of experience which we *feel* but cannot *state* except in relatively vague symbolic terms."¹⁵ The peculiar social value to which the religious attitude gives expression is that of ministering to the spiritual and ethical reënforcement of the group or the individual by emphasizing the fact of a social relationship with the cosmic environment.

The reason that a belief functions is psychologically the same reason that a cult form functions in the life of a group or of an individual. It affords satisfaction for an experienced need, which is another way of saying that it gives expression to a value. Let it cease to be the expression of a value, and it will cease to exist as a belief, persisting, if at all, only as a superstition. A belief is never a superstition until it ceases to function as an expression of what the individual or the group regards as worthful. No people ever created a superstition as such. A superstition is an outworn belief, a form that no longer embodies a value.

The religious attitude is expressed in ways other than worship and doctrine. It is manifest in the constant endeavour to extract meaning from the events which comprise the experiences of life. It is not the task of the scientist, be he never so exact and thorough, to interpret the significance of events for life. His task, as we have seen, is that of explaining and classifying events with special attention to causal rela-

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 227.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 340.

tions. The fact is that the more a scientist includes of interpretation and evaluation in his explanations, the more his explanations themselves are likely to be discounted. The only interpretation allowed to him is what he may be able to achieve in the cold mechanical terms of science in the interests of more science, and the one value with which he is vitally concerned is truth. The artist's task is interpretative. He seeks to make an appraisal of his object in terms of beauty or dramatic expression. The moralist's task is interpretative. His procedure is to reckon value in terms of human relationships. And the religious man is an interpreter, the medium of evaluation being the social categories of cosmic relationships. The religious consciousness is concerned with the meaning and worth of events in consonance with the prevailing view of the relationship between man and his environing cosmos.

The need to extract meanings from events is especially pressing in the case of events of an untoward character. The average Indian villager offers a very good illustration of this tendency. If the crops are good and the family in good health, it is considered dangerous to make full and frank acknowledgment of such blessings as due to the favour of the gods. The very mention of them might break the charm, or draw the attention of some spiteful demon. But let the rains fail, the crops disappoint, famine imperil, sickness or death befall the household, or any other calamitous event happen, and there is at once a questioning of the meaning of the calamity. "What have I done that such a misfortune should come to me?"

"Why should God be angry with me?" In some such manner he questions the event for its meaning in the terms of his relationship with the deified powers which permit or send calamities or favours, adversities or prosperities, according to their will and pleasure.

The Buddhistic interpretation of life is epitomized in the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths. In the Sermon of Benares the Buddha is made to recount the experiences on which his conclusions were based. A hermit in the jungle, he encountered in turn a sick man, an old man and a corpse, from which he reasoned that the substance of life is expressed in disease, old age, and death. To live is to suffer. But suffering, he reasoned, is due to desire. Consequently the overcoming of desire is the way to gain relief from the ills of existence. Nirvana is that inner peaceful state wherein desires have been completely annulled, and one possesses the imperturbable assurance of deliverance attained. The way to Nirvana or the cessation of desire is the noble eightfold path, described as right views, right aspirations, right speech, right actions, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right meditation. Thus it is the first principle of Buddhism to interpret and appraise the events of life with a view to lightening the burdens to be borne in the future. The right attitude towards life and one's environment is the path that leads to the peace that passes all understanding.

One of the most familiar methods of interpretation which religion employs is to relate events to the will of God. Sometimes that means a kindly, loving will, and is the expression of a warm devotional type of

religion. Sometimes it is merely the language of fatalism, and represents a perfectly atomic way of interpreting the relationship between God and man. The orthodox Muslim finds in "Kismet" a ready interpretation for events of all kinds, beneficent as well as maleficent. Many Hindus readily refer events in a similar way to the will of God. The predestinarianism of the Calvinistic Christian is of a piece with the same method of interpretation. Fatalism really evades the question at issue by declaring under a religious guise that an event is inscrutable. Nevertheless it has this to be said for it—it finds the meaning and worth of events in terms of the will of a supermundane power on whom man depends.

Most of the historic religions disclose a variety of methods of interpreting the phenomena of life. This is true of Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism. Among those who call themselves Christian are to be numbered some who emphasize mysticism, some sacramentalism, some doctrinal orthodoxy, some liturgical formalism, some confessionalism, some ecstatic manifestations, some asceticism, others individual conversion, and still others social and ethical reconstruction, while quite a number are content with attendance on public worship or mere respectability. Yet all of them lay claim to the Christian name, and profess to be interpreting the world from the Christian point of view. Perhaps the most inclusive definition of the Christian view of life would be to make such interpretations and evaluations of its events as will help to a life increasingly in harmony with the mind of Jesus. The greatest gift of Jesus to the world was

a way of life, a criterion of worth. And in some manner or other all so-called Christians are attempting an interpretation and evaluation of life in terms of such a world view.

The worth of religion is that it offers a way of escape from banality, precariousness and evil. The contingencies and vicissitudes of experience fill us with a sense of instability. Our own human nature reaches out for a basis for certainty beyond anything which it is itself able to satisfy. To some extent art comes to the service of men, and offers a method of escape, but even the beauty which art creates does not meet the deepest human needs. Beauty is satisfying only when it is coördinated with the good and the true in the object of our faith. But religion which dares to despise the contingencies of experience, and exclaim, "Lord, though Thou slay me, yet will I trust Thee," answers to the deepest needs of the heart. It means an identification of ourselves with the extra-human in a way that gives a new value to experience and nature. The evidence that the value of religion is real and objective is that the universe reveals its secrets to the man whose heart goes forth in worship and communion to God as it does not under any other circumstances.

It is the function of interpretation so to describe the meaning of an event that its personal and social consequences will be disclosed. The event is expected to issue in some sort of overt action, and the appraisal is made as a guide or aid in determining the probable outcome of the action. It is characteristic of religion that it interprets events so that through them no values may be jeopardized, and especially that the events

may be made to contribute positively to the enrichment of life. The religious judgment is thus a judgment of worth on the basis of our cosmic social relationships, the criterion being human welfare. Principal Jacks once described religion as "the soul's ultimatum to the universe. If in one sense religion is the humblest of attitudes, in a deeper sense it is the most exalted. It claims to overcome the world, and to put all things under its feet. Religion is content with nothing less than the absolute submission of the entire range of human experience to itself."¹⁸

Our ideals are categories of value. Indeed our consideration of values is always with reference to ideals or standards of goodness, truth or beauty. Our attainments are evaluated with reference to their approximation or otherwise to those ideals which we have set before ourselves. Unless we conclude that our ideals are chimerical and that the entire range of our spiritual desires represents nothing but figments of the imagination, we must believe in an ideal order as the condition of actualized goodness and truth. Our ideals are like guiding stars that illumine the way and keep our feet travelling in the direction of the better. The service of religion in keeping alive the consciousness of the ideal, and in imparting assurance of the reality of the ideal, is indispensable. There is a comfort and an inspiration in the confidence that there is as Matthew Arnold expressed it, "a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness." The universe has within it more than we can comprehend or measure by scientific technique. We do wrong if we treat it as though

¹⁸ "Credo," art. *The Hibbert Journal*, VII, p. 481.

it sprang from us instead of realizing that we sprang from it. It is big enough to include and even to transcend our highest aspirations and most noble ideals. Indeed they owe their significance to its transcendent values. We owe this confidence to religion more than to anything else—to God who is the summation and the guarantor of all that we cherish as valuable. In God all value lives, and moves and has its being.

The third observation that we desire to make about the religious attitude is that it is an attitude of faith and participation rather than of demonstration and criticism. This is what marks it off so differentially from the scientific attitude. The scientist is concerned with such things as categories, explanations, analyses, classifications, criticisms and demonstrations. But the religious consciousness never realizes itself by any of these channels. The world with which the religious consciousness is concerned to establish helpful relationships is not bounded by human restrictions. Its experiences are with more than can be seen, touched, or heard, more than can be known through the sensory channels, more than can be described within the confines of the syllogism, more than can be demonstrated. And yet its experiences are characterized by reality and validity just as surely as anything scientific. The difference is rather a qualitative difference; they are experiences in the realm of faith and participation rather than proof and criticism.

The attitude of faith stands in peculiar contrast to the logical attitude in that it is creative and adventurous, whereas logic is simply affirmative and critical. That does not mean that faith can create anything or

make any venture which would contradict science. But the values and experience with which faith is concerned are of such a character that science can neither affirm nor deny them. It is only by making the venture of faith that we can understand the universe to be in the hands of a good God, a kind Father. Logic cannot affirm this as true because its instruments are not designed to deal with or criticize such experiences. But neither can logic deny it because such a faith is in harmony with a rational interpretation of the universe, and satisfies the most deep-seated needs of the human race. As Dr. Ward put it: "The existence of this Creative Spirit is matter of faith not of knowledge, to be sure; but may we not hold it to be a rational faith, since without it we are without assured hope in a world that is then without clear meaning?" ¹⁷

One of the most persistent aspects of faith is the conviction that present experience is an inadequate measure of reality. But how are we to transcend experience? It must be by faith. We can learn that there is a power, not ourselves, with whom we can commune and who is the guarantor of our values, only by the venture of faith. It is an instinctive tendency of human nature to pry into the unknown and learn its secrets and mysteries. We see it in the gamester who risks his fortune on the fall of the dice. We see it in the scientist who persists in his laboratory experiments in the pursuit of knowledge. And we see it in its most spiritual form in the faith of the man who makes great adventures, accepting all hazards for the sake of spiritual values which he hopes to achieve. In this

¹⁷ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 422 f.

sense we may speak of faith as the mother of progress. Were it not for men and women of faith who believe that they can make tomorrow better than today and act on the impulse of their faith, the world would not move forward. But the man of faith, even in the face of the most discouraging experiences in the past, and in spite of the most dismal failures of the past, persists in the adventure of faith. The man of faith refuses to believe that nine hundred and ninety-nine failures spell ultimate failure. He is willing to take the one-thousandth risk, in the confidence that he will eventually succeed.

Faith operates sometimes in seeming defiance of the usual methods of human calculation. It will not always accept the judgments of history, because history can deal only with the past, and faith believes in the possibility of regenerated futures. It does not always accept the verdicts of law, still maintaining the possibility of thoroughly regenerating human nature. It does not acquiesce in all the findings of the laboratory, for human nature cannot be measured only mechanically. It declares that the higher values transcend mathematical methods of calculation. It asserts that man does not live by syllogisms only, but by the love of God and the power of God. It is willing to make the great adventure that the light that lights our pathway is unquenchable, that the moral and spiritual tasks that urge us forward are incomparably worth while, and that the moral struggle must issue in ultimate victory.

The chief end of religion is to be a ministrant of life, in the language of the founder of Christianity to give

us the more abundant life. The life to which it ministers cannot be restricted either by the limits of human relationships or the boundaries of temporal conditions. It looks beyond the *now* as well as beyond the *here*. It is concerned with the future as well as with the present. It matters not where we look, we find this element constantly appearing in the world religions. The American Indian looks forward to a happy hunting ground where game shall abound and his faithful dog shall be his companion; such is his delineation of heaven. The Hindu conceives of a future *moksha* or happiness in terms of the absorption of his *atman* or soul in the cosmic *Brahman* or world-soul. The Buddhist keeps his attention focussed on *Nirvana*, when by the suppression of desire, the age-long ground of suffering, he shall attain at last to that peace and contentment which are possible only when the self and its passions are mastered. The Muslim paints his ideal future on the basis of the Jewish and Christian conceptions of heaven and hell that Muhammad found current in the Arabia of his day with an intensification of the elements which would appeal to the sensuous imagination. So also the Christian literature of all times has reflected the persistence of the Christian hope of a heaven for the righteous and belief concerning a hell for the unrepentant. Faith always asserts that the future holds in store something of pain or pleasure that will surpass anything ever experienced. Its heaven is a portrayal of the ideal happiness, the *summum bonum*, in terms of a hope to be realized. There is no doubt that this is one of the most powerful reasons for the inveterateness of religion. It minis-

ters to the abundant life of humanity by keeping alive the fires of a hope more blessed than any achievement of the past or experience of the present. It has helped man to persevere in "the struggle for existence" by keeping before him a goal worthy of his struggle. "Aye, but a man's reach must exceed his grasp, or what's a heaven for?"

The way to the attainment of the ideal, the achievement of a value is the way of faith. Faith sees the ideal which personality portrays to itself, and sets about making it a reality. In faith we often experience the powerful impetus from the ideal as though it were already present and realized. It is the link, the only available and only possible link between the ideal and the real, the medium through which the inexperienced becomes the experienced. Even more than that: it proposes to introduce us to new experiences in spite of the failures and discouragements of the past. In the first place it is by faith that we posit the reality of our ideal. Then it is by faith that we persist in the effort to realize it. When we find that such a faith is not only consistent with our philosophy of the universe, but has a power to inspire us to persist in our idealism, we have the best possible vindication of its validity.

Nowhere is it more apparent that it is the mission of faith to be a great crusader into a new country than in religion. If religion invariably beckons its devotees towards the hope of a better day to come, it also urges them to make the adventure that the better day may become a realized fact. The experiences of the past may dismay us. Logic may ridicule us.

Science may disdainfully smile at us. Nevertheless, unafraid and undismayed, we take the risk, we make the adventure, and if we do not actually attain, we at least come nearer the goal we have set before us, we feel the glow of a life that can be experienced only by faith, and we make the world that much better for our adventure.

Even the crudest, most primitive religions have called upon their adherents to make adventures. Mythology has had its accounts of the accomplishments and conquests of the heroes of the past through the power of certain deities. It was not unusual to have challenges on the part of the followers of one deity to those of another, as to which deity could best reward the adventurer. Such was the rivalry between Elijah and the prophets of the Canaanitish Baalim. Unchastened though it may be, even primitive religions constantly bear a summons to a life of faith. Krishna, Buddha, and Muhammad have been represented as calling upon men to make the adventure of faith, and promising to them appropriate rewards. Very frequently, the ceremonial has been enacted as a concrete expression of the spirit of adventurous faith to which the religion bore its challenge. None will gainsay that the message of Jesus of Nazareth was a challenge to faith. His own life was the greatest triumph of faith, great in its venture and great in its success. And the establishment of a heavenly kingdom among men was an adventure than which none has ever been more daring or more heroic.

Religion is indeed a matter of faith rather than proof. The savage cannot prove that he will win his

battle because of his fidelity to his war-god as evident in the war-dance, mimetic of the battle soon to be staged. But he believes the dance to be efficacious, and he acts on his faith. The Hindu cannot prove that the stopping of *Karma* will put an end to transmigration, and issue in absorption into the world-soul. But he believes that to be true and shapes his conduct accordingly. Neither can the Christian call on mathematics or logic to demonstrate the things which he believes. Yet he insists, with all the vehemence of heroic faith, that God is good, that the portrait which Jesus gave us of God is true, that good will ultimately issue triumphant from the world struggle, and that evil will eventually be subdued.

The religious attitude, for the express reason that it is one of the adventure towards an ideal, is one of participation. Just as soon as one steps outside of the practical group and engages in an analytical or critical task, just so soon does he cease to be religious and begin to be scientific. The scientific or critical attitude towards the phenomena of religion may be perfectly legitimate, if it be employed for logical ends. But it should not be mistaken for religion because it happens to have as its subject matter the material of religion. People are religious when they are actually engaged in some activity whether it be rite, ceremony, prayer, or service that is interpreted as a way of socializing with the enviroing universe. The religious person is himself an integral element in the religious situation. Let an individual or a group be so circumstanced that actual participation is no longer possible, and the activity loses its emotional tone, its

socializing character, and its ability to satisfy the experienced need. An activity takes on the character of religion for the participants; for the observers the same activity is scientific data, laboratory material.

We often commit an injustice against religion when we attempt to justify our beliefs as we would the doctrines of economics or of other sciences. We can never expect to demonstrate God, freedom, and immortality as we prove the propositions of geometry or the deductions of logic. As William James said, "There are cases where faith creates its own verifications." Yet it is certain that the religious man would be unwilling to admit that the knowledge he secures by faith or the reality he knows by faith is any less valid or certain than what might be secured by mathematical or logical processes. The methods of knowing may differ, but the reality and certainty of religious knowledge is able to stand the test of experience for truth and worth, just as surely as demonstrable knowledge.

The religious attitude is differentiated in human experience as the social attitude towards the extra-human environment. Within the sphere of this attitude arises our most transcendent conception of value. At the same time the attitude is one of adventurous faith and participation. We have endeavoured to show how the religious attitude has come to be differentiated from the magical, the scientific, the æsthetic and the moral. These differentiations have been achieved in the process of reflective social experience. They do not belong to the primitive and simple situations of life, but are the outcome of reflective interpre-

tations. Primitive life was on the psychological side an undifferentiated continuum, and with the process of reflection, religion came to be expressed in its characteristic attitude, as did also the other disciplines. Magic also belongs to that uncriticized continuum. Though on its occult side it has been to some extent a forerunner of religion, it is more specifically the precursor of science inasmuch as it is a decidedly mechanical attitude. Magic is pre-science rather than pre-religion. The scientific attitude is a mechanical attitude towards the extra-human whereas the religious is social. The former is concerned with explanation and the latter with interpretation. The first is more interested in quantitative measurements; the second in qualitative meanings. When we come to the æsthetic attitude, we encounter greater difficulty in differentiating it from religion because there are so many points in common. The æsthetic attitude is more highly imaginative; the religious is more assertive. The æsthetic attitude is less concerned than the religious with the reality or unreality of its object. Though the æsthetic attitude may have a social element, the religious attitude is more profoundly and necessarily social. Again there is a closer affinity between morals and religion than between morals and art. It is to religion rather than to art that morals must look for its completion. Many times it would seem that the distinction between the religious and æsthetic attitudes was rather a matter of degree than actual content. Finally we have observed that the distinction between the religious and moral attitudes consists mainly in the fact that in religion we socialize with

the extra-human, while in morality we socialize with the human element of the environment. All of the attitudes have emerged gradually from the primitive undifferentiated continuum, and owe their differentiation and whatever measure of definiteness they have attained to the processes of reflection within the social consciousness.

Man is perpetually in search for means whereby he can bring his environment under control for his own ends. Magic was a method of control in which the occult and the mechanical were brought together in the attempt to gain the desired object. Science attempts to apply the mechanical method and technique, making use of measurements, experiments and apparatus which will serve to make that type of control effectual. Morality is also a method of control, the object being human conduct which it is designed to regulate through a social technique. In the beginnings probably art served the ends of magic as a method of control, but latterly it is more concerned with so controlling the environment as to attain a maximum of beauty and a minimum of ugliness. Probably there is more of the attitude of sheer enjoyment in art than in anything else. The service of religion to man is also "that he may have dominion," and its social technique of worship and prayer is designed to effect such conditions as will secure a maximum of cosmic help for him in his tasks.

A further differentiation has been effected in the field of values. Of the various attitudes considered, science is the least concerned with extracting value or meaning, being much more interested in matters of

causal sequence. Yet even the scientist aims at truth. All that can be achieved by scientific means are fragments of truth, and a coherent view of truth can only be achieved when science is completed by philosophy or religion. The value for which the artist seeks is beauty, but like science, the experiences of art are piecemeal. There is nothing in art to afford ultimate satisfaction for the æsthetic attitude but only fragmentary experiences of satisfaction. Morality aims at goodness, but, as we have observed, requires for its completion and for its validation some such guarantee, as the religious consciousness finds in God, of the ultimate victory of goodness in the moral struggle. Neither science nor art nor morality are complete in themselves. They are in search for values which they cannot guarantee to be ultimate or valid. Religion completes and fulfills the aspirations of all of them in its portrait of God who combines truth, beauty and goodness in perfect measure. In so doing it furnishes a ground of validity to these fundamental values. Now the idea of God, which is the highest value conceived by man, is at once philosophically necessary and religiously satisfying. The conception of an eternally active Goodwill who coöperates with our frail humanity in the achievement of spiritual values makes the universe more intelligible and our knowledge of it more coherent. Whereas the fact that God answers our longings and supplications with positive help, that He goes before us to direct our path and follows behind to bind up our wounds, that He heals, consoles, protects and redeems us—this fact makes faith in God the most satisfying experience of our humanity. So

the idea of God is the summation and guarantee of all value. As Principal Jacks says: "To pass off religion as morality, art, science, singly or together is to mistake the viceroy for the monarch, and to ignore the hiding place of power."¹⁸

The religious attitude is undoubtedly the highest reach that the human consciousness has conceived. It is the finest idealizing attitude known to experience, summing up all the best that is known to science, art and morality, even completing them where they are imperfect, and giving to them a guarantee of validity. There is no attitude that man has assumed which has done so much to fill life full of meaning and purpose. There is none that satisfies the deepest felt needs of the spiritual nature of man. There is none that contributes more coherency and assurance to the philosopher, seeking for a rational view of the universe. We may agree with Edward Caird that, "Without as yet attempting to define religion, or to give any precise account of its characteristics, we may go so far as to say that man's religion is the expression of his ultimate attitude to the universe, the summed-up meaning and purport of his whole consciousness of things. . . . Whatever else religion may be, it undoubtedly is the sphere in which man's spiritual experience reaches its utmost concentration, in which if at all, he takes a definite attitude towards his whole natural and spiritual environment."¹⁹

In the concluding section of his work on *Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, Professor

¹⁸ "Credo," art *The Hibbert Journal*, VII, p. 481 ff.

¹⁹ *The Evolution of Religion*, I, p. 30.

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¹⁸ "Credo," art. *The Hibbert Journal*, VII, p. 481 ff.

¹⁹ *The Evolution of Religion*, I, p. 30.

Émile Boutroux says: "Faith, representation of an ideal, and enthusiasm—these are the three conditions of human action. But are they not, precisely, the three moments in the development of the religious spirit? Do not these three words express accurately the form that will, intellect, and feeling take under religious influence?"²² The point of view here put forward is in practical agreement with Boutroux. The consciousness of a social converse between man and God is what gives to us our enthusiasm and power, for the attainment of those ideals or values that we posit by faith. In all religions we find these three elements which reappear because they represent the ways in which man seeks to satisfy his fundamental needs. The first is a forward look, an effort to secure help in the endeavour to control the future. The second is an ideal, the presentation of our interpretation of the highest conceivable value for life. The third is a propelling force, a power through which the ideal is to be realized, and the future made secure. "And now abideth faith, hope, love. These are the great three, and the greatest of them is love."

²² P. 370 (trans. by J. Nield).

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